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John Trent/Laura Schnurr 
A United Nations Renaissance 
 
“Politicians, pundits, and publics are moving inward and building 
walls whereas addressing global threats requires moving outward and 
breaking down barriers. More than ever, multilateralism is essential 
for problem-solving, and more than ever we need a fitter-for-purpose 
United Nations. Trent and Schnurr provide a persuasive and user-
friendly introduction for a new generation of change-makers.” 
Thomas G. Weiss, Presidential Professor of Political Science, The 
CUNY Graduate Center, Past President International Studies 
Association 
 
 
“More than a simple forum or arena for confrontation of opposing 
interests, the United Nations must become an instrument for world 
governance. This excellent book, from Trent and Schnurr, goes a long 
way to push forward this idea.” 
Modesto Seara-Vazquez, Professor of International Organization, and 
Rector Oaxaca State University System, Mexico 
 
 
“The United Nations remains an essential global institution for 
advancing the values and practices of cooperation, development, and 
human rights, but it also needs reform; and especially it needs 
realistic proposals that give a way forward while still retaining and 
promoting the ideals of the Charter. This new volume places the UN 
in historical and contemporary perspective, identifies its critical 
strengths, challenges, and flaws in a balanced analysis, and suggests 
clear and constructive arguments and ideas for the changes that are 
needed.” 
Alistair Edgar, Professor of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier 
University, Executive Director, Academic Council on the United 
Nations System 
 
 
“The UN is being put to the test in today's jumbled and fractious 
global system. There is a foreboding over the growing trend among 
many member states including three of the permanent members of the 
Security Council towards anti - internationalist sentiments and the 
undermining of norms of global cooperation. As the title of this book 
signals, it is time for a UN Renaissance. This will only happen if there 
emerges a coalition of key member states, civil society groups, 
international institutions and good advocacy in the media and from 
the academic world. 
This book makes clear why this is such an important cause for our 
time. And its focus on mobilizing young people to the cause is a 
worthy recommendation.” 
Lloyd Axworthy, Past President, University of Winnipeg, former 
Foreign Minister of Canada 
 
 
“Global issues require well-functioning global institutions. The United 
Nations and it’s agencies are critical global players that are needed 
more than ever given the increasingly interconnected world. The UN 
is vital in helping to create and support the right operating 
environment so that the Red Cross and Red Crescent and other 
organizations are able to fulfill their humanitarian mandates.  Trent 
and Schnurr have written a concise and readable publication that 
should be read by young people the world over. It is hoped future 
generations would be encouraged to join the ranks in helping to 
rejuvenate an essential institution.” 
George Weber, Secretary-General Emeritus, International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Federation; CEO Royal Ottawa Hospital 
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Introduction 
Welcome to this short, analytical primer on the United Nations as it is and as 
it could be. It is short, because its first task is limited to only providing essential 
information about the UN. Analytical, because its second aim is to try to un-
derstand how we can think about global institutions. The United Nations is an 
international organization set up by a treaty between states in 1945 to help them 
cooperate on peace, development and human rights. Today the word ‘interna-
tional’ has been expanded to become ‘global’, signifying that it is no longer 
limited to states but now includes other actors and activities beyond politics. 
We are witnessing the birth of global institutions whose task it will be to man-
age and govern the increasingly integrated global system. To understand the 
United Nations, we must understand its historical and global context and ana-
lyze its relationships with states, regional organizations, non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and religious and cultural or-
ganizations. We must also study its strengths and weaknesses and its potential 
for the future.  
Achieving the unthinkable 
The world has never been a better place. We live in the most peaceful and 
prosperous era in human history. More than one billion people have been lifted 
out of extreme poverty in the past 25 years. From the early 19th century to the 
mid-20th century, the vast majority of the world’s population lived in extreme 
poverty (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2017). We have not experienced a war be-
tween major powers in decades. The majority of people live in democratic 
countries, compared to just over 10 per cent of the world population a hundred 
years ago. Technological advances have rapidly spread across the globe, with 
more people connected to one another and to information than ever before. 
Tens of millions of lives have been saved from small pox, polio, measles, ma-
laria and tuberculosis, while HIV/AIDS infections and deaths have dropped 
substantially. More people have access to education and basic health care, and 
incomes in the developing world are rising.  
We often forget this as we are constantly fed a stream of bad news from the 
media and from politicians eager to stoke fear and insecurity. We urgently need 
perspective. 
None of this means we should sit back contently, satisfied with the headway 
we have collectively made. Climate change has exacerbated risks such as water 
crises, food shortages, social cohesion, livelihoods and security. Terrorism 
poses a very real threat to our security and stability. Intrastate conflict is 
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devastating for individuals affected while also having regional and global con-
sequences. We remain far from an adequate solution to the migration crisis 
caused by political and economic instability in the Middle East and North Af-
rica. We need to respond rapidly when global pandemics occur, as they can 
spread like wildfire. There is no guarantee that we will avoid another global 
financial crisis similar to the one experienced in 2008-09. 
The threats of our time are not like those of past eras that could often be 
solved by individual states alone or perhaps by a few states within a region. 
The diverse challenges we face today do share several common characteristics: 
they are increasingly complex in nature and they transcend national borders. 
Consider the hundreds of thousands of migrants and refugees who entered Eu-
rope in 2016 by crossing the Mediterranean Sea and arriving in Italy, Greece, 
Spain and Cyprus. Or the rapid spread of the Zika virus, which was confirmed 
to be present in Brazil in 2015 and by September 2016 had reached 48 coun-
tries and territories in the Americas and 10 countries in the Pacific, Asia and 
Africa (PBS Frontline). We know that the so-called Islamic State has devel-
oped a global network, to a great extent through social media, that has allowed 
it to recruit a large number of Western fighters to carry out terrorist attacks in 
cities like Paris and Brussels, while having branches around the world includ-
ing in Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and West Africa. Similarly, 
climate change knows no borders; with rising sea levels, we have seen how 
carbon emissions in the one part of the world have threatened the very exist-
ence of island states on the other side of the globe.  
These transnational issues require a deeper level of cooperation and coordi-
nation between states. They call for strong international laws and norms. Most 
importantly, they demand effective global institutions to develop and deliver 
coordinated responses. Yet few would disagree that such institutions remain a 
distant vision and that in its current state, the United Nations, the only interna-
tional organization of its kind, is not up to the task.  
So, with all this discouraging news, why did we begin this book on a posi-
tive note? The answer is simple: given the magnitude of our problems and the 
barriers we need to overcome, it is useful to remember that we have achieved 
incredible progress in recent decades—progress that previous generations 
would likely never have imagined possible. Just as we have surpassed expec-
tations in creating peaceful continents and in advances in areas such as health, 
development and technology, we are equally capable of reforming the United 
Nations system so it is able to meet present and future challenges. Filling the 
emerging void in effective global governance will certainly not be easy, but 
history tells us it is possible. 
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The global governance deficit 
How has the world changed since 1945? Has it changed to a degree which 
requires us to transform the international institutions that were created at that 
time? We argue that it indeed has. That our present challenges are as much 
global as they are national or local is a powerful rationale for improving our 
institutions, but it is not the only one.  
The world is far more complex than it was during the post-war period. Some 
51 countries came together to form the United Nations in 1945. Today, there 
are 193 member states. And great power politics have shifted tremendously 
since that era. Bipolar or unipolar global order has been replaced by one that 
is multipolar, with all that portends for instability.  
When the UN was established, state governments were the dominant actors 
in the global sphere. While it may be too early to declare even the partial de-
mise of the state-centric world, power is increasingly shared with other non-
state actors, such as NGOs, foundations, multinational corporations, religious 
communities, regional coalitions or blocs, intergovernmental organizations, 
and groups of major economies such as the G7 and G20. 
Economic, social and cultural globalization has meant that we are more con-
nected than ever. Greater ease of transportation has facilitated global trade of 
goods and services. The same is true of the movement of people, resulting in 
rising migration and international travel. Rapid and complex communications 
provide new sources of knowledge and instantaneous access to information. 
Most people’s lives have been affected by globalization in some way, but the 
extent varies significantly. And the gains from deeper integration have not 
been evenly spread; there are distinct winners and losers. Social and economic 
inequalities have reached new heights and capital is ever more concentrated in 
the hands of a few, with just one per cent of the world’s population controlling 
more than 50 per cent of the wealth. The global society we live in today is by 
no means a global community.  
By contrast, international institutions and their capacity for governance have 
not changed substantively. Established in 1945, the United Nations was de-
signed for a different era. Its institutional structure and culture still reflect this 
past era, rather than the realities of the 21st century. It has not kept pace with 
rapid globalization and change. This stunted institutional development has led 
to its marginalization, with states looking elsewhere to solve the world’s most 
pressing challenges. Observing this trend, many fear that the UN will slide into 
irrelevance unless it adapts to the times.  
Sadly, at a time when we are in desperate need of greater cooperation and 
global governance, we are witnessing rising nationalism, xenophobia, and pro-
tectionism in many countries. Accelerated globalization and integration, which 
for decades were assumed to be unstoppable, are being met by a new wave of 
resistance; leaders and politicians favouring nationalism and isolationism over 
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multilateralism are gaining support. We saw this when voters in the United 
Kingdom opted to leave the European Union in June 2016, and again less than 
five months later when voters in the US elected Donald Trump as their next 
President. The rise of nationalist political movements, on both ends of the po-
litical spectrum but particularly on the far right, is undermining international 
institutions such as the UN. 
The United Nations’ balance sheet  
To properly diagnose what is wrong with the United Nations and what possible 
reforms could improve its ability to govern, we need to study its achievements 
and failures.  
As this primer will explore, the UN has had numerous successes in its over 
70-year existence. These range from the public achievements attributed to the 
UN, to the everyday governance that is rarely associated with it, to its effects 
which cannot easily be measured and rarely make headlines.  
The contribution that the UN has made over its lifetime to creating a more 
peaceful, just and sustainable world is so immense that it would be impossible 
to cover everything. It has unmatched legal legitimacy and global convening 
power and has been indispensable in shaping international law, rules and 
norms through adopting treaties and other legal instruments. From the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, it is responsible for a considerable body of inter-
national law that guides states’ behaviour. Several other treaties relating to the 
rights of indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, children, refugees and 
other minorities have ensured that specific rights are outlined for individuals 
or groups that are particularly vulnerable. The UN has made real progress in 
tackling climate change between the Kyoto Protocol, the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Most recently, the Paris Agreement succeeded in getting member 
states to commit to much-needed emission reductions. Beyond climate change, 
it has provided leadership on other environmental issues, from curbing ozone 
layer depletion, to protecting biodiversity and encouraging alternative energy.  
While the UN cannot take credit for all the progress in socio-economic well-
being and health, it has made enormous contributions. Its humanitarian pro-
grams deliver vital services to those in need, saving countless lives and im-
proving the conditions of many more. It has been instrumental in shaping and 
implementing a global development agenda, as we witnessed with both the 
Millennium Development Goals in 2000 and the Sustainable Development 
Goals in 2015. The UN has done much to promote gender equality, including 
establishing key international norms and creating UN Women in 2010.  
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Beyond this relatively visible work, most international economic and polit-
ical activity takes place fairly seamlessly thanks to a host of UN regulatory 
institutions. The result is that nearly all of us interact with the UN on a regular 
basis without recognizing it. Organizations such as the International Postal Un-
ion, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization, and the International Maritime Organization are critical in 
a globalized world, yet we tend not to think of the UN each time we fly across 
a border, buy imported goods, make an international call or mail a postcard to 
another country.  
Then there is the fact that the UN has been a stabilizing force contributing 
to global order for more than seven decades. It is the world’s most important 
diplomatic forum. It has helped avert another world war, managed nuclear pro-
liferation and helped prevent a nuclear weapons war, and reduced and ended 
internal and international conflicts through numerous peacekeeping operations 
and political missions. The nature of this work usually does not lend itself to 
public recognition. This is partly because we simply do not know what wars or 
conflicts have been averted due to the presence of the UN and its unending 
diplomacy, negotiations and mediation. Successful prevention rarely makes 
headlines as the absence of an event is unknowable and causality is difficult to 
determine. In the end, the UN is often taken for granted and does not get the 
credit it deserves, especially for its record in fostering peace and security. Nev-
ertheless, it is worth remembering that without the UN the world would have 
to depend on increasingly brittle state-to-state relationships. Even with all its 
flaws, it remains far better than the alternative. 
Despite all its achievements, even the most ardent supporter of the United 
Nations would not claim it is, or is even close to being, a perfect institution.  
In the peace and security realm, the UN has been dealt multiple blows in 
recent years following a series of crises where it either failed to act or was 
bypassed altogether, along with a couple of highly publicized scandals. When 
the US and a few other states decided unilaterally to invade Iraq in 2003, they 
set a dangerous precedent in a world where only the Security Council was seen 
as capable of authorizing military interventions and the use of force. When the 
UN was not present at the 2015 negotiations on the Iranian nuclear agreement, 
it sent a powerful signal to the organization, which for decades has been push-
ing for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For several years now the 
Security Council has failed to act in Syria, where a prolonged civil war has 
resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and the displacement of millions. 
The international community has tried to step in, but Russia and China have 
used their veto power to halt the attempts. The ability of the Security Council’s 
five permanent members to veto resolutions helps explain why the UN is not 
always able to deal effectively with crises such as Syria. The UN’s failure to 
counter the rising threat of terrorism has further damaged its image as the 
world’s upholder of peace. On top of all this, reports of sexual abuses by UN 
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peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Re-
public along with findings that the peacekeeping force in Haiti was responsible 
for the cholera outbreak after the 2010 earthquake have together served to tar-
nish the reputation of the long-admired blue helmets.  
On the human rights front, the UN has been inconsistent in its approach to 
dealing with grave violations and has let politics trump principled action nearly 
every time. This has severely affected its legitimacy and credibility as a human 
rights defender. It has proven unable or unwilling to prevent mass atrocities 
including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in Rwanda, Dar-
fur, the former Yugoslavia, and Syria, among other places. At the same time, 
it has not been successful in coordinating an international response to the mi-
grant and refugee crisis in terms of mobilizing the required resources and get-
ting states to accept more people in dire straits.  
The diffusion of the Responsibility to Protect norm has succeeded in making 
the principle of state sovereignty and nonintervention conditional rather than 
absolute. Yet politics and national interests still determine which situations will 
receive attention and which will be ignored. Meanwhile the International Crim-
inal Court—a promising innovation created to prosecute the worst human 
rights offenders—struggles to remain relevant as some countries have chosen 
not to join while others are exiting.  
The UN has had its share of troubles in advancing sustainable development 
too. The lofty goals set out in the post-2015 development agenda require far 
more resources than are currently available. At the same time, the complex UN 
development system made up of numerous organizations and agencies, often 
with overlapping mandates, has resulted in inefficiencies, duplication, lack of 
coherence and competition for scarce resources. Its standing as a global health 
leader has been jeopardized by its slow and inadequate response to pandemics 
such as the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2013-14, where its organizational 
culture was largely to blame. And the Economic and Social Council, the UN’s 
principal coordination body for all economic, social and environmental mat-
ters, is in urgent need of reform.  
With other regional and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank 
and regional development banks, as well as private, philanthropic actors like 
the Global Fund and the Gates Foundation, being perceived as more efficient 
and responsive than UN agencies, the UN risks seeing development funding 
diverted elsewhere. Finally, as we look ahead it remains unclear whether it is 
fit to broker and manage 21st century partnerships for development that require 
deeper collaboration between public, private and civil society actors, while 
harnessing innovation and technology to enhance its development impact.  
The urgency of current global challenges alongside the failures of the UN 
and the growing tendency for states to circumvent it suggest that action is 
needed now. There are a range of options available, varying from minor tweaks 
to the existing form and function, to rebuilding the organization from the 
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ground up. If the latter were possible, the potential for a better global institution 
would be limited only by our collective imagination. But a healthy dose of 
pragmatism is advisable. We must recognize the hurdles that are to be sur-
mounted; perfect cannot be the enemy of good.  
Nevertheless, the demands on the UN system require more than a series of 
incremental improvements. The UN’s structure, functions and allocation of re-
sources have undergone reform over the years but not to the degree necessary 
to keep pace with rapid change. The organization today is not ‘fit for purpose’. 
Yet there is no shortage of proposals for improving the dated institution. Schol-
ars, UN officials and other experts are continuously developing workable re-
form ideas. Often, there is general consensus around what should be done. 
Though even in these cases, making change happen is no easy task for a host 
of reasons. When it involves a slow, bureaucratic and political organization 
like the United Nations it becomes harder still. Ultimately, no individual actor 
can do it alone. A concerted effort is needed to transform its institutional defi-
cits. This could take the form of a multi-stakeholder coalition between willing 
states, NGOs, UN officials, independent experts, and other players. Now is the 
time to mobilize diverse actors, identify common goals and develop and im-
plement an agenda for change.  
Empowering youth  
We equally cannot achieve the transformation needed without engaging youth. 
Home to 1.8 billion young people, the world has never in history had such a 
large youth population as it has today. One quarter of the world’s population 
is between the ages of 10 and 24. Nine out of ten youth are in developing coun-
tries, many of which are experiencing a growing youth bulge while most de-
veloped countries tackle issues stemming from an aging population (UNFPA 
2014). These young people, who are more informed, engaged and globally 
connected than ever before, should become the next generation of leaders who 
will shape our common future.  
In his address to the 71st UN General Assembly, former US president 
Barack Obama praised the youth of our time, stating, “I have seen that spirit in 
our young people, who are more educated and more tolerant, and more inclu-
sive and more diverse, and more creative than our generation; who are more 
empathetic and compassionate towards their fellow human beings than previ-
ous generations.” He went on to say that because of young people’s access to 
information about other peoples and places, they have “an understanding 
unique in human history that their future is bound with the fates of other human 
beings on the other side of the world.”  
Indeed, today’s youth have incredible power to craft a more peaceful, just 
and sustainable world. The 2016 High-Level Segment of the General 
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Assembly saw an unprecedented number of world leaders acknowledge this, 
with 59 member states emphasizing the crucial role of youth in their national 
statements (United Nations Youth Envoy 2016). 
The UN itself has taken note. In his second term as secretary-general, Ban 
Ki-moon made working with and for young people one of his top priorities. He 
established the Office of the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth and chose 
Ahmad Alhendawi of Jordan to serve as the first-ever UN Envoy on Youth 
beginning in 2013. At 28 years old, he was the youngest senior official in the 
history of the UN. He was mandated to harmonize youth development efforts 
across the UN system, enhance the UN response to youth needs, advocate for 
addressing the development needs and rights of young people, and bring the 
voices of young people to the UN (Youth Envoy website). 
Despite a series of public statements and gestures recognizing the immense 
potential of youth, there are too many young people around the globe who live 
in poverty and countless are being denied the opportunity to pursue their edu-
cation and find decent employment. The number of children and adolescents 
out of school is on the rise, and reached 124 million in 2013. There are over 73 
million unemployed youth worldwide. At 13 per cent, the overall youth unem-
ployment rate is three times the adult rate, though it is even higher in some 
regions (in two thirds of European countries the youth unemployment rate ex-
ceeded 20 per cent in 2014; the figure is close to 30 per cent in the Middle East 
and Africa) (ILO 2015). The reality for girls and young women is even more 
troubling. Secondary school enrolment rates are often lower for girls than boys 
and only about two out of 130 developing countries have achieved gender par-
ity at all levels of education. Unemployment affects young women more than 
young men in almost all regions, while in North Africa and the Arab States the 
female youth unemployment rate is almost twice that of young men (ILO 
2016). Those in countries affected by conflict are also worse off than most. 
Meanwhile, many countries are failing to give a voice to their youth; two 
out of three countries do not consult young people as part of the process of 
preparing poverty reduction strategies or national development plans (United 
Nations Youth Envoy 2014). Youth participation in national parliaments is 
low, with less than 2 per cent of parliamentarians globally under 30 years old 
(Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). 
It is little wonder, then, that, despite their potential, youth often feels disem-
powered. Voter turnout among 18-25 year olds continues to be lower than other 
age groups and a lack of civic engagement among youth is common. But young 
people cannot afford to watch from the sidelines. They need to press for action 
and positive change. They need to better the world for themselves and for fu-
ture generations. With political rights come responsibilities. More than ever, 
the world needs its youth to elect good leaders, get involved in politics, expand 
their understanding of global problems and develop solutions.  
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Objectives of the primer 
This primer on global governance and United Nations reform analyzes the or-
ganization in its current form while offering alternatives for the future. It aims 
to provide the fundamentals to those who are relatively new to the subject. It 
seeks to be informative and thought-provoking while remaining accessible to 
a broad range of audiences, varying from students to practitioners.  
It is designed to: 
 provide an overview of essential information about the United Nations 
system including its historical and global context; 
 delve into the UN’s record on its three ‘pillars’: human rights, peace 
and security, and development; 
 introduce various ideas and proposals for renewing the organization so 
it can better meet the demands of tomorrow; and 
 explore the role of norms, values and attitudes as well as diverse actors 
in building a movement for a UN renaissance.  
We take the notion of renaissance to have two meanings. First, it is used to 
refer to renewal, rebirth, revival or even spring, which leads us to think about 
change, reform and transformation at the UN. The second sense refers to the 
essential meaning of the historical renaissance as ‘a return to origins’. Dotted 
throughout the book are references to the UN’s founding objectives, which in-
cluded preventing the scourge of war, getting great powers to cooperate on 
essential decision making, striving to protect human rights, and ensuring eco-
nomic coordination. This book is dedicated to a renewed search for the initial 
aims of the United Nations: peace, development, cooperation and human 
rights—and, indeed, much more as the world has continued to evolve. Thus, 
we use renaissance to call for a transformation of the UN that remains deeply 
rooted in its original lofty goals.  
We hope this book prepares and inspires readers to join and expand existing 
efforts to achieve this renaissance. 
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Chapter 1 – Evolving International Organizations:  
the UN Past and Present 
“[He] wondered why men could rarely harness this same sense of oneness toward 
good ends. Men would sacrifice their own interests, even their own lives, welding 
themselves together with bonds that far surpassed ordinary life, toward the purpose 
of killing one another. But when it came to creating beauty and life and love, too 
often men were left to act alone, their every act weighed against self-interest and 
simple inertia. If men were as good at creating heaven on earth as they were at 
creating hell, it would be a very different world.” Rachel Lee (2007: 474) 
To really understand the United Nations it is not sufficient just to describe its 
structures, personnel and activities. It is first necessary to explain its begin-
nings and the intentions of its founders. And then the hard part begins: we have 
to weigh its strengths and weaknesses and analyze its components. This is the 
plan for this chapter. 
Early international cooperation efforts 
The United Nations is not the first but the third in a series of international or-
ganizations that date back to 1815. To give some historical context to the es-
tablishment and workings of the United Nations as it is today, the first part of 
this chapter describes these organizations and the key events that led to their 
creation (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Evolution of international organizations, until 1945 
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The Concert of Europe 
The Concert of Europe was founded by the Treaty of Vienna, which put an end 
to the Napoleonic Wars that had lasted nearly 20 years. In many ways it set the 
mold for its successors: the League of Nations and the United Nations. Like 
these last two, the Concert was founded in the aftermath of a devastating war 
waged by a group of allies to stop one nation from trying to set up an empire 
to dominate the world. The word ‘concert’ was intended to mean a bringing 
together of states in a concerted effort to work on common concerns. It was a 
radical departure from the past. At the time, it was called “a principle of general 
union, uniting all the states collectively with a federative bond, under the guid-
ance of the five principal Powers” (Mazower 2013: 4). Up until the Napoleonic 
Wars, Europe (as other parts of the world) was ordered by an ever-changing 
“balance of power” by which each sovereign state attempted to maximize its 
own interests and stop any state or group of states from obtaining overwhelm-
ing dominance. This was the continually shifting basis of foreign policy. Na-
poleon’s France had upset this balance. The allied powers wanted to re-estab-
lish it on a permanent basis.  
Thus, the Concert of Europe was like a continuing coalition of the Great 
Power victors of the Napoleonic Wars (Russia, Prussia, Austria and Great Brit-
ain, plus the newly monarchical France). Its role was to convene meetings on 
a regular basis or upon need and to include other smaller countries to discuss 
overlapping interests and their efforts to maintain stable European relations. 
The Concert’s two major functions were to maintain peace between countries 
and to ensure the internal stability of the established monarchical governments 
against nationalist, liberal and democratic revolts. Consultation often checked 
aggressive impulses. It generally achieved its twin goals for more than a half 
century from 1815 until the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71.  
The Concert of Europe sought to manage the affairs of the continent by 
binding all states to the rules of the international game. Sometimes this could 
only be achieved by intervening in the affairs of others. In fact, the word ‘in-
ternational’ was a relatively new concept that suggested there were ongoing 
links between states despite their past habit of just wanting to ‘do their own 
thing’ based on their sovereign independence. This right of sovereign nation-
alism harked back to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia—which itself put an end 
to Europe’s Thirty Years War. Nevertheless, on several occasions after the 
French Revolution, the Concert did not hesitate to interfere in the internal af-
fairs of states to enforce a conservative restoration. For instance, in 1823 Con-
cert members invaded Spain to drive a revolutionary government out of Ma-
drid. 
International relations grew slowly but steadily in the 19th century. Between 
1840 and 1914, there were nearly 3,000 international gatherings. More than 
450 international, private or non-governmental organizations were created and 
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the Concert itself grew to 37 governmental organizations. International NGOs 
invited themselves to the international meetings, thus becoming new ‘actors’ 
in international relations and the forerunners of today’s ‘civil society’. Their 
‘competitor’ was the historic notion of sovereignty (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Understanding ‘sovereignty’ 
Sovereignty grew out of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 to define the 
legal identity of a state in international law. Each state is considered to 
have sovereign equality. There is a corresponding obligation to respect 
each other’s sovereignty by not intervening in another’s internal affairs. 
Internally, sovereignty signifies the capacity of the government to make 
authoritative decisions through exclusive jurisdiction within its territorial 
boundaries, which it has the right to defend. This is international law and 
its principles are hotly defended, but, obviously, it is not the international 
reality. The ‘sovereign equality of states’ is enshrined in Article 2.1 of 
the UN Charter. The principle of ‘non-intervention’ is to be found in Ar-
ticle 2.7. The ‘right of self-defence’ is embodied in Article 51. The UN 
Secretary-General has discussed the dilemma of the two concepts of so-
vereignty, one vested in the state and the second in the people and indi-
viduals. The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty proposed the extension of the concept to include 
‘responsibility’ alongside ‘control’, so that state authorities would have 
the responsibility to protect their citizens and would be responsible to the 
international community through the UN. This gave rise to the UN’s 
2005 resolution on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
Source: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereig-
nty, 2001: 12-3 
Right from the beginning of international institutions, there was debate over 
how much the creation of a set of arrangements to maintain peace and stability 
could legitimize intervention in the affairs of others—debates which continue 
with the new UN policy of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). International af-
fairs are not just about the arrangement of relationships. They are also about 
dominant ideas and a desire for power. So, it was said, “The Concert of Europe 
had not mastered the new art of international government; it was, on the con-
trary, a symbol of the very problems—autocratic leadership, bellicosity, an in-
comprehension of the values of freedom and the power of social change—that 
a true internationalism was needed to solve.” (Mazower 2013: 12). 
In reality, foreign relations in 1815 were really the playthings of sovereign 
monarchs and their aristocratic ministers who were determined that Europe 
would not only remain stable but would crush radical democratic tendencies. 
One example was the French Foreign Minister, Prince Talleyrand, who used 
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his diplomatic dexterity to insist that France, although defeated, was too central 
to Europe to be dismembered. These men dominated the 1815 peace treaty, 
Congress of Vienna, and the Europe to which it gave rise. And they were only 
men because, with a few exceptions like Queen Elizabeth I, women were not 
involved in foreign relations until after the Second World War when Eleanor 
Roosevelt and several colleagues implanted the Universal Charter of Human 
Rights within the United Nations.  
We can also recognize that international organizations are not purely polit-
ical creations; they also reflect their time and their context. In many ways, pol-
itics follows the lead of economics and technology. Thus, the development of 
international organizations throughout the 1800s was greatly inspired by in-
dustrialization, and the expansion of railways and shipping beyond national 
boundaries. Business sought continent-wide security for markets and invest-
ments. Together, science and commerce framed the modern thinking that made 
possible the ideas of internationalism. Modern forms of trade and transport led 
to the forming of ‘public international unions’ (the forerunners of today’s ‘spe-
cialized agencies’ at the UN) in the fields of transport, communications, 
weights and measures, statistics, patents, agriculture, labour, science, policing 
and sanitation. In addition, international movements for workers, women and 
peace formed world public opinion.  
If fact, there have been a great number of influences on the development of 
international organizations. Although we recognize that the impetus for inter-
national organization comes out of the chaos of post-war disintegration, theo-
rists maintain that, in general, an evolutionary or ‘genetic’ perspective seems 
best suited for us to understand how they developed from a host of interests 
(national and international, public and private), as well as internal learning pro-
cesses and even the very act of international conferencing (Reinalda: 2001). 
Evidence suggests that in international organizations, innovation often comes 
out of lively and continuous debate originating in scientific, technical and hu-
manistic communities (Reinalda 2001; Schemeil 2003). Indeed, the conferenc-
ing process creates a temporary equality among unequals and encourages the 
sort of open discussion that often gives rise to innovation (Murphy 1994: 62). 
Conferencing was also conducive to developing the techniques and the psy-
chological aptitudes required for successful multilateral negotiation (Claude 
1966: 23). Engaged thinkers and practitioners found they could implement 
their ideas on a world scale and sometimes were called upon to prepare gov-
ernment positions. In other cases, NGOs learned that governments can be 
moved toward cooperation by private or unofficial pressures, when skillfully 
applied (Lyon 1963: 154). Changes in domestic politics such as new govern-
ments and political leaders can constitute windows of opportunity for new ad-
vances at the international level (Reinalda 2003: 9).  
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A note on the creation of the League of Nations  
The context just described was both the process and the inducement for the 
forming of international institutions from the 1850s to the 1900s. It was also 
part of the background for the formation of the League of Nations in 1919 
following the First World War. Other inducements were the atrocious loss of 
life, the destruction of countries, the wartime cooperation of the allies, and the 
need for an on-going organization as a forum to promote peace rather than war. 
Also of great significance was the spirited leadership of the American Presi-
dent, Woodrow Wilson. After the Second World War in 1945 it was much the 
same story that led to the United Nations except the leadership came from a 
new American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The League of Nations was founded in January 1920 as a result of the Paris 
Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles which terminated the First 
World War. As the world’s first permanent intergovernmental organization, its 
principle objective was to maintain world peace via collective security, dis-
armament and arbitration. It had an initial 44 state members, which rose to 58 
in 1935. Its headquarters were established in Geneva immediately after its 
founding. 
As we will see, the various in-depth analyses of the founding of the League 
and the UN teach us much about the causality, meaning and intentions of in-
ternational organizations (see Mazower, Reinalda, Schlesinger, Archer and 
Trent). The League came about as a result of history, national interests, ideas, 
and personalities. It was a combination of ‘big bang’ politics responding to the 
war, and evolutionary development based on historical precedent. When it 
came to thinking about post-war institutions, the allied participants in the 1919 
Paris Peace Conference (dominated by the US, France, Great Britain and Italy, 
with personalities like Jan Smuts of South Africa as additional players) had in 
their minds their cooperation during the war but also the internationalism of 
the past century. In their deliberations, they considered a number of options: 
resurrecting a new version of the old Concert; a model based on the American 
Monroe Doctrine which proclaimed US sway over Latin America; the British 
Empire transformed into a Commonwealth; and simply of a return to balance 
of power politics.  
The thinking that predominated was essentially that of Great Britain and the 
US. Being great powers, neither wanted any new arrangements to tie their 
hands too much. They wanted to maintain the Anglo-American alliance but in 
a larger format that did not look too self-interested or racist. The French and 
the British did not want the League to interfere with their imperial ambitions. 
Many thought the new arrangements should be as light as possible and be cen-
tred on negotiations, international law, mediation and arbitration. For both the 
League and the UN, the wartime experience of cooperation was crucial as a 
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seedbed for more centralized and systematic world relationships and the im-
portance of procedure and precedents. 
But when push came to shove, it was the negotiations between the leaders 
of the major, victorious powers which drove the founding of both the League 
of Nations and the United Nations. In Paris in 1919, U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson ended up in protracted negotiations with the French President Georges 
Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Italian Prime 
Minister Vittorio Orlando—leaders who were equally creatures of their own 
personalities, philosophies and visions, and influenced by their close advisers. 
Known as the ‘Big Four’, these leaders had no intentions of relinquishing con-
trol of the conference agenda—a tradition that is maintained to this day.  
They also maintained the earlier tradition of diplomatic secrecy because 
they thought not to do so would be “a veritable suicide” for their negotiations. 
But they surrendered to the growing demands of journalists for regular plenary 
sessions and briefings. Small states were “given something to do” as an adden-
dum to the Council and in the powerless Assembly. Following the submission 
of plans by various leaders, thinkers and associations, Robert Cecil, the British 
undersecretary of foreign affairs, was able to provide a draft text for the 
League, based in part on a study of historical precedents (as the American Sec-
retary of State later did for the UN). It was discussed, amended and adopted in 
two months. However, it would be incorrect to think there were no other sig-
nificant influences on the peace negotiations. Among the other major influ-
ences were: the blending of morality and realpolitik in the provocative ideas of 
Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa; the London intellectual elite in-
cluding Leonard Woolf, who had written a suggestive book entitled Interna-
tional Government; the demands of small allies, especially those in the nascent 
British Commonwealth who had helped win the war; and popular associations 
(now NGOs) such as the League of Nations Association.  
The League of Nations as an institution 
To the degree that he wanted a permanent organization, President Wilson of 
the United States wanted to keep power with the politicians in a forum for 
quasi-parliamentary deliberations rather than with the lawyers in a sort of super 
judicial court. He wanted an institution that would evolve with the collective 
will. He also wanted to protect the territorial integrity of the growing number 
of nation-states in a universal association of nations capable of acting in the 
common interest to help prevent war. “The days of the Treaty of Vienna are 
long past,” as British Prime Minister Lloyd George put it, referring to the birth 
of the Concert of Europe (Mazower 2013: 127). There were, of course, many 
contradictions. The general principle of national self-determination remained 
vague. Britain, the great imperial power, thought that the Empire itself 
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resembled “a league of nations”. Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, many 
questions remained. How much executive power would a League possess? 
How far would it be committed to protect established boundaries? Could sanc-
tions be automatically triggered? How far would the League go beyond being 
just a more permanent conference system? 
However, history shows that once at the Peace Conference, personal diplo-
macy took over. A committee chaired by Wilson rapidly approved the British 
draft agreement. There would be a tripartite division of powers in a parliamen-
tary type organization. It consisted of: a Council with Great Power permanent 
members and four elected, rotating lesser powers in a sort of ‘upper chamber’; 
a one-member, one-vote Assembly; a relatively weak secretary-general in an 
administrative rather than a diplomatic post; and, in 1922, a Permanent Court 
of International Justice.  
The Council’s permanent members were France, Great Britain, Italy and 
Japan (the US did not join). Eventually, the Assembly’s 40 members, meeting 
at the new headquarters in Geneva, represented minimally the various parts of 
the still-colonized world. Almost all of Africa, Asia and the Middle East were 
controlled by European imperial powers. The Assembly had no law-making 
functions and each member could veto any action. In any case, the League 
lacked any standing forces or mechanisms for enforcing peace. All it could do 
was to recommend arbitration, sanctions and boycotts. It was even unable to 
apply sufficient pressures in clear-cut cases of aggression. Nevertheless, it did 
introduce a democratic dimension of public deliberation and opinion. Also, the 
full Assembly only met once a year, so the rest of the time the League’s merit-
based civil servants were free to take the initiative. 
This became a major dimension of the League and its definitive heritage. 
The bureaucracy was created by Eric Drummond, a mid-level official of the 
British Foreign Office, who went on to hold the office of Secretary-General for 
14 years, longer than anyone either at the League or the UN. Having built a 
small (650), highly professional international civil service, one with perma-
nence and autonomy that favoured expertise over diplomacy, he became one 
of the architects of modern international organizations. It was divided into 
functional secretariats that “cemented the connection between internationalism 
and technical expertise” (Mazower 2013: 148). For instance, German and So-
viet officials worked with the League’s technical services before their coun-
tries even formally joined. The Secretariat also took advantage of Articles 23 
and 24 of the League’s Covenant which gave it wide responsibilities and al-
lowed it to become an umbrella organization that gathered under its auspices 
the 31 international bureaus (also called ‘permanent conferences’ or ‘public 
international unions’) that had been formed before the First World War. 
One example of the League’s extraordinary feats as a humanitarian organi-
zation was its overseeing of emergency relief camps giving succour to the Rus-
sian, Armenian and Greek refugees in the Balkans in the early 1920s. They ran 
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and financed tented encampments and brought in health experts to stop infec-
tious diseases. They helped the Greek government get loans to resettle hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees. They created the Refugee Settlement Commis-
sion to build new settlements, even small towns. This effort by a government 
organization was entirely new. It had previously been the work of charities. 
We can easily see how there is an eerie resemblance to events in the Middle 
East since 2010 and may ask: why is the world still having to deal with the 
same horrific problems one century later? 
The League also became recognized for gathering data and issuing volumes 
of statistics. Its health, transport, and financial and economic sections became 
indispensable in the interwar years. Strangely enough, many of its personnel 
came from the United States and much of its technical funding came from the 
Rockefeller Foundation. It worked hard to restore monetary stability but lost 
out to the protectionism of the Great Depression. Its members prided them-
selves on being impartial and above national interests (unlike the UN) but not 
above paternalistic interference in member states’ internal affairs. Overall, 
some two hundred employees of the League’s Secretariat went on to work for 
the UN and even to be leaders of a number of post-Second World War inter-
national organizations—including Jean Monnet, who would become one of the 
founding fathers of the European Union.  
That said, the League was battered continuously by horrendous public ca-
lamities, the defection of prominent members and the battle of ideologies. In 
1918 and 1919, Spanish influenza affected one fifth of the world’s population 
and killed between 20 and 40 million people, exceeding the deaths during the 
First World War. More deadly than the Black Plague in the 1300s, it was the 
worst scourge ever to sweep the world. But the League also had to face con-
tinuing war and a refugee crisis in the Middle East, economic collapse in East-
ern Europe and a public health disaster including influenza, typhus and mass 
starvation. In addition, Western leaders were terrified by the spread of com-
munism from Russia’s revolution, which was welcomed by many in Western 
Europe due to economic collapse and massive unemployment. On top of all 
this, the new League was called upon to administer the territory of the Saar and 
the Free City of Danzig and look after the plight of the Christians in Turkey 
and the status of Armenia. By 1929, the world fell into the grip of the Great 
Depression.  
The defection of prominent states never ceased. Perhaps the cruellest blow 
to the League was the vote by the U.S. Senate against joining President Wil-
son’s brain-child. The decision reflected a refusal by part of the political elite 
to become enmeshed in ‘entangling alliances’ and the world’s troubles. Public 
support for the League was low, and there was resistance in Congress to mak-
ing commitments to international organizations that would hamper the freedom 
of action of the United States. It was a fine example of American isolation-
ism—something that still lingers today. But it was paired with a will to 
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international leadership, exemplified in the interwar years by the private en-
dowments which financed support for the League and for institutes, journals, 
international relations clubs and conferences to train Americans for their role 
in the world. 
For its part, the Soviet Union did not even join the League until 1934 and 
then was the only state to be kicked out after it invaded Finland in 1939. Ger-
many, which had not been welcomed at the beginning, joined in 1926 and then 
withdrew under Hitler’s Nazi regime in 1933. Mussolini’s fascist Italy fol-
lowed in 1937 after having invaded Ethiopia. Japan, unhappy with criticism of 
its occupation of Manchuria, withdrew in 1933. Germany, Italy and Japan, 
which would become known as the Axis powers, each had a grudge against the 
dominant colonial system the League represented. They wanted what the 
French and British had. They wanted territory, colonies and power. For them 
there was a power imbalance in the world represented by the League. This 
virtually left Great Britain and France among the Great Powers and they were 
still too ravaged by their losses during the First World War to devote energy 
to saving the League. What with its heavy burdens and quarrelling members, 
the League was not able to stop the slide to a new world war. 
The battle of ideologies consisted mainly of multiple attacks on the Western 
theoretical claim about the fairness of international law, equally applied to 
equal states, as a keystone of the League. For instance, the Western empires 
did not even subject themselves to minority rights treaties. What Germany, 
Italy and Japan had in common was their criticism that the League was just a 
‘fig leaf’ to keep in place a territorial status quo that favoured Great Britain, 
France and the US. The same criticism was to be levelled later about the UN. 
Hegemony, the leadership of one or more states, was the central German con-
ception of world rule. Japan too saw the League as protecting the self-interests 
of the imperialists in Asia.  
The Soviet Union weighed in with the establishment of the ‘Third Interna-
tional’ in 1919 as a direct rival to the League of Nations. Lenin even referred 
to the League as a “stinking corpse” (Mazower 2013: 177). Soviet diplomats 
became more measured and conciliatory though, even joining the League in 
1934. For Moscow, its security came before revolution. For its part, Italy pro-
moted a ‘fascist internationalism’ in a fascist European confederation, suppos-
edly fighting for the rights of European nation-states.  
One can see arising out of these affirmations of sovereignty and nationalism 
the destabilizing potential from which the UN too would suffer. The leading 
American political scientist, Quincy Wright, worried that, “totalitarianism has 
unmasked the inadequacy of the philosophical and political foundations of in-
ternational law.” (Mazower 2013: 187). Its impartial authority lay in tatters. 
International law would require a demonstration of shared values and interests, 
alongside the enforcement capacity. 
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Box 2: Strengths and failures of the League of Nations 
 
 The quasi-parliamentary model at the League’s core was abused 
from the start by members who came to Geneva more for theatrics 
than policy-making. The pre-war ideals of open negotiations and di-
plomacy to stimulate world public opinion ended up creating unful-
filled expectations.  
 The unanimity rule (i.e., each member holding a veto) made deci-
sions hard to reach, thus condemning the organization to impotency. 
 Its irresolution was magnified by its lack of any means of enforce-
ment or deterrent such as armed forces or a police force so that even 
the rules and laws it did proclaim lacked authority. 
 The League was operating on a shoestring in a period of financial 
stringency. Its budget of $5 million a year was less than a thirtieth of 
the UN’s—also considered minuscule in today’s multi-billion-dollar 
world. 
 Due to these failures, the League was not able to provide answers to 
the urgent crises of the day, thus reinforcing public perceptions of its 
inefficacy. 
 The League’s technical services provided by its professional civil 
service took international humanitarian cooperation and the promo-
tion of science much further than anyone had imagined possible be-
fore the First World War. It offered the promise of democratization 
and social transformation through technical expertise. 
 Its technical, intellectual and scientific skills proved the value of an 
international organization. Even if it was a diplomatic failure, its ex-
pertise and international action became a model for the evolutionary 
growth of cooperative behaviour due in part to its flexibility and 
multitasking.  
 Not all initiatives worked out. For instance, the Institute for Intellec-
tual Cooperation had few tangible results as Europe fragmented ide-
ologically, and few states ratified the 1937 Treaty for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court (60 years before its time)—even the French 
proposal for a federal union of Europe to combat the Depression was 
not successful! 
 The League’s enduring influence was as a vehicle for world leader-
ship based on moral principles and the formal equality of sovereign 
states. It managed to marry the democratic ideal of a society of na-
tions with the reality of Great Power hegemony. 
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We recall all this (along with the League’s strengths and failures outlined in 
Box 2) now to remind ourselves of the sensitivity of international organizations 
to the politics of their member states, and to the continuous attacks by ideo-
logues, by the media and by an unreasoning public. 
From the League of Nations to the United Nations 
One day during a visit to Washington in 1941, Prime Minister Churchill was 
just getting out of his bath when President Roosevelt rolled his chair in and 
declared that he had thought of the perfect name for the new organization: the 
United Nations. Churchill immediately agreed it was a brilliant idea (Mazower 
2013: 197). It is little known that, although the UN was not officially founded 
until the San Francisco Conference in 1945, the Second World War was fought 
under the auspices of the United Nations Alliance in which 26 allies joined the 
United States and Great Britain. With their backs to the wall, the war years 
were in many ways the heydays of liberal multilateralism and institution build-
ing. The war encouraged cooperation. In terms of international relations the-
ory, we may conclude that building the UN was evidence that multilateralism 
and robust intergovernmental organizations were viewed as “realist necessi-
ties, not liberal window dressing” (Plesch & Weiss 2015: 199).  
In 1942, the UN Information Office went to work and the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) started planning for the eradication of hunger. 
Aside from the many backroom debates about the nature of the UN, the UN 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was created in 1943 (it then shut 
down operations in 1947). The International Labour Organization was revived 
in 1944, the same year that saw the Bretton Woods UN Monetary and Financial 
Conference that gave birth to the World Bank Group and the International 
Monetary Fund. The UN War Crimes Commission was a precursor to the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo trials. In a strange little twist of fate, one of the remaining 
utilities of the League of Nations was transferred to the United States in 1941. 
With the help of the Rockefeller Foundation, 12 key Secretariat members with 
their files and experience transferred to Princeton, New Jersey to take up resi-
dence in the Institute for Advanced Study where they advised on the post-war 
problems.  
So, what was behind all this creative action? What did the leaders want out 
of the new United Nations? Needless to say, they all wanted an organization 
that was strong enough to promote international peace. In addition, Great Brit-
ain wanted to maintain its ‘special relationship’ with the US. It also believed 
that having the US and the Soviet Union in the new organization was more 
important than the exact form it would take. Joseph Stalin, the leader of the 
Soviet Union, wanted to maintain the alliance until he had time to rebuild his 
country. U.S. President Roosevelt had learnt from his ‘New Deal’ economic 
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development program that good politics went hand in hand with socio-eco-
nomic programs. In the context of the UN, this meant that fostering post-war, 
international economic and social stability would make a contribution to main-
taining peace and security. The massive unemployment following the First 
World War led to social unrest that was a harbinger of a new world conflict. 
The Americans thought it was crucial to prevent a renewed post-war economic 
slump by structuring an international bank and monetary fund to slay the triple-
headed dragon of economic nationalism, speculative capital flows and trade 
barriers. To determine where they were heading, the Americans set up a top-
secret ‘Division of Special Research’ as early as 1941 under Leo Pasvolsky, 
an aide to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, to plan a new permanent world or-
ganization.  
The three major allies (Britain, the Soviet Union and the US) had differing 
ideas right up to the last minute, even concerning the actual nature of the new 
organization. Early on, they envisioned an international police force run by the 
three allies along with China. Another option considered was to set up a ‘World 
Council’ made up of three regional councils (Europe, the Americas and the 
Pacific). In the end, they agreed to some post-war structure that could more 
effectively manage conflicting interests and contain, at minimum, the threat of 
military and humanitarian disasters (Meacham 2003: 202-29). 
By the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944 and the Yalta conference in 
1945, the concept of the United Nations started to gel. The conversation shifted 
from regional councils and other proposals to planning for an organization that 
could exert force to try to maintain order, complete with a Security Council 
(with permanent members) and a General Assembly (ibid: 321).  
It was decided that the UN would preside over a vast expansion of the social 
policy initiated by the League Secretariat, and that a voice would be given to 
the smaller nations under the leadership of the major powers. Churchill and 
Roosevelt sought to build institutions that would prevent the mistakes of the 
first half of the 20th century from repeating themselves in the second half. 
Nothing was left to chance as the Americans ramped up the promotion of the 
United Nations ideal using not only bipartisan political resolutions but adver-
tisements, Hollywood showgirls, and musical anthems. On March 1, 1945, just 
weeks before his death, Roosevelt made a last plea for a global, rather than 
regional, organization. He told Congress that the UN agreements in Yalta 
"ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alli-
ances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expe-
dients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed.” (ibid: 321). 
What we can see from all this is that states only began thinking about inter-
national institutions when they feared their interests or those of the world were 
in danger. It was major powers and their top leaders who set the rules, explor-
ing numerous concepts and taking nothing for granted at the outset. Smaller 
countries were marginalized in processes that were neither inclusive nor 
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democratic. Concepts and details would be forged by some ‘secretariat’ in the 
background for debate by the leaders, who in turn would work through the 
issues and come to conclusions that shaped the future. This particular lesson 
should give us hope for change. As Plesch and Weiss concluded, “We thus 
should not act as if today’s international political order were immutable or pre-
ordained. The 1940s should give us the courage to formulate ambitious visions 
about improving future world orders.” (2015: 203).  
From the experience of these three international organizations we should 
recall the following:  
 All resulted from efforts to create stability and peace after devastating 
wars; 
 They also resulted from the evolution in international relations and the 
socio-economic context; 
 All were dominated by the great powers of the period;  
 Foreign relations are still masterminded by political elites with little 
democratic control; 
 The right of international political intervention is still contested; 
 All were torn by the contradictory desires for both cooperation and sov-
ereign independence, and for equality but also leadership of the strong; 
 States want the help of international organizations to smooth out their 
relationships—but these organizations are to be the creatures of the 
states and must not become too powerful or independent; and 
 International organizations are not purely political creations; they also 
reflect their unique context. 
Introducing the United Nations 
The United Nations was founded at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 by 
delegates from 50 countries (Poland did not attend the Conference but signed 
the Declaration later that year, becoming an additional founding member). The 
overall design of the United Nations had much in common with its predecessor, 
reflecting how international institutions tend to evolve rather than change rap-
idly. Illustrating the continuity between the two organizations, few people even 
noticed that the United States joined the League after the Second World War, 
a year before it was legally wound up at a final ceremony in Geneva in 1946.  
As with the League, the UN is based on a tripartite parliamentary structure 
including a Security Council (as a sort of Cabinet), a General Assembly or 
debating chamber with one vote for each state member but with few powers 
(sort of like legislatures), and an administrative Secretariat and secretary-gen-
eral who, once again, is more secretary than general (a prototype of a public 
service). Likewise, the International Court of Justice in The Hague (replacing 
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the Permanent Court of International Justice) can only accept cases submitted 
to it by members and its decisions are more recommendations than orders. 
Also, the UN has no prosecutor, no police and no jail. And once again, although 
the UN Charter speaks glowingly of fundamental human rights and it gave 
birth to the Universal Charter of Human Rights, there are no binding obliga-
tions that commit members to protect citizens—even if they sign treaties to do 
so.  
There are also significant differences between the League and the UN. The 
very powerful Security Council was designed to take action whenever its mem-
bers are in agreement. Vetoes were accorded to the Great Powers (the Perma-
nent Five members) to make sure they do not have to leave the UN to protect 
their interests—which was one of the downfalls of the League and something 
we must remember when we discuss criticisms of the veto later. No other mem-
bers were given veto power with which to block action, so there is no proto-
anarchy as in the League. The Security Council is given exclusive jurisdiction 
over maintaining peace and security. Various chapters of the Charter give the 
Council gradated powers to enforce the peace, starting with investigations and 
moving on to negotiations, sanctions and eventually a possible call on all coun-
tries to protect the peace of the world. There were also provisions for armed 
forces and a command system, but when the Cold War started soon after the 
founding of the UN, these were never acted upon.  
Another new feature was the Economic and Social Council, which was in-
tended to spearhead much broader development and cooperation of experts 
than imagined under the League. As we saw, because of his experience with 
the New Deal to help overcome the worst aspects of the Great Depression, this 
had become one of President Roosevelt’s main goals. Thus, the UN combines 
humanitarian technocracy to promote economic and social development with 
the powerful potential of the Great Powers to protect the peace whenever they 
can jointly decide to do so. After more than 70 years, it can be claimed that the 
UN has kept the major powers together—and talking, not fighting. Some say 
it was the rebirth of the League, only with more teeth and with the participation 
of the United States.  
The principal organs of the United Nations 
The Security Council 
The Security Council is formed of five Permanent Members (the P5) wielding 
vetoes (the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China—the victors 
in the Second World War) plus, currently, 10 other rotating members elected 
by the General Assembly for two-year terms. It is the UN’s most powerful 
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forum. The rotating members represent the various regions of the world. Each 
member has one vote. Procedural matters require nine votes. Substantive mat-
ters require nine votes and the absence of a veto. Thus, in theory the rotating 
members have a negative or blocking vote for stopping things from happen-
ing—it is sometimes referred to as the ‘sixth veto’. The presidency of the 
Council rotates monthly among its members.  
The Council bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. Linda Fasulo has provided an excellent word por-
trait of its powers: “It has the authority to examine any conflict or dispute that 
might have international repercussions and to decide matters affecting the fate 
of governments, establish peacekeeping missions, create tribunals to try per-
sons accused of war crimes, apply economic sanctions to misbehaving govern-
ments, and in extreme cases declare a nation to be fair game for corrective 
action by other member states. It is the only UN principal organ whose resolu-
tions are binding on member states, which means that governments do not have 
the option of choosing which of the council’s decisions they will or will not 
accept and help implement.” (2015: 55).  
The role of the UN in peacekeeping and peace enforcement (under Charter 
Chapter VII: ‘Action with regard to threats to peace’) has increased immeas-
urably since the first United Nations Emergency Force was deployed for the 
Suez crisis of 1956. The UN went from modest monitoring and supervision 
operations in the 1940s, to now supervising more troops in the field (contrib-
uted by members) than any country. By 2016, there were 16 UN-led missions 
in the field for an annual cost of some $8.2 billion (on top of the regular UN 
budget). They include large civilian and police components. In the post-Cold 
War period after 1990, the P5 in the Security Council were much more coop-
erative and were willing to tackle more numerous and diverse conflicts includ-
ing domestic rivalries. Often this has led to a need to work cooperatively with 
regional partners in ‘coalitions of the willing’ from such groups as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, West African 
States and the African Union. The Security Council now goes well beyond 
pure peacemaking to work toward peacebuilding with the monitoring of elec-
tions and long-term international support for the development of institutions 
and finances. There has also been a reinforcement of combatting terrorist 
threats. 
Aside from peacekeeping, the Security Council has at its disposal a whole 
series of measures it can use to try to change the orientation of ‘misbehaving’ 
states. One of the most dramatic forms of influence is sanctions that can be 
used to restrict the movement of finances, weapons, trade, travel or diplomatic 
contacts. As will be discussed in the following chapter, sanctions have become 
more targeted and efficient over the years in response to criticism and there 
have been several examples of successful use.  
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The number of formal and informal meetings of the Security Council has 
fluctuated over the years. For instance, there were 117 in 1988 and 373 in 2012. 
Under pressure from Canada and other members, the Council has slowly 
evolved to a more open process beyond the meetings of diplomats of its 15 
members. It now invites non-members, UN officials and agencies, and even 
international NGOs. It also consults with states making major contributions to 
peacekeeping and other UN operations. The Council has also established some 
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Security Council’s agenda has broadened to include not only peacekeeping but 
also humanitarian concerns, the international right to intervene, the plight of 
war induced refugees, monitoring of elections, post-conflict peacebuilding, ter-
rorism and the creation of international criminal tribunals. 
The question of the veto power afforded to the Permanent Five is highly 
significant both for the nature of the UN and its future. The major victorious 
powers insisted on having a veto in the new international organization in order 
to protect their ‘vital interests’. Other states went along with it to ensure the 
presence of the major players and make sure they did not leave at the first 
hiccup. However, it was never thought the P5 would use the veto or the threat 
of a veto to cover their whole foreign policy, as has often been the case, most 
recently with Syria. 
Russia has long considered Syria to be in its ‘sphere of influence’. China on 
the other hand has no clear connection with the Middle East. Yet both have 
used their veto power to block resolutions to halt the Syrian civil war, on the 
basis that may interfere in their internal affairs or may establish a principle or 
a pretext for such intervention. In particular, they fear the aggressive overreach 
of the ‘Western powers’ (the US, Western Europe, and their NATO allies). In 
2007, Russia and China accepted that NATO, on behalf of the UN, could use 
the Responsibility to Protect norm to authorize air support to protect the civil-
ians and the rebels against Gaddafi in Libya. Western powers went far beyond 
this mandate though, by instituting a complete regime change. So, Russia and 
China feared that even having the Security Council authorize ‘no-fly’ zones 
over Syria would be the thin-edge-of-the-wedge to permit the complete over-
throw of the Assad regime. They considered that stopping such a precedent for 
intervention in domestic affairs is vital to their interests and worthy of a veto—
however hard it is for the rest of the world to understand because it permitted 
this deadly war to continue for six years. 
Given this situation, many critics have called for the complete abolition of 
vetoes in the UN. Meanwhile, those who think the P5 will never let go of their 
advantage propose that the world work toward a curtailment of the veto so that 
its use would exclude resolutions dealing with war crimes and be limited 
strictly to resolutions directly affecting the vital interests of a P5 state.  
Another basic problem with the current Security Council is that it is not 
representative of the world to which it is supposed to give leadership. This has 
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led to calls for the expansion of its membership, for which there has already 
been a precedent in 1965 (one of the few amendments of the UN Charter). 
However, this too is deeply political and the debate has been ongoing for dec-
ades. Various proposals for reforming the Security Council, specifically those 
dealing with the issue of representation, are discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. 
In sum, the Security Council can be very effective at protecting international 
peace and security when its members are able to work together. Since the end 
of the Cold War, it has proved influential and even transformative as it has 
asserted the UN’s responsibility to intervene, even in internal conflicts. Yet it 
has crucial shortcomings, including its occasional failure to act, its unrepre-
sentative nature and its two-tier membership of permanent and non-permanent 
members. 
The General Assembly 
The General Assembly (GA) is the main deliberative organ of the United Na-
tions. It is composed of one representative from each member state, each of 
which has one vote. It is sort of like the UN’s legislature where all the general 
debates are held. The significance of having all 193 member states debating 
together in one place for three months of the year (September to December)—
and on 24-hour call the rest of the time—cannot be over-emphasized. Whether 
they like it or not, they are learning to apply the rules of international law, 
diplomacy and even democracy. They practice getting along and listening to 
one another. They learn to live by the rules of the game—and, indeed, deter-
mine what the rules of the game are. They learn to persuade rather than to fight. 
This is no small matter when you consider the UN has grown from 51 members 
when it was founded in 1945 to 193 members by 2011 (the year that the last 
new member, South Sudan, joined). Thus, the GA is a cornerstone institution 
which demonstrates the UN’s distinctive universality—the very thing from 
which it derives its legitimacy. That may be why so many heads of state turn 
up for its annual general debate each September, which symbolizes the UN’s 
convening power. Together, the above attributes define what is called the prin-
ciple of ‘multilateralism’. Nonetheless, we have to recognize that since the 
1980s, the Assembly has been largely eclipsed by the more active Security 
Council and by the fact that major states have turned to institutions or grouping 
such as the World Bank and the Group of 20 to manage international economic 
relations. 
Article 11 of the UN Charter authorizes the General Assembly to “consider” 
and “discuss” peace and security and “make recommendations” to members, 
except on issues being considered by the Security Council, to which it must 
also refer questions of “action”. Article 13 spells out the GA’s main fields of 
competence. It shall initiate studies and make recommendations for political 
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cooperation, development of international law, and promoting international co-
operation in the “economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields”, as 
well as assist in the realization of “human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
Often fundamental developments can take a long time. For instance, the Mal-
tese ambassador’s well-known speech in 1967, which called for international 
regulations relating to the sea and proposing that the seabed and its resources 
were the “common heritage of mankind”, was just the start of a 15-year long 
debate that eventually led to the Law of the Sea. Even so, we should note that 
it is often the bilateral and multilateral discussions that go on outside the formal 
debates that make the more significant contribution to the peaceful unfolding 
of world affairs. 
The Assembly elects a new president each year as well as 21 vice-presidents 
and the heads of its six Main Committees. Anyone can become involved. 
Whether countries are small, medium or large, the Assembly tends to give as 
many delegates as possible some position of responsibility—with attendant 
recognition and rewards. Yet not all relations are cozy. Power has shifted in 
the Assembly since 1945 as the regional distribution of states has changed. 
From the UN’s inception to the present day, the number of African states has 
increased from 3 to 54, those of Asia have risen from 9 to 53, while those of 
the West and Latin America have only doubled, from 39 to 85. The GA is riven 
by all sorts of groupings, mainly regional and the North–South split but also 
historical (the British Commonwealth) and cultural/linguistic (Spanish, 
French, Arab, etc.). 
The two major blocs representing the ‘developing countries’ of the ‘South’ 
are the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with its 114 members and the Group 
of 77 with 133 members—many of them overlapping. The NAM was formed 
during the Cold War as a home for those who did not simply want to be swept 
up in the Communist-Capitalist divide. The G77 was founded several years 
later in 1964 to coordinate the position of developing countries on trade and 
development and to help them get a better collective grip on international trade 
and finance. Together they work to defend the General Assembly against what 
they perceive to be US dominance and attempts by the Great Powers to mar-
ginalize them. Some see the NAM as a holdover generally used to oppose the 
United States. Nonetheless, it is claimed that the Third World majority was 
hobbled by the fact that its majority inside the Assembly is not paralleled by 
resources for action outside. This highlights the GA’s weakness as a delibera-
tive body without effective administrative and coercive capabilities. This is in 
addition to the fact that the blocs tend to slow the process and bring decisions 
down to the ‘lowest common denominator’—all of which underlies the ten-
dency to want to boot all the action up to the Security Council. 
The General Assembly’s recommendations or “resolutions” are only bind-
ing when they apply to the UN’s internal operations such as budget and mem-
bership matters. It elects the rotating members of the Security Council and the 
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Economic and Social Council, and, along with the Security Council, it elects 
the judges of the International Court of Justice. It appoints the secretary-gen-
eral on the recommendation of the Security Council.  
The Assembly’s current agenda runs to some 175 items arrayed across nine 
broad categories. To get through the agenda, the GA relies on its committee 
system to examine issues and propose solutions. There is a General Committee, 
a Credentials Committee and six Main Committees (see Box 3). 
Box 3: The General Assembly’s six Main Committees 
First Committee – Disarmament and National Security 
Second Committee – Economic and Financial 
Third Committee – Social, Humanitarian and Cultural 
Fourth Committee – Special Political and Decolonization 
Fifth Committee – Administrative and Budgetary 
Sixth Committee – Legal 
Although these committees handle discussion of the main issues before the 
UN, the actual agenda reflects the more day-to-day workings of the world such 
as sustained economic growth and sustainable development; drug control, 
crime prevention and combating terrorism; disarmament; and maintenance of 
international peace and security. As can be imagined, each of these items has 
many subsections. 
One of the main functions of the General Assembly is as a repository for 
international treaty making. Much international, multilateral activity and inter-
national law is treaty based. Treaties are also called covenants. The United 
Nations itself is essentially a treaty among all its state members (through the 
Charter). A member state becomes ‘party’ to a treaty by formally ‘consenting 
to be bound’ by its terms, usually via ‘ratification’ of the treaty by its legisla-
ture. Each treaty sets out a minimum number of states that must ratify it for it 
to become international law by which its signatories are bound. Later, other 
states may accede to the treaty/convention. An oversight committee is often 
established as a ‘convention secretariat’ to monitor the implementation of the 
treaty.  
The most significant criticism of the General Assembly is that it does not 
represent the world effectively. With the GA’s ‘one member, one vote’ policy, 
China gets the same representation as Malta. In 2013, 39 member states had 
populations under one million and 13 had populations under 100,000. The 65 
least populated member states could together block a two-thirds majority vote, 
despite comprising less than 1 per cent of the total population of all member 
nations. And, theoretically, the 128 least populated members—which account 
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for less than 8.5 per cent of humanity and collectively pay under 1.3 per cent 
of the total UN budget—could provide the two-thirds majority required to 
adopt a resolution (Schwartzberg 2013: 19-20). In other words, the power in 
the General Assembly is skewed away from the largest states. As Schwartzberg 
concludes from these figures, “If one is to oppose—quite rightly—the undem-
ocratic veto by any one of the five strong nations with permanent membership 
in the SC, one should also oppose unwarranted exercises of political power by 
GA coalitions of the very weak.” (ibid: 20). 
There are also criticisms of the GA’s ineffectual processes. It is accused of 
debating minutiae and of being unable to reach closure on issues that squander 
its prestige. Past secretaries-general have noted its need to streamline proce-
dures and structures. In fact, most of the largest countries have ‘voted with 
their feet’ and fled the UN to work through the more restrained membership of 
the G7 and the G20. To overcome these deficiencies there are proposals for 
‘weighted voting’ that would combine a country’s population and economic 
contributions with its vote as a state (see Schwartzberg 2013). It is certainly 
clear that reforms are needed to attract the important players to reconsider the 
United Nations as an effective forum of global decision-making. 
The Economic and Social Council  
ECOSOC is the acronym used to refer to the third principal organ of the UN, 
the Economic and Social Council. Its primary functions are to be a central fo-
rum for discussing economic, social and environmental issues, to formulate 
policy recommendations for states and the UN, and to integrate the three pillars 
of sustainable development. The UN Charter spells out both its policy and ad-
vocacy roles, stating that it may make or initiate studies with respect to inter-
national economic, social, cultural, educational, and health matters, as well as 
human rights; make policy recommendations to the General Assembly; and 
convene conferences. It is also responsible for coordinating the work of UN 
agencies (e.g., UNICEF, UNESCO) in these fields and is the intermediary be-
tween the GA and the more than 30,000 NGOs doing development work and 
humanitarian advocacy (including the approximately 4,000 that have consul-
tative status with ECOSOC).  
The Council’s current 54 members, elected by the General Assembly on a 
geographical basis, serve three year terms. They elect their own president and 
four vice-presidents every year. Decisions are by majority vote with each 
member having one vote. It holds preparatory meetings along with relevant 
NGOs and then holds a four-week substantive session in July, alternating be-
tween New York and Geneva. This session includes a high-level segment that 
cabinet ministers and other officials are meant to attend. The Council is in-
tended to coordinate the work of UN programmes and funds, and specialized 
42 
agencies. The year-round work of ECOSOC is carried out by its subsidiary and 
related bodies including: eight functional commissions (statistics, population, 
social development, women, narcotics, crime, science and technology, and for-
ests and sustainable development—now a high-level political forum); five re-
gional commissions (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Latin America and Carib-
bean, and Western Asia); three standing administrative committees; a Perma-
nent Forum on Indigenous Issues; and a number of expert bodies (for instance 
on tax matters and transport of dangerous goods).  
ECOSOC has long been criticized for its ineffectiveness. There have been 
many efforts to reform it over the decades, and yet it is perhaps the organ that 
has shown the least amount of change. Its difficulties stem from a host of rea-
sons. First, its responsibilities and functions often overlap with those of the 
General Assembly. Although the Charter elevates ECOSOC to the rank of a 
principal organ, it also clearly places it under the authority of the GA. As we 
saw above, the Second Committee of the GA deals with economic and finan-
cial matters, while the Third Committee’s mandate covers the social, humani-
tarian and cultural fields. On top of this duplication, the Assembly has the ad-
vantage of being the UN’s foremost plenary debating society where everyone 
has a voice, while ECOSOC is one-quarter its size.  
Second, many large countries, particularly Western, industrialized nations, 
have long sought to limit the UN’s voice when it comes to the international 
economy. They certainly do not want the UN to be the central forum for de-
bating and coordinating economic policy. Nor do they want to be held hostage 
to listening to the grievances of the scores of small and poor developing coun-
tries that dominate the General Assembly and ECOSOC. This sheds light on 
why, at the creation of the UN, the Great Powers shovelled the serious eco-
nomic matters to the independent World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund where they not only control the agenda but also nominate leaders. This 
was part of a long process of diverting the UN away from macro-economic 
policy-making and toward development assistance. More recently, the wealth-
iest countries have fled the UN in the direction of the G7 and the G20 to discuss 
economic matters.  
Third, in order to promote decentralization, the founders of the UN endowed 
the 14 Specialized Agencies with their own governing apparatus. Each one re-
ports to its own state authorities. The result is that they have never felt com-
pelled to want to be ‘coordinated’ by ECOSOC. As if these fundamental prob-
lems were not enough, the very ponderous nature of ECOSOC also dooms it 
to irrelevance. Its 54 members are too numerous to be decisive and too few to 
have the attraction of the General Assembly. Its processes and meetings are 
too cumbersome to attract powerful ministers and to deal with emergency is-
sues when the UN really needs to be active.  
ECOSOC has been adorned with such adjectives as ‘fuzzy’, ‘powerless’ and 
‘lacking a clear identity’. Proposed reforms have run into the opposition of 
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foreign ministries of powerful countries, the General Assembly or the Security 
Council. So, ECOSOC continues to limp along helping to advance programs 
for development and technical matters. It does now meet with the international 
financial institutions and interacts with the Security Council, but the issues of 
its ambiguous relations with the General Assembly, the non-binding nature of 
its decisions and its composition remain to be solved. Chapter 3 will explore 
some past attempts at reform, as well as ideas put forward by experts to trans-
form ECOSOC into a workable institution.  
Trusteeship Council 
There is an additional, little known principal organ of the UN, now in disuse. 
It is the Trusteeship Council, originally created in 1945 to administer and su-
pervise the 80 countries still under colonial jurisdiction while on their path to 
independence under the guidance of the UN. Palau, a small island group in the 
Pacific, was the last trust territory before becoming a UN member in 1994. 
Despite considerable thought and effort by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a 
majority could never be rallied behind any of the propositions for an amend-
ment to the Charter to change the Council’s vocation (e.g., to be an environ-
mental council). Hence, the Trusteeship Council simply suspended operations 
in 1994 and ceased to exist except on paper. This story demonstrates that the 
founders of the UN could not foresee every eventuality. It also illustrates how 
difficult it would be to amend the Charter, even when there is relative consen-
sus on non-threatening modifications to better reflect the current reality. De-
spite the hurdles that would need to be overcome, the former Trusteeship 
Council is available to be used for some new purpose. 
The International Court of Justice 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), founded in 1946 as part of the Charter, 
is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Located in The Hague 
(the Netherlands), it is the only one of the six principal organs not located in 
New York. Also known as the ‘World Court’, it is the only court of a universal 
character with general jurisdiction. Its first role is to settle legal disputes sub-
mitted by states in accordance with international law (see Box 4). There are 
more than 180,000 inter-state treaties in the UN registry and over 500 major 
multilateral treaties, for which the secretary-general is the repository. ICJ 
judgements have binding force for the parties concerned and are without ap-
peal. Second, the Court gives advisory opinions on legal questions referred by 
UN organs and agencies.  
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Box 4: Understanding ‘international law’ 
In general, international law includes duly ratified international treaties 
and conventions, decisions of the Security Council, international custom, 
the general principles of law, and, in a subsidiary manner, previous judi-
cial decisions and the teachings of the most notable international law ex-
perts. In a broader sense, ‘soft-law’ may include declarations, statements, 
and plans of action agreed to by signatory countries or international con-
ferences. Together they provide the norms of international law, but not 
the coordinating framework for an international legal regime. 
 
The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly 
in 1947 to promote the progressive development of international law and its 
codification. A major part of their work is preparing drafts of aspects of inter-
national law and submitting them to the GA. The GA may then convene a con-
ference to incorporate the draft into a convention, open to states to become 
parties if they agree to be bound by its provisions. Some regulate relations be-
tween states such as the Conventions on Diplomatic Relations, Consular Rela-
tions and the Law of Treaties. There are also a number of extensive bodies of 
law such as International Trade Law and Environmental Law. One of the 
world’s most comprehensive instruments is the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, with its 320 articles and nine annexes. It is now universally 
accepted that all activities and resources in the oceans and seas are governed 
by the Convention, with its 165 states parties. For instance, there is general 
acceptance of 12 nautical miles as the limit of a country’s territorial sea and 
also of an exclusive economic zone and also continental shelf zone up to 200 
miles. The Convention has also brought stability to navigation, establishing the 
right of innocent passage in territorial waters, transit passage in narrow straits, 
and freedom of navigation in the exclusive economic zone.  
The ICJ has delivered fewer than 100 judgements on cases running from 
boundaries and sovereignty to violations of humanitarian law and diplomatic 
disputes. It has also rendered 27 advisory opinions. Thus, the Court is not ex-
actly over-worked. This is in part because only member states can submit dis-
putes (no individual or other international actor can bring a case forward) and 
states must bind themselves in advance to accept the ruling. The ICJ is not a 
‘constitutional court’ for the UN system and has no legal review of decisions. 
There is also little power of enforcement. 
The International Court of Justice is now buttressed by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), an independent permanent court founded by the Rome 
Statute in 1998 and entered into force in 2002. By 2013 it had been ratified by 
122 states parties. It tries persons accused of ‘international crimes’: genocide, 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. We include it here for completeness; 
however, it is not part of the United Nations. Its creation was facilitated by the 
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UN and cooperation between the ICC and the UN is governed by a ‘negotiated 
relationship agreement’. The Security Council can refer cases to it. The ICC is 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 4.  
In its attempts to expand international humanitarian law, the Security Coun-
cil also established the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia (1993) and for Rwanda (1994) and supported the special courts for Si-
erra Leone (2002), Cambodia (2006) and Lebanon (2007). These are some-
times referred to as ‘hybrid courts’, which cease to exist once all cases have 
been heard. 
The Secretariat 
The Secretariat includes all departments and offices that develop policy and 
administer the UN. It is the head and the heart of the international organization. 
Despite continuous accusations of a ‘huge bureaucracy’ from enemies of the 
UN, the reality is that there are only around 40,000 staff (as of June 2016), 
comparable to the personnel of some municipalities and indeed less than that 
of the New York City police and fire departments. Of these, roughly half are 
located in the field; the remaining half are based out of cities where the Secre-
tariat has a presence, mainly New York where it is headquartered but also Ge-
neva, Vienna, Nairobi and others. The Secretariat services the other principal 
organs and administers the programs and policies they establish. The duties 
carried out by the Secretariat include: peacekeeping administration, mediation 
of international disputes, organizing humanitarian programs, surveying eco-
nomic and social trends, studies on human rights and sustainable development, 
and promoting international agreements. It also has the task of developing pub-
lic information and organizing international conferences.  
The list of departments and offices within the Secretariat (see Figure 2) 
shows the immense scope of UN activities. In addition to the diverse respon-
sibilities listed above, it must also stay abreast of current affairs, whether re-
lated to economic and social affairs, peacekeeping or human rights. Given the 
‘globalization of everything’, from financial instability to the movement of 
people, this is no easy task. To finance its work, the Secretariat’s 2016-2017 
budget was approximately $2.4 billion—about half the UN’s total biennium 
budget for these two years. To secure the human and financial resources to 
carry out its responsibilities, the secretary-general and his assistants must con-
tinually bargain, negotiate and ‘beg, borrow and steal’ with the member states 
and, to a lesser extent, the corporate sector.  
It can be said that over time the Secretariat has been as well run as any 
bureaucracy. In response to multiple criticisms (especially from the Ameri-
cans), it has been studied, restructured and seen its budget and personnel re-
duced many times. For instance, in 1997-98 Kofi Annan brought together some 
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thirty departments, funds and programmes into four executive groups for De-
velopment; Political and Security Affairs; Humanitarian Affairs; and Human 
Rights—a basic model which is still adhered to. New safeguards on spending 
and corruption are continually instituted.  
The real problem with the Secretariat lies in the refusal of nation-states to 
allow it to be a fully meritocratic international public service as was originally 
tried with some success under the League of Nations. Everyone, the major 
powers included, has reasons for wanting to control the secretariat—or not 
wanting someone else to do so. In 1945 it was intended in Charter Articles 100 
and 101 that staff members would be independent of any government. Article 
100 enunciated the principle of an independent, international civil service and 
Article 101 spelled out the overriding values of the “highest standards of effi-
ciency, competence and integrity”. But under pressure from the Soviet Union, 
a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ was reached in London in 1946 and the five perma-
nent members were ‘assigned’ major departments of the Secretariat. This was 
the beginning of the seesaw battle that has continued ever since between those 
who want a professional and independent public service and those who want 
to place their nationals in strategic positions. The latter have been winning. 
Reinforced by demands for ‘geographical distribution’, there has been a grow-
ing politicization of the Secretariat over the years and often poor management, 
lack of accountability and cronyism. Staff members have also complained 
about poor administrative justice in the Secretariat (Jonah 2007: 165). 
Beyond the organs 
The Secretary-General 
“There are limits to what the Secretary-General can do… Multilateral institutions 
(such as the UN) are conditioned by changing international power configurations, 
and by conflicts that exist within the broader international system” Edward Newman 
(2007: 189) 
Active and skilful secretaries-general such as Dag Hammarskjöld and Kofi An-
nan have managed to transform a rather benign position into a “symbol of the 
United Nation’s ideals and a spokesperson for the interests of the world’s peo-
ples” (UN Information Service). The secretary-general is named by the Gen-
eral Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council for a term of 
five years. Almost all have completed two terms (see Box 5 for the complete 
list of past SGs). The description of the position in the Charter is very skimpy. 
It says little more than, “he shall be the chief administrative officer of the Or-
ganization” (UN Charter, Article 97). The UN’s description of the position is 
a little clearer, stating that the secretary-general “establishes general policies 
47 
and provides overall guidance to the organization and is in equal parts diplomat 
and advocate, civil servant and chief executive officer” (Basic Facts about the 
UN 2014: 17). Tradition has it that the founders expected the SG to be more 
secretary than general. Nevertheless, the world expects him to ‘speak truth to 
power’ by telling “the Security Council what it has to know, not what it wants 
to hear”, as Michael Sheehan, former assistant secretary-general for peace-
keeping, put it (Fasulo 2015: 27). In fact, the most significant function of the 
SG is to make the Council aware of any impending dangers to peace and secu-
rity. 
Box 5: Secretaries-General, 1945-present 
Trygve Lie (Norway)   1946-1952 
Dag Hammarskjöld (Sweden)  1953-1961 
U Thant (Burma)   1961-1971 
Kurt Waldheim (Austria)  1972-1981 
Javier Pérez de Cuellar (Peru)  1982-1991 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Egypt)  1992-1996 
Kofi Annan (Ghana)   1997-2006 
Ban Ki-moon (South Korea)  2007-2016   
Antonio Guterres (Portugal)  2017-  
The SG also chairs the Chief Executives Board of the UN system including all 
the funds, programmes and agencies, and the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. This is as close as the UN gets to coordination. Traditionally 
the SGs have rotated among the world’s regions. All have been men, but the 
calls for a woman head of the UN have become louder. 
Needless to say, the secretary-general cannot do everything him or herself. 
The SG is surrounded by 15 under-secretaries-general who manage the various 
departments of the Secretariat. Since 1998, the SG has also been seconded by 
a deputy secretary-general to help with the administrative burden and special 
activities. To help carry out the secretary-general’s all-important use of his 
‘good offices’ (negotiation, mediation, conflict prevention, public relations, 
arm twisting in public and private, etc.), the SG can name special and personal 
representatives and envoys, including ‘Messengers of Peace’ and ‘Goodwill 
Ambassadors’. Each secretary-general also must focus the UN’s activities de-
pendent on the international context. For example, Ban Ki-moon’s focus for 
his second term from 2012 to 2016 included sustainable development, climate 
change, prevention of natural disasters, armed conflict, human rights abuses, a 
more secure world, nations in transition, and women and youth.  
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One analyst has summed up very well the complexities of the secretary-
general’s position. “Without the traditional levers of power, the Secretary-Gen-
eral can nevertheless wield real influence in international politics through the 
use of moral suasion and his authority as the embodiment of the ‘international 
community’. However, this is always within the context of an organization 
controlled by member states which have as their primary concern their national 
interests.” (Newman 2007: 175). 
 Given the significance of the secretary-general’s position, there have al-
ways been debates over the scope of its powers and the mode of nomination. 
The nomination comes from the Security Council, which essentially means 
those states which can veto any proposal (the Permanent Five members, though 
in effect just the largest—the United States, China and Russia). There has been 
no openness, foresight or planning. Critics have long called for a serious selec-
tion process with specified qualifications, an extended search, rules for nomi-
nation, a timetable for discussion and a single seven-year term to avoid poli-
ticking. Thanks to the 1 for 7 Billion campaign led by the World Federalists 
Movement and the British United Nations Association, the Security Council 
finally relented in 2015 and gave the critics half a cake. It was decided that 
while the method of selection would go according to tradition, there would be 
an open nomination process for all countries and candidates would make their 
case to the General Assembly. There were 10 official candidates in the 2016 
selection for the next secretary-general. Half the candidates were women, fol-
lowing significant pressure for a woman to hold the top post. The entire process 
was more transparent than it had been in the past, with public dialogue and 
televised debates. But the single nomination still came from the Security Coun-
cil, and it was done in secret. 
The candidate finally chosen by the Security Council and elected by the 
General Assembly was Antonio Guterres. Mr. Guterres served as Prime Min-
ister of Portugal (1995-2002) and as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
for two mandates (2005-2015). He was known at the UN for maintaining good 
relations with member states, civil society and the private sector. He also re-
formed and innovated in his Office while minimizing its costs. 
In his ‘vision statement’ presented to the General Assembly in April 2016, 
Antonio Guterres summarized his intended priorities for the coming years. He 
spoke to the need for new approaches to deal with the challenges of our time, 
which include inequality, exclusion and the changing nature of conflict. He 
envisioned a UN that is able to ‘connect the dots’ through a holistic approach 
that effectively links the three pillars of peace and security, sustainable devel-
opment and human rights. To achieve this, Guterres highlighted the importance 
of reforming the UN Development System, mainstreaming both human rights 
and gender equality across the whole UN system, and implementing the 
Agenda 2030, the Paris Climate Agreement, and the Addis Ababa Action 
Agenda. He went on to emphasize the centrality of prevention in ensuring 
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peace and security, and specifically the need for diplomacy, the participation 
of women and institution building. Reform and innovation, focused on delivery 
and results, is another key priority outlined. He stated his view that reform is 
not a onetime action but a permanent attitude, and that efforts should centre on 
being less bureaucratic and more productive, efficient and field oriented. Fi-
nally, he called for strong partnerships with regional organizations, the inter-
national financial institutions, civil society and the private sector. 
UN budgets 
The United Nations General Assembly approved a two-year UN budget of $5.4 
billion for 2016-2017, down 1 per cent from the total spending during the pre-
vious two years. The new biennial budget includes a 2 per cent staffing cut, or 
some 221 posts, and a one-year freeze in staff compensation. This is not the 
first time there has been a decrease in the UN budget. In fact, the organization 
is almost always held on a short financial leash by member states. Many critics 
believe the endemic underfunding of the UN is its most crucial problem. On 
the other hand, many members, led by the United States, have over the years 
accused the Secretariat of being a bloated bureaucracy and profligate 
spender—whether this be a gross exaggeration or not. 
As in past years, the biennial budget negotiations were marked by a tussle 
between poor countries seeking to increase the UN development spending, and 
major developed countries, the biggest budget contributors, trying to rein in 
the figures as they struggle to reduce expenditures in their own national budg-
ets. 
The so-called core UN budget that was adopted does not include peacekeep-
ing, currently running at over $8 billion a year and approved in separate nego-
tiations. Noteworthy is the fact that the total peacekeeping budget represents 
less than half of one per cent of annual world military spending, estimated at 
$1.7 trillion in 2016, or 2.3 per cent of world gross domestic product (GDP). 
Nor does the core budget cover the costs of the UN tribunals. Both the peace-
keeping and the tribunals are covered by payments assessed by the Assembly, 
mainly among the wealthier countries. The individual budgets of the major UN 
agencies and programmes (such as UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, UNESCO and 
WHO) are funded by voluntary contributions from member states.  
The UN System 
Technically speaking, the ‘United Nations System’ is formed of the UN family 
of organizations that includes the principal organs, the United Nations pro-
grammes and funds, the specialized agencies and other related organizations 
(although many of us do use the term UN System more loosely to refer to all  
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organisms related to the UN). Programmes, funds and offices are subsidiary 
bodies of the General Assembly. On the other hand, the specialized agencies 
are independent but are linked to the UN through individual agreements and 
report to ECOSOC and/or the Assembly. There is also a difference in funding. 
While all subsist on chronically inadequate voluntary contributions from mem-
ber countries, the specialized agencies also receive contributions from the 
overall UN budget. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the World 
Trade Organization are considered to be ‘related organizations’ with their own 
legislative bodies. As we just saw, an attempt to coordinate the UN system is 
made by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination. 
With its 29 members and chaired by the Secretary-General, it meets twice a 
year.  
The need for better coordination across the system has been an issue for 
decades. In fact, in their analysis of the lack of institutional coherence of the 
UN system, Childers and Urquhart concluded that the founders understood 
from the outset that a loose assemblage of agencies could not provide adequate 
governance. Recognizing this, the founders had specifically designed linkages 
that could make a loose collection of organizations work. From the outset it 
was intended that the UN would be the authoritative hub “able to forge coor-
dinated strategies” (1994: 40), while the specialized agencies (by signed legal 
agreements under Articles 57, 58 and 63 of the Charter) were meant to have 
their objectives coordinated along with varying degrees of administrative har-
monization and coherence. Yet these were never implemented. Moreover, 
while it was deliberate that specialized agencies would have their own separate 
legal existence and secretariats (so that politicians and diplomats could not hin-
der progress on specialized and technical matters), it was never envisaged that 
the agencies would grab the degree of separateness that has become one of the 
system’s chief weaknesses.  
As the authors deduce, “There is no intergovernmental assembly or council 
of the UN system as a whole.” (ibid: 31). Now we see why so many ‘reformers’ 
are turning to a restructured ECOSOC as the potential new central pillar for 
economic, social and environmental policy cohesion. 
International financial institutions and other international actors  
The two major international financial institutions, the World Bank Group and 
the International Monetary Fund, are in a class apart. Founded at the Bretton 
Woods Conference in 1944, they are also known as the Bretton Woods insti-
tutions. Although they are completely independent, they are considered to be 
two of the 15 Specialized Agencies of the United Nations with which they 
maintain formal relations through the Chief Executives Board for Coordina-
tion. However, the founders of the UN specifically separated these two major 
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financial institutions from the rest of the UN, presumably to reduce political 
interference and provide for shareholder governance as described below. 
The World Bank Group evolved from the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (that facilitated post-Second World War recon-
struction) to today’s five financial institutions with a mandate to provide fi-
nancing and technical assistance for worldwide poverty alleviation. The five 
institutions are: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
the International Development Association, the International Finance Corpo-
ration, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
In 2016, the World Bank Group provided $64.2 billion for financial and 
technical assistance to developing countries around the world, making it one 
of the largest sources of such financing. This assistance supports a wide array 
of investments in such areas as education, health, public administration, infra-
structure, financial and private sector development, agriculture, and environ-
mental and natural resource management. The International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD) makes loans for development projects to 
governments of middle income and creditworthy low-income countries; in 
2016 it made new commitments of $29.7 billion in 114 operations. The Inter-
national Development Association (IDA) provides interest free loans (called 
credits) and grants to governments of the poorest countries with terms varying 
from 25 to 38 years. It made new commitments of $16.2 billion in 162 opera-
tions in 2016. Together, IBRD and IDA make up “the World Bank” (as op-
posed to “the World Bank Group” which consists of all five institutions).  
The primary purpose of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to ensure 
the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange 
rates and international payments that enables countries to transact with each 
other. It does so in three ways: keeping track of the global economy and the 
economies of member countries; lending to countries with balance of payments 
difficulties; and giving practical help to members. For instance, along with Eu-
ropean banks, it was the major lender to help Greece out of its troubles in 2014. 
The Fund's mandate was updated in 2012 to include all macroeconomic and 
financial sector issues that bear on global stability. Since the global economic 
crisis in 2009, it has also strengthened its support for low-income countries to 
respond to changing economic conditions and their increased vulnerabilities.  
For both the Bank and the IMF, the 189 member countries subscribe funds 
according to their economic strength. Voting power is linked to the level of 
subscription. While the voting shares vary by organization, the US, Japan, Ger-
many, France and Great Britain control roughly 35 per cent of the votes. Each 
member country appoints one governor and one alternate to the Boards of Gov-
ernors, which meet annually. The governors are usually ministers of finance or 
governors of a central bank. Traditionally, the President of the World Bank has 
been American while the Managing Director of the IMF has been European. 
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However, the IMF has moved toward an open, merit based process for selec-
tion of the Managing Director in 2011 and the World Bank is likely to follow. 
The international financial institutions do more than provide loans and reg-
ulate the international economy. They also impose conditions. Starting in the 
late 1980s, what was called the ‘Washington Consensus’ promoted neo-liberal 
rules to reduce the role of governments in the economy and increase the role 
of market forces. The World Bank and IMF were able to promote that view 
throughout the developing world by attaching policy conditions to the major 
loans they made for budgetary support. Countries were obliged to cut public 
spending, eliminate subsidies, and privatize state-owned industries. Later in 
the 1990s this was described under the banner of ‘good governance’ and in-
cluded democratization and transparency. As time went on it was recognized 
that these policies often spawned more poverty in developing countries and 
more foreign ownership. Government fiscal restraint sometimes made national 
financial emergencies worse rather than better. 
Founded in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a successor to 
the post-war General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Over 50 years, 
the GATT successfully cut tariff protection by more than half among member 
states, but it had several perceived weaknesses. Formal disputes among mem-
bers, for instance, relied on the consent of all parties, including the defendant, 
to proceed. Countries could simply block proceedings against themselves, 
though, interestingly, they rarely did. Yet the WTO is a comparatively far more 
legalistic institution. It also has a broader scope, encompassing issues such as 
health and safety measures, and intellectual property. Like the GATT, the 
WTO continues to operate by a consensus voting rule. Combined with its large 
membership, which counts 164 members as of 2016, this consensus rule has 
been faulted by many for the institution's current stalemate: its last negotiation 
round, the Doha Round, has been stalled for over a decade. Yet one aspect of 
the institution, its dispute settlement function, continues to thrive. Among in-
ternational courts, it stands out by its large caseload, with over 500 disputes 
filed, its high level of compliance with its rulings, and the consistency of its 
jurisprudence. Insofar as countries continue to liberalize trade under the 
WTO’s auspices, it is through the continuous clarification of their obligations 
that occurs with the settlement of formal disputes. Although it is not a formal 
part of the UN, the WTO maintains regular relations with parts of the UN sys-
tem.  
The rise of other international actors cannot be ignored (see Box 6). Enu-
merated her are those that are now generally accepted in the international rela-
tions literature but we must keep our eyes open for powerful new partners on 
the global stage.  
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Box 6: Other ‘actors’ enter the world stage 
The term ‘actors’, as it is used here, refers to groups which have a signif-
icant enough influence on international politics that they must be taken 
into consideration both by other players and by analysts. Up until the 
1980s and 90s it was generally agreed the only influential actors in inter-
national politics were nations states and their creatures like the United 
Nations and other international organizations. One of the major changes 
in international politics is the presence of new actors which cannot be 
ignored. These, in particular, include civil society, in the form of NGOs, 
and the private sector represented by multinational corporations—but 
also the media, religious groups, regional actors, and major cities. 
 
Civil society, which is considered the “third sector” of society, distinct from 
government and business, comprises NGOs, social movements, religious insti-
tutions, academics, unions and all other non-state organizations and institutions 
that promote the interests of citizens. A recent count placed the number of 
NGOs at more than 50,000; most created since the 1980s and 90s. Some NGOs 
have more resources than even UN agencies. Civil society is most effective 
when its members come together in what are called ‘campaign coalitions’ to 
influence major international decisions, such as the creation of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, the ban on landmines, and R2P. It derives its strength, 
in great part, from having come to represent democratic forces and because it 
can influence public opinion, the media and corporations at both national and 
international levels. It is also a source of international expertise. 
Similarly, the corporate world has become increasingly influential in inter-
national politics, where it is now considered to be an important partner. The 
relationship reached new heights in 2000 when the UN created the Global 
Compact to encourage businesses to adopt sustainability principles and report 
on their implementation. Over 9,000 companies have since joined the initia-
tive. 
Another set of new actors, the G7 and G20 provide ideal settings for eco-
nomic influence. The Group of 7, made up of the wealthiest and most powerful 
Western allies and Japan, wanted a space for policy making that could focus 
on the political issues of the moment. The Group of 20 is composed of the 
world’s largest economies. Some consider it a necessary institution to deal with 
world financial crises and economic planning away from the discordant de-
mands of the UN. Others see it as the antithesis of attempts to create universal 
diplomatic forums. Concentrating on short term issues determined by the most 
powerful, it is a throwback to the Concert of Europe with no agenda for devel-
opment and no secretariat to carry out any long term purposes. An increasingly 
important actor on the international stage is also the World Economic Forum, 
meeting annually in Davos, Switzerland. It claims to be committed to 
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improving the state of the world and engages the foremost political, business 
and other leaders of society to try to shape global, regional and industry agen-
das. 
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Chapter 2 – Peace and Security:  
Fixing the Security Council 
“Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding” Albert 
Einstein 
We already outlined the Council’s mission and structures in the last chapter. 
Now our task is to understand what works and what does not in the Security 
Council. In the UN, it is rarely all or nothing. We have to avoid the temptation 
to exaggerate. The Security Council has made great strides since the 1990s. 
And yet there remain fundamental blockages to its goal of overseeing peace 
and security in the world. 
Most of us would like to take a straightforward, rational approach to ana-
lyzing a subject like the Security Council. Unfortunately, it does not lend itself 
well to seeking consistent explanations. It is too fraught with complexity, con-
tradictions and anomalies to present purely reasonable conclusions. For in-
stance, according to the UN Charter, all members are meant to be equal but the 
Permanent Five veto-holding members are evidently more equal than the oth-
ers. While the Security Council is meant to uphold international peace and 
security, most of its energy is spent on interventionist peace operations within 
war-torn countries. The UN is not meant to meddle in the sovereign affairs of 
independent countries and yet the Security Council regularly does so with im-
punity. Despite the Charter, the Council has moved partially from a Westpha-
lian sovereignty perspective toward global community responsibility. Another 
obvious conundrum is that the Security Council is responsible for peace and 
security and yet not only does it allow the bloodiest conflicts to go on endlessly 
but it sometimes appears that some of its members aid and abet them. So when 
we analyze the Security Council we must be at pains to sort out the wheat from 
the chaff and to seek underlying causes and explanations wherever possible. 
We also must blend our focus on the Security Council with an attention to the 
broader world security perspective. 
Finally, by way of introductory comment, it should be stated that the mean-
ing of ‘peace and security’ has evolved over the decades. Originally, it simply 
meant the ‘national security’ of the nation-state. Later it came to mean the 
‘common security’ of the international or global community, which is chiefly 
the responsibility of the United Nations. More recently, ‘human security’ has 
been added to focus on individuals—especially civilians in war-torn situa-
tions—and the responsibility of governments to them.  
In another sense the term refers to a whole array of global challenges that 
lead to ‘insecurity’. A first example would be terrorism, which seeks to spread 
fear and conflict. States have been unable to even agree on a definition of ter-
rorism, as one person’s terrorist can be another person’s freedom fighter or 
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even agent of a government. Then there are mass migrations which, as we have 
seen in Europe, can upset the balance of societies, create frictions, lead to po-
litical disputes and even threaten regional integration efforts. The effects of 
climate change, including rising water levels, extreme weather conditions and 
greater migration, will only intensify. Pandemics can send whole countries and 
regions into a tailspin and cause an international blame-game. Cyber attacks 
are a less deadly but nevertheless destructive form of warfare. Economic 
shocks spread from one country to another. International crime and mafias de-
mand international solutions.  
At a moral level, the Charter names other forms of security including free-
dom from hunger and the right to housing, employment and health. Just where 
in all this is the Security Council meant to intervene?  
As we have seen, there are jurisdictional disputes between the Security 
Council and the General Assembly. They first surfaced in 1950 with the Unit-
ing for Peace Resolution 377 under Articles 10 and 11. In the Soviet Union’s 
absence from the Security Council (which it was temporarily boycotting), the 
West did an end-run around the Council. Using the General Assembly's power 
to act for peace and security when the Security Council is incapable of doing 
so, it created a UN force under American leadership to halt the invasion of the 
south by North Korea. 
Today there is another jurisdictional, North-South confrontation over the 
extension of the Council’s mandate. When the Council thinks it should act, it 
does. It often does as it pleases because it is thought by some that its relatively 
restricted format provides the ideal setting to address world crises, whether 
they relate to peace and security or not. For instance, the Council formally ad-
dressed the HIV/AIDS issue in 2000 under the heading of ‘vital security inter-
ests’. Later, in 2007, the United Kingdom called on the Council to debate the 
relationships between energy, climate and security. The Council has also paid 
considerable attention to the issues of violence against women and women’s 
contributions to peace. So now the shoe is on the other foot and many GA 
members think the Council should stick to armed conflicts. 
Having noted this jurisdictional dispute between the Assembly and the 
Council, let us now return to our more specific focus on how well the Security 
Council handles its central objective of dealing with peace, conflict and secu-
rity, before going on to look more specifically at its expanded use of peace 
operations. 
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The Security Council’s functions and activities 
Security Council strengths 
It has been said that there has not been a single day since the Second World 
War when there has not been deadly political conflict somewhere in the world. 
Often this calls for action by the United Nations. In response, the Security 
Council has accelerated its pace over the years; it adopted 685 resolutions dur-
ing its first 46 years, then 1,650 in the following 26 years (1991-2016). No 
matter whether it is admired or not, it has become generally accepted that the 
Security Council must authorize the use of international force—exactly as the 
Charter says it should. In other words, one source of the Security Council’s 
authority is the international law arising from the stipulation in the United Na-
tions Charter that the use of force by one state against another is limited to 
situations of self-defence (Art. 51) or circumstances where force is authorized 
by the Security Council (Chapter VII). Thus, contrary to popular belief, there 
is no independent justification for “humanitarian intervention” or “responsibil-
ity to protect”, both of which are subject to authorization by the Security Coun-
cil. Of course, a state or a group of states may still take independent actions on 
the basis of a purported moral or political legitimacy, but they are not consid-
ered legal. In the rare exceptions where UN authority was not obtained, things 
generally have not ended well (for instance, the NATO ‘humanitarian’ inter-
vention in Kosovo in 1999 and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003). Indeed, 
this aspect of international law has done much to protect the world since 1945, 
ensuring that armed conflicts between states remain uncommon. 
More broadly, as the President of the General Assembly, Mogens Lykketoft, 
pointed out at the May 2016 High Level Thematic Debate on Peace and Secu-
rity, the UN has helped restrain the world’s largest powers, mobilized person-
nel and money for peacekeeping, established a clear legal framework on war 
and human rights, and helped reduce the threat of the world’s most deadly 
weapons. 
So, in effect, the Security Council has become a sort of executive body for 
dealing with world crises. And when the Council acts in harmony it has proven 
quite effective. For instance, in 2014 it unanimously agreed to place sanctions 
on six leaders of the Islamic State and Al Nusra in the heat of the Middle East 
crisis. It has also virtually eradicated the notion of absolute national sover-
eignty. Now states can no longer act with impunity with regard to their own 
population and the Council can interfere in state conflicts that can be said to 
threaten international security. As David Malone states in his essay on the Se-
curity Council, “The Council’s decisions in the post-Cold War era have proved 
immensely influential, indeed transformative, on a normative level. By assert-
ing the UN’s responsibility to intervene, even in internal conflicts—where hu-
man rights and the humanitarian interests of populations are severely 
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affected—Council decisions, arising from evolving interpretations of the Char-
ter, have deeply affected the meaning of sovereignty.” (2007: 133).  
Over the years, the Council has expanded its search for peace, making use 
of the secretary-general’s ‘good offices’ and engaging in fact-finding missions. 
It also uses ‘Groups of Friends’, that is to say countries which can be influential 
and can advise and help intervene in particularly thorny cases when the Coun-
cil members, themselves, may not have sufficient contacts. As we explore later 
in this chapter, the UN has moved beyond peacekeeping to undertake military 
missions of peace-enforcement as it tackles more numerous and diverse con-
flicts such as protecting East Timor in 1999, turning back the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990, and intervening in the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salva-
dor. The SC also empowers regional organizations and ‘coalitions of the will-
ing’ to act on its behalf. In recent years, the African Union and the Economic 
Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) have played leading roles in trying to 
tame conflicts in Darfur, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.  
Sometimes the Security Council acts as one. Sometimes it is just the perma-
nent members calling the shots. Sometimes it is just the United States, Russia 
or China individually pushing their weight around. Other times there are tem-
porary alliances among some of the 15 members. However, aside from straight 
power and national interests, the Council can also be seen from the perspective 
of leadership. Getting things done among the 193 members of the UN often 
takes leadership and determination, as well as long term planning and diplo-
macy. The United States is often accused of calling the shots but usually its 
role comes down to drafting resolutions, getting votes and putting things to-
gether—in other words, providing leadership. The Council’s difficulty in deal-
ing with terrorism is a good example. Although it has adopted many strong, 
action-oriented resolutions to control terrorism, it is still not able to develop a 
consensual definition of the meaning of terrorism. Despite this, the leadership 
of a few led to a heads-of-state summit condemning terrorism in 1992, the pur-
suit of the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11, and sweeping decisions to combat 
terrorism financing and safe-havens and to create the Counter Terrorism Com-
mittee as a subsidiary body of the SC.  
The Security Council is relatively more open, active and effective than we 
give it credit for. It now meets with states contributing to peace missions, 
NGOs, the business community, and regional organizations. Since the mid-
1990s, the Council’s president has been briefed informally by individual ex-
perts, NGOs and observers on special issues. There have been consultations 
with troop-contributing countries since 1994.  
Given that the media often focuses on the inability of the UN to act in crises, 
it is rather astounding to learn that most Security Council resolutions are 
adopted. For instance, in 2016, there were some 457 meetings resulting in 72 
resolutions which were adopted and only three vetoed. The percentage of ve-
toes as a portion of the total number of resolutions of the Council dropped from 
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85 per cent during the Cold War to 15 per cent after 1988. In other words, the 
major business of the Security Council goes on rather smoothly. Nevertheless, 
what the Council is known for is the relatively small number of resolutions that 
are vetoed by one or several of the Permanent Members (P5). From 2012 to 
2017, Russia and usually China have vetoed resolutions on the Syrian civil 
war, impeding all consequential actions except for a small amount of humani-
tarian aid. One P5 veto, or the threat thereof, is sufficient to stop the Security 
Council, and hence the UN, from acting. This is even more significant now 
that, as we have just seen, the Security Council has spread its wings to consider 
ever more issues such as pandemics, climate change, health and economics. 
As we have seen earlier, another facet of the Council’s ability to influence 
the international system is through the use of mandatory sanctions to cut off a 
state’s access to diplomatic relations, finance, trade and arms. Traditional sanc-
tions, which were fairly broad in nature, have been criticized for causing more 
harm to the population at large than to the economic and/or political elites. 
Recent sanctions have been more focused, targeted at the travel, banking assets 
and luxury items of elites so as to have minimal effect on ordinary citizens. It 
has also become increasingly recognized that the main use of sanctions should 
be for persuasion rather than punishment. All in all, they have been used with 
considerable success against the apartheid regime of South Africa and the nu-
clear ambitions of Iran, but, so far, seem to have had little effect on the behav-
iour of North Korea. In the last decade, the public ‘naming and shaming’ of 
‘sanction busters’ has added to the effectiveness of sanctions. 
The Security Council has many other tasks as well. It nominates the judges 
of the International Court of Justice, with which it gets along well. The same 
cannot be said of relations with the International Criminal Court that was 
founded outside the UN and which the United States and China (as well as 
India, Israel and others) have refused to join. Though it is worth mentioning 
that the SC set up, on its own, ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 as well as special courts for Sierra Leone 
in 2002 and for Cambodia in 2005. The Council is active in sending monitors 
to national elections when legitimized outcomes are crucial for developing de-
mocracy. It has 40 subsidiary bodies dealing mainly with fact-finding missions 
and implementation of sanctions but also with such continuing problems as 
counter-terrorism and children in armed conflict.  
In sum, we may say that the UN Security Council since the 1990s has be-
come far more open and partner-oriented and has developed a much larger and 
more diversified tool kit of means of intervention in peace and security. The 
cumulative effect has been an impressive list of achievements related to the 
UN’s first pillar, peace and security (see Box 7). 
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Box 7: The UN’s record of achievement in peace and security 
 
 Helping avoid another global war. 
 Amassing a body of international law, rules and legal norms includ-
ing 560 international treaties since 1945, with their resultant norma-
tive impacts. 
 Putting in place a system of dispute-settlement mechanisms includ-
ing the International Court of Justice, the 1982 Law of the Sea, the 
2005 Resolution of the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and the Medi-
ation Support Office. 
 Developing a network of 14 multilateral agencies to regulate inter-
national daily, vital, practical interaction—everything from telecom-
munications to tourism. 
 Managing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
inspection. 
 Imposing sanctions on wayward state behaviour on 26 occasions. 
 Deploying 54 peace operations and 39 special political missions de-
signed to prevent, ameliorate or conclude conflicts.  
Source: Rudd 2016: 11-16 
 
Security Council weaknesses 
Despite these achievements, all is not well with the Security Council. In its 
decisions, national self-interests too often clash with global security concerns. 
The great hopes people had for the Council as the peace-maker after the Second 
World War and after the Cold War were barely fulfilled. It did not translate 
itself into a collective body that was able to engage in the world’s hot spots. 
There has been insufficient common leadership which has resulted in doubtful 
institutional legitimacy and international disenchantment. The contentious re-
lations with the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 in the General 
Assembly only served to deepen the frustrations. The agreement of the P5 to 
help create the G20, comprising the world’s most financially powerful nations, 
has further undermined the economic credibility of the United Nations. The 
Council is noted for being a reactive rather than a preventive body. The failure 
to include a set of operational criteria for activating the R2P norm symbolized 
this weakness perfectly. The Great Powers have not seen fit to equip the United 
Nations with its own emergency peace forces or autonomous finances, thus 
ensuring that the UN is kept on a leash. 
Three failures of particular concern deal with nuclear weapons, global de-
cision-making and a perception of growing irrelevance of the UN. The first 
UN resolution in January 1946 called for the elimination of weapons of mass 
destruction. But old-fashioned power politics took over from the hopes for 
62 
collective morality. Principles gave way to national interests. The world de-
scended into the Cold War dominated by the strategy of Mutual Assured De-
struction. Although no nuclear arms have been used since Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki at the end of the Second World War, proliferation of nuclear arms and 
their delivery systems has gone on a pace. Initially limited to the US, France, 
Great Britain and the Soviet Union (now Russia), the number of nuclear armed 
states grew to include India, Pakistan, China and North Korea. Many believe 
Israel possesses nuclear weapons (though it has never admitted to it) and Iran 
sought to be included on the list.  
Cognizant of the perils, a Non-Proliferation Treaty was established in 1968. 
Efforts were made in the 1972 SALT 1 treaty to cap the number of offensive 
nuclear weapons, but the 1980s saw a renewal of the arms race. Finally, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was adopted in 1996. The underlying idea had 
been that nuclear states would agree to share peaceful nuclear technology with 
states that renounced efforts to have their own nuclear weapons, but there is 
dispute over whether the transfer has actually happened. Aside from these trea-
ties was the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in 
1957. As an independent agency, it reports to the GA and SC on its mandate 
for control, verification, security, and technology transfer. Whenever it has 
been supported by the Security Council, it has done laudable work. But by the 
end of 2016, Trump and Putin were still talking about spending billions on 
modernizing their nuclear arsenals rather than technology transfer or ending 
poverty. Despite this, in 2017 a majority of 122 countries in the General As-
sembly voted for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons. All of the nine countries 
known or believed to have nuclear weapons boycotted the discussions claiming 
they disregard the "realities" of international security. The treaty will be open 
for signatures in late 2017 and will come into force when 50 countries have 
ratified it. 
The second failure has been the inability of the Security Council to make 
decisions at crucial times at which the fate of whole peoples was under threat. 
The Council has not been able or willing to stop the most horrendous blood-
baths of our era is such cases as Bosnia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Darfur and Syria. 
In part, this has been because of the P5 veto or the threat of its use. This is 
paradoxical. The veto was the instrument invented to keep the major powers 
in the UN. In the modern era, great powers have never felt they had to threaten 
to quit the UN to defend their interests. But now they do not want to lose the 
power advantage the UN gives them. 
Vetoes are a major cause of indecision in the Security Council, even if they 
have been declining in number. Vetoes are often not used to protect vital inter-
ests (e.g., to protect the state’s national territory), but rather to maintain pre-
sumed spheres of influence and to protect allies as the US has done for Israel 
and Russia for Syria. They are also thought to heighten international status and 
strengthen public opinion at home. In other words, the P5 find plenty of reasons 
63 
other than their vital interests for using the veto. Thus even without the veto 
we would still have big power politics in the Security Council and a disruption 
of global decision-making. That is why France and Mexico are pushing for a 
limit of the veto (which is possible) rather than its abolition (which is much 
less likely to happen). 
Box 8: The Security Council’s challenges, problems and failures 
 Perceptions of impasse in the Security Council due to the veto and 
the threat of a veto feed frustrations about the UN’s capacity to act 
to deal with crises, despite there being only 276 vetoes while 2,296 
resolutions have been successfully adopted. 
 Failure to prevent mass atrocities (war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity) when the UN was slow or failed to respond—e.g., 
Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Darfur, South Sudan, and 
Syria. 
 Limited response to global terrorism including state-sponsored ter-
rorism. 
 Continuing repercussions from the invasion of Iraq against the UN’s 
wishes. 
 Absence of the UN from negotiations on the Iranian nuclear agree-
ment and being used as an afterthought in Afghanistan. 
 Lack of effective action to resolve the Syrian crisis, standing by as 
400,000 have been violently killed and half the population uprooted. 
 Lack of involvement in the Ukraine crisis. 
 No UN diplomatic initiative against North Korea’s illegal nuclear 
program. 
 Inability to handle the 2015-16 wave of refugees, migrants and 
asylum-seekers. 
 Loss of moral authority due to inconsistent response to human rights 
violations. 
 Sexual abuse in peacekeeping operations tarnishes reputation of blue 
helmets. 
 UN forces responsible for cholera outbreak in Haiti that killed 
thousands. 
Source: Rudd 2016: 16-20 
While these (along with the other failures listed in Box 8) can be considered 
legitimate limitations or flaws of the Security Council, the last issue relates 
more to how it is perceived. The word ‘irrelevant’ was first used by President 
George W. Bush in talking about the UN in 2003, and has become a refrain 
used by many others since. Of course, we have seen from the achievements of 
the Security Council that the UN is not in fact irrelevant. The world would be 
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lost without all its contributions. Nevertheless, as regards perceptions, and of-
tentimes media coverage, it is another story.  
We saw this in 2016 when, after the vetoing of another resolution on Syria 
in the Security Council, Canada was joined by 71 other countries in side-step-
ping the Council and bringing the issue directly to the floor of the General 
Assembly, in the manner of the 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution. This unique 
and newsworthy endeavour was barely mentioned by major newspapers. How-
ever, the next day, the nomination by the UN of Wonder Woman as an honor-
ary ambassador was ridiculed in world headlines. It looks like irrelevance—or 
worse. Unfortunately, the tendency is still for the media to focus on the UN’s 
shortcomings.  
However, the consequences reach beyond simply harming public opinion of 
the UN. When the organization is regarded as being incapable of dealing with 
the most pressing security concerns, states have and will bypass it, as we saw 
when the Iran nuclear deal was negotiated in 2015.  
The UN’s peace operations 
Historically, analysts have offered many different and sometimes conflicting 
explanations for the causes of war and the means of fostering peace. In Man, 
the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz (1954) was able to order these different 
approaches to causality under three headings: the individual, the state and the 
international system. Each one corresponds to a further analysis of what the 
type of causality portends for possible paths to peace. In the first, it is the bes-
tial, aggressive nature of mankind which is targeted as the culprit. But, it is 
asked, if individuals are the cause of war, is it not the public institutions of the 
states which shape and limit their citizens? Then, it is further proposed that 
states too have to vie for themselves within the competitive, anarchical inter-
national system, leaving individuals and even states few choices in their be-
haviour. Waltz concludes that even these very general fields of causality may 
be further confused by the possibility that the causes of war may come from 
all three domains and even depend on particular circumstances.  
Whatever the causes of war, the UN has been active in promoting peace 
since its inception. Before examining the evolution of UN peace operations, it 
is worth outlining some key terms related to the full scope of activities under-
taken by the UN to maintain peace and security. These are: peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali delineated these four distinctive but overlapping roles 
for peace operations in his 1992 Agenda for Peace. Peacekeeping, which 
broadly involves helping war-torn countries create conditions for lasting peace, 
is sometimes used in an all-encompassing sense to refer to other activities as 
well. Peacemaking (under Chapter VI of the Charter) refers to diplomatic 
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action to bring hostile parties to an agreement, including through negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or with the 
help of regional agencies. The new methods that have been added to this long 
list have been the ‘good offices’ of the Secretary-General and his use of special 
envoys and representatives as mediators. Peace enforcement (under Chapter 
VII) requires the authorization of the Security Council and involves a range of 
coercive measures, including the use of military force. Finally, peacebuilding 
focuses on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction, aiming to build national 
capacities for conflict management and create the conditions for sustainable 
peace. 
Although the first United Nations Emergency Force was deployed for the 
Suez crisis of 1956, the UN had already gained experience from monitoring 
and supervision operations as early as the 1940s. The original peacekeeping 
missions were limited to lightly armed forces acting as mediators and monitors, 
interceding between conflicting combatants to keep them apart—literally, to 
‘keep the peace’. They depended on the principles of consent, neutrality and 
the non-use of force. 
Over the years, peace operations have expanded greatly in mission and man-
date, going well beyond pure peacemaking, by working toward peacebuilding 
with the monitoring of elections and long-term international support for the 
development of institutions and finances in failed states. They may be author-
ized to use force and have police forces and administrative specialists oversee-
ing the rebuilding of a functioning government and (hopefully) independent 
civil society. Operations have become multidimensional, aiming to facilitate 
the political process, protect civilians, promote human rights, support election, 
restore the rule of law, and assist in the disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration of former combatants. As it may be imagined, such operations are 
frightfully complex.  
What had changed was that from 1900 to 1941, 80 per cent of wars were 
between states; from 1945 to 1976, 85 per cent of wars were within a single 
state. These civil conflicts tended to be more all-encompassing and destructive 
of the economy, civil rights and state institutions. Many became mixed up in 
illicit trade and terrorism and conflicts threatened to spill over into neighbour-
ing countries, thus endangering international peace. The UN was drawn in 
more and more. For the first time, operations came to combine both war-like 
enforcement and peace-like negotiations. In the post-Cold War period after 
1990, the P5 in the Security Council were more cooperative and willing to 
tackle more numerous and diverse conflicts including domestic rivalries. 
By 2016, there were 16 UN-led missions in the field for an annual cost of 
some $8.2 billion. They include large numbers of civilian and police compo-
nents. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the Secretariat super-
vises more troops in the field—some 120,000—(contributed by members) than 
any individual country. There is often a need to work cooperatively with 
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regional partners in ‘coalitions of the willing’ from groups such as NATO, the 
European Union, West African States and the African Union. 
Over time, peacekeeping missions have been at once some of the UN’s 
greatest successes and greatest failures. Among the successes were: the inde-
pendence of Namibia; ending the conflict in El Salvador; demobilization, 
peace and reestablishment of Cambodia; peace, disarmament and elections in 
Mozambique; independence and a new government in East Timor; and ending 
the civil war and re-establishing the government in Sierra Leone. Terrible fail-
ures were in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda and Syria, where the Security Council 
refused to mobilize sufficient forces to control the situation and civilians were 
slaughtered by the thousands.  
A great deal of research has been done to better understand why some mis-
sions succeed while other fail. Doyle and Sambanis found that the success of 
peace settlements depends on three factors: the degree of hostility, local capac-
ities left over after the conflict, and the amount of international assistance 
available. Optimal intervention strategies need to match means to ends. Con-
sideration has to be given to local causes, levels of conflict and hostility and 
factional capacities. A strategy of discrete acts of enforcement must be calcu-
lated to fit in with peacemaking (negotiations), peacekeeping (monitoring), and 
peacebuilding (reconciliation, reconstruction). This juggling act must be con-
stituted within the context of military resources and civilian means for the re-
building of institutions (2007: 323-348). 
The UN itself has also initiated efforts to review its peace and security ac-
tivities and recommend improvements. A particularly noteworthy study was 
the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly called 
the Brahimi Report, prepared in 2000 in response to significant UN peacekeep-
ing failures in the 1990s. It called for “robust doctrines” and “realistic man-
dates” (referring to an explicit mandate for civilian protection and the resources 
to carry it out), improved headquarters management, and rapid deployment. 
The Security Council and the secretary-general delivered on all but the last, 
and many analysts agree that progress made in peacekeeping efforts was in-
deed influenced by the report. 
Still, as the 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Op-
erations makes clear, there continues to be room for improvement. The report 
proposes a long list of operations improvements, such as clearer strategic di-
rection, improved speed, strengthened partnerships, more purposeful engage-
ment with host countries, and addressing sexual abuse which has tarnished the 
reputation of UN peacekeeping in recent years. The report also recognizes that 
certain political realities limit the UN’s ability to consolidate peace. These in-
clude the fact that neither governments nor regional groupings fully entrust the 
UN with preventive diplomacy, and that the UN continues to be a relatively 
minor player in the field of international cooperation. This recognition is im-
portant when thinking about the future of the UN because it highlights a 
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situation that is the inverse of what it should be if we want to enhance peace 
and cooperation. State diplomacy, focused on maximizing national interests, is 
currently winning over global diplomacy—this must change if we are to 
achieve a renaissance of the United Nations.  
As this section has shown, the UN has an elaborate structure of prevention 
and peace operations. However, a number of tendencies have limited success. 
First, powerful states have sought to avoid assertive secretaries-general there-
fore limiting the role SGs can play in international diplomacy. Second, the 
UN’s ability to prevent conflicts depends on the political will of member states. 
Unfortunately, the Security Council is oriented toward “the visible, forceful 
and reactive rather than the invisible, quiet and proactive initiatives required 
for dispute settlement” (Mani 2007: 318). This relates to perhaps the main chal-
lenge with prevention: successful instances are all but invisible, and the more 
effective it is, the less likely it is to make headlines. A final point is that global 
trends such as rising economic inequality, political marginalization and de-
mocracy movements tend to stimulate conflict, making prevention an onerous 
task. 
The Security Council and the future 
Reforming the Security Council is at once very simple and incredibly complex. 
There are many good ideas about what to do, but there are so many actors in 
the pot with too little common political will that nothing gets done. It is said 
that the Security Council is one of the major world arenas of power and real-
politik. Participation provides access, knowledge, power and influence. No 
wonder there is little consensus on who the players should be and what proce-
dures are best. For us to see a little more clearly, we have to start with some 
basic principles and a set of objectives before going on to look at various re-
form proposals.  
The basic principles that we should strive for are legitimacy and effective-
ness. It is said that the power of social institutions resides mainly in their legit-
imacy. Writing about the legitimacy of the Security Council some years ago, 
David Caron stated, “For an institution to be considered legitimate it must be 
recognized as a lawful authority; one that conforms to a particular standard and 
operates in such a manner that its actions and decisions are seen as legally or 
morally justified and proper.” (1993, 552). The United Nations is founded on 
an international treaty that all members have signed, so with this founding au-
thority the Security Council may be said to be clearly lawful. As we have seen, 
its much improved manner of operation has made it more transparent and in-
clusive. Yet the organization is much larger now than in 1945, so the Council 
is no longer representative of the current UN membership. Also, because of its 
two-tier membership resulting from the veto, as well as the poor record of 
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decision-making, it is no longer considered by many to uphold standards that 
are morally justified and proper. The second principle is effectiveness. Many 
question whether the Security Council is properly managing the world’s peace 
and security and whether it is doing so in a manner that protects human rights 
and sustainable development. One also wonders just how big a Council could 
be to operate effectively and make decisions. 
 In terms of potential goals for a reform process, UN expert Andy Knight 
provides useful ideas: “improve the rate of participation from poorly repre-
sented categories; improve the geographical representation; improve its dem-
ocratic character by limiting the use of the veto to Chapter VII actions and 
ensuring the Council represents a clear majority of the world’s population; 
maintain its efficiency by limiting its growth; improve transparency by con-
sulting with non-members on actions concerning them, and greater involve-
ment of rotating members.” (2002, 33-4). Thus, we have a set of objectives that 
cover diverse issues of size, fair representation, composition, legitimacy, effi-
ciency and the veto. 
The search for Security Council reform did not start yesterday. Resentment 
of the P5 members pushed the General Assembly to launch consultations on a 
reform agenda in 1993. It was called the “Open-ended Working Group on Eq-
uitable Representation”. Two decades later it came to be known in the corridors 
of the UN as the ‘Never-Ending Working Group’.  
In a 2004 meeting in Baden-Baden, Austria, the secretary-general’s High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change thought they had found the 
ideal solution on composition. The Council would be increased to 24 members 
in three tiers: tier one would include the present P5 (the US, Russia, China, 
Great Britain and France); tier two would include seven or eight semi-perma-
nent members elected on a regional basis for a renewable term of four or five 
years (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and South Africa might be in this group); 
the third tier of rotating members would be elected as at present for a non-
renewable two year term. Only the Permanent Five would have a veto. More 
emphasis would be accorded to giving membership to those who make a real 
contribution to peace and security. A full review would be made every 15 
years. The consensus in the Panel dissolved over a demand by some that all 
new tier two members be given a veto. The proposal never even got into the 
final report which included two inferior models catering to special interests. 
The secretary-general in effect threw up his hands and said members should 
vote for whatever they liked. 
This example is given at length because it introduces most of the issues 
about composition and veto. As regards size, it is generally agreed that the 15-
member Security Council should be expanded to be more representative of the 
world. The question is: by how much? More big powers may just add to the 
current conflict of interests and national prestige, making for more difficult 
decisions rather than easier. Still, most proposals come in the range of 20 to 
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25—small enough for discussion, big enough to be representative. All sugges-
tions propose one to three more non-permanent, rotating seats. At present, the 
10 rotating seats are for two-year terms elected by the General Assembly with 
three going to Africa, two to Western Europe and Oceania, two to Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean, two to Asia and one to Eastern Europe. Five are replaced 
each year and the elections are hotly contested.  
Then we come to the crunch. Who should the new semi-permanent (or per-
manent) members of the Security Council be and should they have a veto or 
not? Surely countries as big as India, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Germany and Pakistan should not be excluded from being Permanent 
Members? Alas, it is not so simple. Each of these countries has neighbours 
who are absolutely set against their elevation to a Permanent Member status. 
At the 2005 World Summit, Japan, Germany, India and Brazil grouped to-
gether to form the G4. They were determined to get permanent seats but ap-
peared willing to compromise on the veto. They had considerable support, but 
their regional rivals, including South Korea, Italy, Pakistan, and Argentina, 
immediately banded together with other countries like Canada, Mexico, Tur-
key and Spain in the ‘Uniting for Consensus’ group to propose there should be 
10 new, non-permanent members with possibility for re-election, but no new 
permanent members. We see here one of the sticking points. Instead of acting 
like cozy regional friends, most neighbours are age old traditional enemies who 
do not want to see each other moving ahead. For their part, the African states 
proposed increasing the Council’s membership from 15 for 26, introducing six 
new permanent seats with vetoes and five new rotating seats (granting Africa 
two seats in each category). At the present time the P5 represents four conti-
nents but not Africa.  
When all is said and done, even if one were to find a workable model, noth-
ing is to say that the current P5 would agree and not use their veto. Also, all 
these alliances are now a decade old and may have given way to other inten-
tions. Nevertheless, they demonstrate to us the complexity of Security Council 
reform.  
However, ten years does make a difference. In its 2015 report, the Commis-
sion on Global Security, Justice and Governance took a refreshingly different 
approach to reforming the UN Security Council. Showing that the world had 
moved on, instead of dwelling on the Council’s composition, the Commission 
simply states that we must expand its membership and allow immediate re-
election of non-permanent members in order to achieve the twin goals of ef-
fectiveness and acceptability. 
When we think about transforming the Security Council, we should remem-
ber that if we are to make decisions for the good of the world, we will need 
something that looks like an ‘executive committee’ or a ‘cabinet’. Perhaps all 
our present models are too wedded to the present context of ‘nation-state in-
ternational relations’. For ‘global governance’, we may need another model 
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based on more state-like institutions with political and democratic foundations. 
In any case, we can imagine that it is going to take a lot of consultative thinking 
and perhaps a global movement to break all the impasses we have just seen and 
to press forward with all the potential reforms. We will return to these possi-
bilities in Chapter 5. 
“The future depends on what we do in the present.” Mahatma Gandhi 
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Chapter 3 – Social and Economic Development  
Understanding ‘development’ 
The global understanding of development has changed over the years, as have 
definitions. Countries now agree that the best path forward is one of sustainable 
development, which the UN defines as “development that promotes prosperity 
and economic opportunity, greater social well-being, and protection of the en-
vironment”. Sustainable development seeks to achieve these three pillars—
economic development, social development and environmental protection—in 
a balanced manner. The term was originally coined in 1987 by the World Com-
mission on Environment and Development in Our Common Future, in what 
became known as the Brundtland report. The report defines sustainable devel-
opment as “development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Thirty years 
later, this continues to be the most widely used definition.  
Much of what the UN does falls into the broad category of ‘development’. 
This includes work related to poverty reduction, food security, climate change, 
gender equality, housing, education, employment, infrastructure, disaster risk 
reduction, health and emergency response, water and sanitation, safety and 
crime prevention, good governance, and early childhood development. Even 
the areas of human rights and peace and security (the other two pillars of the 
UN’s work) are now recognized as having important impacts on social and 
economic development. Their inclusion in the global post-2015 development 
agenda (Sustainable Development Goals) reflects these linkages. 
This chapter explores what development meant at the UN’s inception, the 
period of decolonization, and the introduction of the world’s first global devel-
opment agenda to mark the new millennium, as well as what it means in the 
present era of a second set of global goals. It looks at what lies ahead for the 
UN and assesses how prepared it really is to achieve the challenging task at 
hand. 
The first 50 years 
Development in the early years 
Development is among the three founding pillars of the UN system. The UN 
Charter states that “the United Nations shall promote higher standards of liv-
ing, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and de-
velopment”. Yet the understanding of development when the Charter was 
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drafted was unique to that specific moment in history, and the concept evolved 
greatly over the years. Consider how the world looked in 1945. The original 
membership of the UN was 51 countries, of which the vast majority were Eu-
ropean, Latin American, North American and the Middle Eastern states. The 
notions of developed and developing countries, North and South, First World 
and Third World simply did not exist at that time. Early development efforts 
of the international system focused on post-World War II reconstruction. In 
1948, the US launched the Marshall Plan, a massive aid initiative to rebuild 
Western Europe following the devastation of the war. Through the Plan, offi-
cially known as the European Recovery Program, the US, aided by companion 
programs in Canada and other countries, channeled more than $12 billion over 
three years to finance the economic recovery of Europe—a region that, rela-
tively speaking, was industrialized and economically advanced. Europe’s swift 
recovery meant that the international community could soon focus its efforts 
elsewhere.  
In the years that followed, the emphasis quickly shifted to developing coun-
tries that were gaining independence from their colonial powers. Between 1956 
and 1968, UN membership grew from 80 to 126. Nearly all of these additional 
members were African and Asian countries, newly independent from European 
colonial powers. This period of rapid decolonization, which began in the late 
1940s but accelerated in the two decades that followed, was prompted by the 
recognition that all peoples had the right to self-determination. In 1960, this 
basic right was formalized when the UN General Assembly adopted the Dec-
laration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
stating that “the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of 
world peace and cooperation.” It called for immediate steps to be taken in ter-
ritories that had not yet attained independence to transfer power to the people 
to enable them to enjoy independence and freedom. It was added that lack of 
political, economic, social or educational readiness should not be used as a 
reason to delay independence. Thus, a number of states with low levels of de-
velopment were born.  
Two factors drove Western countries to begin providing aid to these devel-
oping countries. First, it was acknowledged that moving from an international 
order based on colonization and imperialism to one of free trade and fair deal-
ing would require some degree of intervention. In other words, if post-colonial 
countries were to become trading partners, they needed assistance to reduce 
poverty and increase productive capacity. Second, Western countries wanted 
to prevent Third World countries—those neither belonging to the First World 
(developed, capitalist countries) nor the Second World (socialist countries of 
the Eastern Bloc)—from drifting towards communism. This fear motivated the 
development of the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development 
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in South and Southeast Asia in 1950, which could be considered the world’s 
first development cooperation initiative. The Plan was established to combat 
poverty in Asia, as it was believed that poverty was responsible for fuelling 
communist political movements in the region.  
Expanding development efforts 
The emergence of new international institutions supporting development ef-
forts mirrored the shift in thinking. At the time of its inception, the UN was 
primarily focused on maintaining peace and security. In fact, the words ‘peace’ 
and ‘security’ appeared in the UN Charter 42 and 148 times respectively, while 
the notion of ‘development’ appeared only once. The term ‘environment’ was 
altogether absent from the founding Charter (see Box 9).  
Box 9: Putting the environment on the agenda 
Environmental issues are one example of how the UN has successfully 
adapted to changing times. Though the environment was absent from the 
UN Charter and the initial organizational structure, it was effectively in-
tegrated into the existing system later on. At the first United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment that took place in Stockholm in 
1972, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was created as 
the voice for the environment in the UN system. With UNEP reporting 
to the GA and ECOSOC, ECOSOC saw environmental issues added to 
its original mandate of economic and social.  
Some argue that the environmental realm needs to be given greater 
prominence and that ECOSOC ought to more formally recognize it, by, 
for example, rebranding itself as the Economic, Social and Environmen-
tal Council (ESEC) as part of a larger set of reforms. It seems unlikely 
that ECOSOC will get a new name any time soon, but a 2013 reform of 
the outdated institution mandated it to convene an integration summit to 
monitor and promote the balanced integration of the three dimensions of 
sustainable development (economic, social and environmental). Thus, 
progress is being made.  
In 1945, the UN had just a handful of development-related agencies. The Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was created to coordinate social and 
economic activities within the UN system, while the International Labour Or-
ganization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and United Na-
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) were spe-
cialized agencies that fell under ECOSOC’s mandate. The following year saw 
the establishment of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). However, 
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as preoccupations expanded beyond security issues to areas of development, 
human rights, humanitarian assistance and the environment, the UN system 
quickly expanded. During the 1960s and 1970s there was a proliferation of new 
UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies dealing with poverty and hun-
ger, social development, health, women, environment and housing (see Figure 
3). Rather than adding to the mandates of existing agencies, new ones were 
created.  
Figure 3: United Nations Development Group members (excluding re-
gional commissions and Secretariat bodies) by year established 
Meanwhile, economic issues such as trade, development lending and monetary 
policy had been delegated to the Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) along with the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The World Bank and the IMF were established 
as specialized agencies of the UN, while recognizing that they were independ-
ent international organizations. As such, the institutions hold observer status at 
the UN and are able to participate—though not vote—in the General 
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Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC. The World Trade Organization 
(which replaced GATT in 1995), on the other hand, is considered a ‘related 
organization’ in the UN system, falling under the General Assembly but with 
no obligation to report to it, and contributing on an ad-hoc basis to the GA and 
ECOSOC. The relationship between the UN and the Bretton Woods institu-
tions has historically been thorny. Many have argued for the UN to have more 
authority over economic issues, pointing to the so-called democratic deficit of 
the World Bank, IMF and WTO, while others support the status quo, maintain-
ing that these institutions are more effective than the UN in achieving their 
stated objectives. 
The North-South divide 
Cold War politics saw a political divide between the “East” (the Soviet Union 
and its allies) and the “West” (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand). With decolonization, developing countries came to 
outnumber developed countries and the power dynamics shifted within the 
United Nations as postcolonial countries pushed to have their voices heard. As 
we saw in the description of the General Assembly, a group of newly inde-
pendent countries joined forces in the 1950s to push back against the two su-
perpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union. These countries formed 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, what is now often referred to as 
the “Global South”, and many of the same countries also organized themselves 
into the “Group of 77”, to have their economic and social issues heard on the 
world stage. Despite the breakdown of the East-West divide following the end 
of the Cold War—to say nothing of the blurring North-South distinction re-
sulting from globalization—both the NAM and the G77 continue to live on.  
As Thomas Weiss has pointed out (2011), the “various constructed roles on 
the international stage in the global theater are played by actors from the two 
major troupes, North and South”. This theater, Weiss argues, is counterproduc-
tive to generating universal norms and ensuring human security. Though there 
are some exceptions, countries have generally adhered to artificial roles based 
on which side they are on, rather than where they may fall on specific issues. 
Instead, policy debates should reflect issues-based and interest-based alliances 
and coalitions. 
Millennium Development Goals 
The year 2000 was a milestone for development cooperation. For the first time 
in history, states came together behind a clearly defined set of goals related to 
social and economic development. The Millennium Development Goals, also 
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referred to as the MDGs, were eight easy-to-remember, time bound, focused 
and measurable goals that people worldwide could rally behind (see Figure 4). 
They were drafted in the late 1990s and came into force through the Millen-
nium Declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 8, 
2000. They were intentionally ambitious, with goals such as “halving extreme 
poverty” and “providing universal primary education” by 2015.  
Figure 4: Millennium Development Goals 
Source: United Nations 
The MDGs were praised for their simplicity. Schoolchildren in Nigeria, Laos 
and Germany alike could memorize and recite them. They also brought atten-
tion to previously under-the-radar issues, like Goal 5 on improving maternal 
health. Maternal health advocates had long fought for greater attention to the 
issue, and being given equal presence with priorities such as poverty and hun-
ger, environmental sustainability, and primary education was an important step 
in mainstreaming it. However, the MDGs were also criticized for being devel-
oped without sufficient consultation with key actors, such as UN member 
states, civil society organizations, NGOs, think tanks and academia. Instead, 
they were drawn up by a group of experts in a ‘basement of UN headquarters’. 
It is likely that this lack of consultation in the design of the goals meant that 
developing countries had a weakened sense of ownership of them. 
Tallying up the results 
“The 13 years since the millennium have seen the fastest reduction in poverty in 
human history” 2013 UN Report, A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and 
Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development 
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As 2015 approached, the question on everyone’s mind was: how successful 
were countries in meeting these goals? The most impressive achievements 
were made on fighting extreme poverty. The target to halve the proportion of 
people living on less than $1.25 a day by 2015 (with a 1990 baseline) was 
achieved in 2010, five years early. However, this was not the case in all coun-
tries, regions, or population groups, but rather on the aggregate or global level. 
In South Asia the proportion of people experiencing extreme poverty dropped 
by 41 per cent, while in Sub-Saharan Africa it fell by a mere 14 per cent. Mean-
while huge gains were made in China where the proportion fell from 60 per 
cent in 1990 to 12 per cent in 2010. Critics noted that China’s rapid economic 
development, which coincided with the timeline to achieve the MDGs but was 
due to entirely exogenous factors, skewed the overall picture and drew atten-
tion away from countries that fared less well.  
Significant achievements were made on numerous other goals as well—
such as boosting primary school enrolment and improved access to clean wa-
ter—even if ambitious targets were not always met. The final assessment of 
the MDGs highlighted that, despite groundbreaking success, millions of people 
are being left behind, especially the poorest and most vulnerable populations. 
It pointed to climate change and environmental degradation as factors under-
mining progress achieved, and stated that conflict remains the biggest threat to 
human development.  
Sustainable Development Goals  
A changed world 
Long before 2015 approached, the international community was looking ahead 
to the post-2015 development agenda. The idea for a new set of goals that 
would replace the MDGs was formally tabled by Columbia and Guatemala at 
the Rio+20 Summit in 2012, which was the largest summit in UN history. A 
three-year process engaging millions of people through dialogues, thematic 
consultations and national surveys culminated in the 17 Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs), also known as the Global Goals, being adopted unani-
mously by states at the UN Sustainable Development Summit in September 
2015 (see Figure 5). 
The post-2015 consultation process that led to the development of the SDGs 
sought to address many of the shortfalls of the MDGs, while also adapting to 
a new era. When consultations were launched in 2013, the world had become 
more complex and the discourse around development had changed drastically. 
The MDGs felt outdated. 
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Figure 5: Sustainable Development Goals 
Source: United Nations 
For one thing, the MDGs were meant for developing countries, and funding 
was to come from developed countries through their official aid contributions, 
known as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Yet by the time stakehold-
ers were discussing the SDGs, it had become apparent that the traditional 
North-South lines were blurring. South-South cooperation was becoming a 
new norm and the economic and political power was beginning to shift from 
developed countries toward emerging economies, in particular the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It was also recognized that 
every country, not just those belonging to the Global South, had room for im-
provement.  
Meanwhile, development finance was becoming increasingly complex and 
ODA was no longer viewed as the only source of funding to achieve the goals. 
A number of other sources of finances such as domestic resources (taxation), 
investment and remittances were gaining relevance and in some cases outpac-
ing traditional aid. For example, as migrant workers went abroad in search of 
economic opportunities, remittances—money that foreign workers transfer to 
an individual, usually a family member, in their home country—came to com-
pete with international aid as one of the largest financial inflows to developing 
countries. In 2000, remittances to developing countries totalled $120 billion 
(OECD 2006), while by 2015 they had grown to $441 billion (World Bank 
2015). Meanwhile, official development aid, or ODA, grew at a much slower 
pace during the same period, from $80 billion to $147 billion (Compare Your 
Country). 
The world had become less state-centric too. Non-state actors such as the 
private sector and civil society were playing a more central role in promoting 
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global cooperation and development. Sub-national governments (e.g., provin-
cial, municipal) were also much more involved. 
 Finally, the global distribution of poverty shifted during the past couple of 
decades. In 2000, poverty was mainly regarded as an issue for low income 
countries, with the greatest portion of world’s poor in these countries. In 1990, 
there were 1.6 billion poor people in low income countries, representing 95 per 
cent of the world’s poor. Yet by 2012 when the SDGs were being developed, 
many of these low income countries had graduated to middle-income status 
and the number of poor people in low income countries had dropped to 0.3 
billion (FUNDS 2016). It was thus argued that inequality and redistribution in 
all countries needed to be given greater weight. The SDGs reflected this by 
having a goal devoted to reducing inequalities.  
Several other issues addressed by the SDGs but not the MDGs include good 
governance, respecting human rights, climate change, and peace and security 
as fundamental to development. These additions are mostly a reflection of 
emerging challenges and an evolution in thinking about development issues. 
For instance, climate change is a global threat that became widely recognized 
only after the MDGs. The same can be said about the linkages between devel-
opment outcomes and peaceful and just societies. The other reason for certain 
additions was pressure from stakeholders to include key issues that the MDGs 
neglected (e.g., secondary/post-secondary education, governance, and energy).  
More voices at the table 
Quite unlike the process to establish the MDGs, the post-2015 development 
planning favoured a participatory, consensus-based approach that included 
years of consultations with tens of millions of people. Consultations consisted 
of three separate streams. First, UN country teams in coordination with other 
key stakeholders facilitated 88 national consultations in countries where the 
UN provides assistance. Second, UN agencies worked with national govern-
ments and other stakeholders to conduct 11 thematic consultations. Both of 
these channels used numerous methods of outreach, including face-to-face 
meetings, online mechanisms and door-to-door surveys. Lastly, views from the 
public were sought online through the MYWorld survey. The survey asks in-
dividuals to choose six issues that matter most to them and their families from 
a list of 16 (e.g., affordable and nutritious food, better transport and roads, po-
litical freedoms). This survey continues to collect votes and in March 2017 had 
over 9.7 million votes. 
According to Amina Mohammed, special adviser to the UN Secretary Gen-
eral on post-2015 development planning, about 70 per cent of those consulted 
were under 30 years of age and at least 8 million were contacted through social 
media.  
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With regards to the process, Ms. Mohammad states: “[Developing the 
MDGs] was just a bunch of technocrats sitting round a table to produce a set 
of goals based on what UN agencies had been doing over the years. There was 
no attempt to be transformative. For me, the SDG process has been one of the 
most intellectually and politically and technically challenging endeavours I 
have ever engaged in.”  
A summary of how the SDGs differed from the MDGs is provided in Figure 
6. 
Figure 6: Key differences between the MDGs and the SDGs 
 MDGs SDGs 
Timeframe 2000-2015 2015-2030 
Scope 8 goals 
18 targets 
61 indicators 
17 goals 
169 targets 
230 indicators 
Target  Developing countries 
only 
Universal 
Process UN-led with little  
input from external  
stakeholders or the  
public 
Consultative,  
participatory, concrete 
role for civil society  
organizations 
Despite the inclusive and consultative approach taken to their development, 
the SDGs have not been without criticism. Following the announcement of the 
new goals, many voiced discontent with their broad scope, calling the 17 goals 
and 169 targets “dizzying” and “worse than useless”. Economist William East-
erly suggested SDG stood for “senseless, dreamy, garbled”. Many argued they 
are aspirational and unrealistic, while lacking the precision and clarity needed 
to be measurable. That these two realities go hand in hand should not be a 
surprise—the trade-off between the number of parties involved in negotiations 
and the usefulness of the outcome is an oft-cited challenge in international re-
lations. The process vs. product trade-off is seen across the UN system. It is 
most pronounced in comparing the Security Council and the General Assem-
bly: the former is known for being an exclusive club of member states but more 
effective decision making and less watered-down products, while the latter for 
greater participation but an inability to produce meaningful outcomes.  
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Financing the goals 
A legitimate concern is the high cost of achieving the lofty goals coupled with 
a lack of adequate financing. It is estimated that meeting the goals would cost 
$2-3 trillion a year over 15 years, which is roughly 4 per cent of world GDP. 
Research by Development Finance International suggests that low- and mid-
dle-income countries could fund the SDGs if three key sources of public fi-
nance were raised: doubling developing country tax revenues; doubling aid 
flows from developed countries; and raising $500 billion a year from innova-
tive financing (e.g., through introducing taxes or levies on carbon emissions 
and/or financial transactions and allocating these new monies to achieving the 
SDGs) (UNRISD 2015). 
Currently, none of these financing sources seem likely. Doubling develop-
ing country tax revenue would require an increase equivalent to 10 per cent of 
GDP (ibid). Meanwhile, doubling aid flows would require OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC) members—the world’s major donor coun-
tries—to meet their pledge to spend 0.7 per cent of their national income on 
aid, despite never having met this target since it was agreed upon in 1970. In 
2014, the average across DAC members was 0.03 per cent, with only 5 of 29 
countries meeting or exceeding the target (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, 
Sweden and United Kingdom) (OECD). Ideas for innovative financing ap-
proaches, such as a global financial transaction tax from which revenues would 
go to achieving development goals, have been proposed for years but have yet 
to be implemented. The UNDP has also launched an SDG Fund, which, similar 
to the MDG Fund, is an official funding mechanism in support of the post-
2015 agenda. Currently, the Fund’s total budget is approximately $60 million 
(SDG Fund website).  
In reality, public funding alone cannot be relied on to meet the financing 
needs of the SDGs. Blended finance, a concept that seeks to blend public and 
private capital to finance development goals, has become a new norm. Mobi-
lizing private capital for development-related purposes such as education, 
health, green technology or microfinance in developing or emerging markets 
is a promising though still nascent approach to supplementing traditional fund-
ing sources. Often referred to as impact investing or social impact investment, 
capital is typically supplied by financial institutions, investment firms, foun-
dations’ endowments, high net worth individuals, pension funds and individual 
or retail investors. Financial return on investment ranges from below market 
(“impact first”) to market rate (“finance first”).  
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Looking ahead 
The new development agenda has been set and implementation is already un-
derway. Attention has shifted to how national governments and other stake-
holders will measure progress on the goals and how they will report on that 
progress. The review process is multi-level and complex. The High-Level Po-
litical Forum on Sustainable Development, which convenes annually under the 
auspices of ECOSOC, is the central platform for follow-up and review of the 
SDGs. States report to each other at the regional level and regions report to the 
global level. Each year, the High-Level Forum focuses on a different overall 
theme and zeros in on a few of the 17 goals. Member states are encouraged to 
prepare Voluntary National Reviews on successes and challenges related to 
implementing the agenda. Every four years, the UN Secretariat will prepare a 
Global Sustainable Development Report covering overall trends, and heads of 
state will meet to review progress.  
National governments are thus busy incorporating the SDGs into their na-
tional development plans, strategies and budgets, and considering how they 
will raise awareness and mobilize action among diverse actors. They are not 
the only ones getting to work. Consultations on the SDGs revealed a strong 
desire from other actors to be involved not only in the design of the goals, but 
also in future implementation. What role will the UN play in this next phase 
and what role will be played by civil society, businesses, and other key stake-
holders? Is the UN development system fit to tackle current global challenges 
in partnership with other sectors? How can it be improved? 
Partnering in a new era of development cooperation 
The traditional understanding of ‘development’, a simple characterization of 
developed-developing, donor-recipient relationships that emerged in the 
1960s, is giving way to a new era of universality and global partnerships. The 
universal nature of the SDGs makes clear that the greatest challenges of our 
time are not problems of the global South, but global problems. One example 
is the inclusion of climate change action in the goals. Evidence has emerged 
that Western, industrialized countries are most responsible for climate change, 
while its harmful effects have disproportionately affected developing countries 
that have done little to contribute to it. The goals also recognize that developed 
countries have a particular duty to ensure sustainable consumption and produc-
tion, given their sizeable consumption levels relative to poorer states. Reducing 
income inequality within countries is another example. The level of inequality 
in the United States—an exemplary country according to indicators related to 
maternal health, education, preventing and combating disease, extreme poverty 
and hunger, etc.—exceeds that of many developing countries. Similarly, 
83 
despite having a much higher Gross National Income (GNI) than most African 
countries, South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in Africa, and 
indeed in the world.  
Alongside an understanding that current challenges extend beyond develop-
ing countries, there is a general acceptance that these broader, more complex 
problems require new, innovative approaches as well as enhanced collabora-
tion between sectors. Old ways of thinking coupled with a reliance on devel-
opment aid will not suffice. “Lasting solutions to global problems no longer 
lie in the hands of governments alone. The United Nations of the 21st century 
must think in terms of networks and coalitions.” (UNSG 2013). 
The role of multi-sector partnerships in UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon’s 
special initiatives launched over the past years is telling of the UN’s commit-
ment to collaboration: 
 Climate Resilience Initiative, launched in 2015, seeks to strengthen 
climate resilience of world’s most vulnerable countries and people by 
“bringing together private sector organizations, governments, UN 
agencies, research institutions and other stakeholders to scale up trans-
formative solutions.” (UN 2015).  
 Global Education First Initiative, launched in 2012: “a partnership 
comprised of a range of actors and institutions including governments, 
UN agencies and multilateral organizations, civil society organisations, 
and the private sector.” (UNESCO GEFI). 
 Every Woman Every Child, launched in 2010: “an unprecedented 
global movement that mobilizes and intensifies international and na-
tional action by governments, multilaterals, the private sector and civil 
society to address the major health challenges facing women, children 
and adolescents around the world.” (Every Woman Every Child web-
site). 
 Global Pulse, launched in 2009: “Global Pulse partners with experts 
from UN agencies, governments, academia, and the private sector to 
research, develop, and mainstream approaches for applying real-time 
digital data to 21st century development challenges.” (Global Pulse 
website).  
Analysis of two related UN documents, The Future We Want (the outcome 
document of the 2012 Rio+20 Conference at which the idea for SDGs was 
officially tabled) and We the Peoples (the report proposing the MDGs, released 
ahead of the 2000 Millennium Summit), demonstrates that the emphasis on 
partnerships is relatively new. The report published in 2012 cited the concept 
of partnerships three times more often than the 2000 report did. The term stake-
holder(s) was used 26 times in the 2012 report, and only once in the slightly 
longer report from 2000. Another key document, the UN Secretary-General’s 
2014 synthesis report The Road to Dignity by 2030 includes partnerships as 
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one of six “essential elements for delivering on the SDGs”. This report men-
tions partnerships twice as many times as the The Future We Want published 
just two years earlier (Volt 2015).  
ECOSOC has placed greater emphasis on leveraging partnerships in support 
of the international development agenda since 2008 when it began convening 
an annual Partnership Forum, bringing together governments and stakeholders, 
particularly from business and foundations, to discuss ways to engage and col-
laborate to achieve the development goals. At the 2016 Forum, ECOSOC Pres-
ident Oh Joon stressed that governments, the UN system, civil society, the pri-
vate sector, the philanthropic community and academia must break down tra-
ditional silos for more and better cross-sectoral decision-making and solutions 
(ECOSOC 2016). 
Role for private sector 
“Putting social and environmental purposes in the driving seat of business is the 
only way to ensure an equitable and sustainable economy for the 21st century.”  
Professor Muhammad Yunus (British Council and SEUK 2015) 
The private sector is a critical element in the 21st century notion of partnerships 
for development. Beyond being a potential source of capital to finance the in-
ternational development agenda, in itself quite significant, the business world 
brings expertise, innovation, rigour and efficiency. Businesses and corpora-
tions focused on providing technology, products and services to the poor can 
have huge impacts on poverty alleviation. Think about a company that pro-
duces low-cost medical supplies or affordable home water-filters to those at 
the bottom of the pyramid. Or microfinance institutions, like Grameen Bank 
or BRAC, that offer micro-loans to the poor who lack access to traditional fi-
nancial services and would not qualify for a bank loan due to a lack of collat-
eral. Even growing ventures like Lucky Iron Fish, a social enterprise working 
to reduce iron deficiency in Cambodia and worldwide through a reusable iron 
fish that can be added to any pot while cooking. The ingenuity and drive of a 
new class of social entrepreneurs that seek to solve complex social challenges 
through business is changing the way we think about addressing social issues. 
In fact, there is a spectrum of private sector actors that can support the UN’s 
goals. These range from for-profit social enterprises to socially responsible 
businesses, to corporations looking to engage in corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) work and purely profit-oriented companies. When incentives align, 
there is enormous potential for corporations to contribute to meeting the UN’s 
needs while achieving their own social responsibility goals. The UN Global 
Compact, a voluntary initiative based on business leaders’ commitments to 
adopt sustainable and socially responsible policies, seeks to tap into the boom-
ing CSR trend. Self-described as the world’s largest voluntary corporate 
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sustainability initiative, it had the participation of over 8,400 companies from 
162 countries as of April 2016. This reflects an acknowledgement that global 
trade, investment and business activity can be powerful drivers of economic 
transformation and social change. One just needs to compare the $134.8 billion 
in ODA in 2013 to worldwide trade in goods and services, worth $23 trillion 
in 2014, to see the potential of a more social impact-oriented private sector 
(British Council and SEUK 2015). If economic globalization were harnessed 
for international development, the result would be transformational. 
Even corporations not driven by the desire for social change have a place at 
the table. Public-private partnerships have traditionally been essential to de-
velopment projects, particularly those related to public infrastructure, transpor-
tation, and information technology (e.g., internet access). Recently, interest has 
broadened to other areas such as affordable or social housing, water and edu-
cation.  
The new attention paid to the opportunities associated with private sector 
involvement in development outcomes has led to concerns around the risks 
posed. Many have pointed to the need to ensure transparency and accountabil-
ity, which is now acknowledged in nearly every UN speech that stresses the 
potential of private sector partnerships. Accountability is an issue as corpora-
tions often have an incentive to keep information confidential in order to pro-
tect any competitive advantages. As well, corporations are accountable to their 
shareholders, not stakeholders, and have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize 
profits. Inclusion of all relevant stakeholders is not a given. In fact, despite the 
UN framing public-private partnerships as a way to enhance inclusion of di-
verse actors, evidence suggests that work in this area remains to be done. Sev-
eral studies have shown that such partnerships have failed to achieve inclusive 
participation, particularly of certain groups such as farmers, workers and trade 
union, indigenous peoples, women, youth or children. If business interests are 
put ahead of the UN’s interest to advance the internationally agreed develop-
ment agenda, the UN will risk losing its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes 
of the people.  
Ultimately, what is required for these partnerships to be successful is for 
there to be proper due diligence screening, clear partnership principles and 
guidelines, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that expected 
results are achieved.  
Role for civil society 
Amidst all the promise of leveraging the private sector as a force for good, civil 
society has been sidelined and its contribution undervalued. That corporations 
are relatively new actors in this space is partially responsible for the hype. As 
well, the financial resources they offer are welcome at a time when developed 
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countries are facing recession and cutting their ODA budgets accordingly. Yet 
civil society, made up primarily of NGOs but also social movements and net-
works, has been pivotal to advancing the UN development agenda over the 
past decades.  
At the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, 
around 1,500 participants from NGOs joined the 5,000 government delegates, 
members of the media and other officials and staff in attendance. NGO partic-
ipation at UN world conferences and summits has risen dramatically since. 
Over 17,000 NGO participants took part in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, and 
in 2012 at Rio+20 the number reached more than 40,000. At the same time, the 
number of NGOs that enjoy consultative status with ECOSOC has risen from 
41 in 1946 to 4,189 today, reflecting both the expanding number of NGOs 
globally and the greater influence they hold in the UN development arena. 
NGOs and civil society organizations are uniquely placed to support gov-
ernments and the UN in achieving social and economic development, gender 
equality, environmental sustainability and human rights, as they typically share 
the same vision and ideals. They achieve impact through knowledge, expertise, 
lobbying, advocacy, research, priority setting, media outreach and monitoring. 
They have succeeded in raising public awareness of issues, shaping public 
opinion, norm setting, influencing international deliberations and negotiations, 
and pressuring states and the corporate world to be more responsible and ac-
countable. During the climate negotiations in Paris in 2015, civil society move-
ments and self-organizing networks were crucial in getting states to take action 
against climate change. Their immense contribution to the creation of the 
SDGs helped ensure an inclusive decision-making process and goals that ulti-
mately reflected the world’s most pressing needs.  
Through campaigning and political pressure, NGO coalitions played a cen-
tral role in the adoption of international bans on landmines, ending apartheid, 
and establishing the International Criminal Court, among many other achieve-
ments. With the internet’s ability to rapidly mobilize global supporters around 
an issue or concern, NGOs that make effective use of new technologies have 
been able to reach the public like never before. Avaaz, the world’s largest 
online activist network, has over 44 million members worldwide. Launched in 
2007, its model of internet organizing engages citizens around the world to 
take action on pressing global, regional and national issues through signing 
petitions, funding media campaigns and direct lobbying, and organizing “of-
fline” protests and events. 
Though technology is enabling civil society organizations to achieve un-
precedented scale, NGOs have also increased their impact through partnering 
or forming coalitions with other NGOs. In global decision-making processes 
such coalitions are favoured as they are seen to represent agreement and con-
sensus around specific issues. Yet this pressure for a single voice poses a chal-
lenge for NGOs, which are as diverse as the problems they were created to 
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solve and the constituents’ views they give voice to. This is especially true for 
NGOs from the South, which tend to be less established and powerful than 
their Northern peers. Reaching consensus and getting others on board has his-
torically been easier for Northern NGOs than Southern ones, which can mean 
that voices from the North may be more likely to be heard (Browne and Weiss 
2014: 200). This is problematic as NGOs in the South have distinct priorities 
and interests. 
UN leaders have for decades proclaimed that NGOs and civil society are 
vital to human progress. Former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
called NGOs “an indispensable part of the legitimacy” of the United Nations. 
Similarly, Kofi Annan referred to NGOs as “the conscience of humanity” and 
Ban Ki-Moon said that “civil society has never been more important or 
needed” (UNSG 2013). Yet despite these declarations, civil society participa-
tion in global governance at the UN is not as strong as it could be and NGOs 
are too often perceived as a nuisance. The following chapter on human rights 
explores this challenge in greater depth, as NGOs have less influence in the 
current Human Rights Council than in its predecessor, the Commission on Hu-
man Rights. The hostility towards NGOs within the walls of the UN mirrors 
the fraught relationship between civil society and national governments. In 
many countries—from those in the global South to the North, from authoritar-
ian regimes to developed democracies—NGOs are increasingly being targeted 
by governments. Turkey is just one example; its government shut down hun-
dreds of NGOs following the failed coup attempt in July 2016, and interna-
tional aid organizations helping Syrian refugees in Turkey are experiencing 
hostility and expulsion (Sanchez 2017).  
A number of reforms have been proposed to strengthen civil society’s in-
volvement and influence in UN processes. Key recommendations include: es-
tablishing permanent, more inclusive structures and mechanisms for civil so-
ciety participation in institutional decision-making; allocating more funds for 
relations with civil society organizations; cultivating positive attitudes towards 
civil society; and increasing the UN’s capacity to engage with civil society 
through staffing decisions, training and guidance. As well, the UN should ac-
tively encourage the participation of underrepresented NGOs, with a particular 
focus on empowering NGOs from the global South that may struggle to attract 
levels of international attention similar to their Northern peers. 
Going forward, civil society and NGOs will be essential to effective global 
partnerships for development. States recognize that their success will remain 
limited without the support of civil society, while the business community 
struggles with accountability. Civil society cannot be marginalized by global 
actors looking to new solutions to solve the world’s most pressing challenges. 
Their place at the table can contribute to more effective global governance by 
ensuring a diversity of views and interests. 
88 
Innovation and technology 
The digital revolution and the spread of mobile technology have transformed 
international development efforts. The internet and social media have fostered 
the swift mobilization of people and resources in an unprecedented way. New 
technology and new applications of existing technology have made possible 
significant improvements in the developing world across diverse sectors such 
as banking, education, health and agriculture. Access to technology is not yet 
universal, but uptake is rising exponentially.  
Innovation for development is the latest trend. While the focus here is on 
the potential of tools such as social media, mobile technology, crowdsourcing, 
big data and open data, the concept is much broader. It refers to doing things 
differently, with an emphasis on achieving better outcomes through evidence-
based decision making, experimentation to determine what works, scaling suc-
cessful models and adopting a human-centered design approach.  
Mobilizing civil society  
One outcome of the internet’s penetration in developed and developing coun-
tries alike has been a new form of civic engagement. Self-organizing networks 
and online social movements have succeeded in mobilizing previously unfath-
omable numbers of people to support causes, pressure governments and cor-
porations, contribute resources, and coordinate action. Social media has been 
instrumental in enabling the shift from state-based institutions and forums di-
recting change towards a model based on leadership from civil society and 
other non-state actors. Leading up to the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference 
in Paris (COP21), individuals and civil society groups expressed their discon-
tent with the inability of states to take action on climate change. Six months 
before the Conference, over 20 million people had joined the Climate Reality 
Project and other self-organizing networks pushing for action against climate 
change (Tapscott 2014). Ultimately, states agreed on a far more ambitious deal 
than ever before, restoring some degree of faith in the ability to states to act, 
though the considerable pressure from civil society was undoubtedly a crucial 
factor contributing to COP21 success.  
Fundraising  
Social and environmental causes have embraced the internet for its fundraising 
potential. A particularly striking example was the ALS Association’s Ice 
Bucket Challenge, which dared people to post videos of having ice water 
dumped on themselves, and challenging others to do the same. It exploded in 
July and August 2014 and in less than three weeks the ALS Association—a 
non-profit health organization that few had heard of before the challenge—had 
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raised $15.6 million. The crowdfunding industry, of which social impact initi-
atives make up a rising proportion, grew from $16 billion in 2014 to an esti-
mated $34 billion in 2015, surpassing the venture capital industry which in-
vests an average of $30 billion each year (Barnett 2015). Online platforms for 
microfinance lending have also gained momentum in recent years. Kiva, the 
most prominent platform, has nearly 2.5 million users and has lent over $846 
billion to individuals in 84 countries through its field partners. 
Sectors: banking, commerce, disaster response, education 
Technology has had a tremendous effect on the banking and commerce world, 
reducing transaction costs and facilitating participation of marginalized popu-
lations in global trade. Kenya’s mobile money-transfer scheme, M-Pesa, al-
lows people to make microfinance loan repayments, pay bills and send remit-
tances to family members back home using their mobile phones, saving time 
and money. The cashless nature of electronic transfers also helps reduce theft. 
In April 2016, M-Pesa had about 19 million active users in Kenya, more than 
two thirds of its adult population, and over 6 million subscribers outside of the 
country in Africa, Asia and Europe (Ochieng 2016). East Africa is now re-
garded as a global leader in mobile banking. Meanwhile, the growth of e-com-
merce has removed barriers for entrepreneurs to participate in global markets 
and sell their goods or services to businesses and consumers around the world.  
In the field of disaster response, crowdsourced data and geographic infor-
mation system mapping have drastically improved abilities to respond to nat-
ural disasters and other crises in a timely and effective manner. Following the 
devastating 2015 earthquake in Nepal, Kathmandu Living Labs developed cri-
sis map QuakeMap to better match relief efforts with the needs of affected 
people and communities. Similarly, HaitiData makes public geospacial maps 
of Haiti, containing a wealth of information and data to support policy makers 
in post-earthquake reconstruction. These technologies have applications in 
other areas as well, such as climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
Online learning and massive open online courses, referred to as MOOCs, 
are innovations disrupting and creating opportunities in higher education. 
MOOCs first entered the scene in 2008, but gained worldwide attention and 
praise (along with some criticism) in 2012. Several top US universities, includ-
ing Stanford University, Princeton, MIT, and University of Berkeley, intro-
duced MOOCs at that time, and hopeful observers envisaged vast numbers of 
students in developing countries benefitting from the highest quality of educa-
tion. The hype was not entirely overblown; enrolment began to spread from 
the West to the rest, emerging countries such as India and Brazil saw home-
grown MOOCs take off, and higher education has indeed become more acces-
sible and affordable for everyone. The spread of MOOCs in the developing 
world is not without challenges, namely that many lack the basic level of 
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education and literacy required to benefit and advantages of face-to-face inter-
action with professors are lost, but potential is great. 
There are numerous other sectors, such as health and agriculture, where in-
formation and communications technology (ICT) has been altering the status 
quo. In terms of making progress on the SDGs, effectively utilizing new tech-
nology will be key. As this chapter has explored, social media outreach was 
instrumental in ensuring that the SDGs reflected the diverse voices from 
around the globe. Moving forward, data collection through mobile devices and 
crowdsourcing will be essential to monitoring achievements and progress on 
the goals.  
A main caveat to the great promise that technological advancements hold 
for accelerating global change is that information and communication technol-
ogy infrastructure is still lacking in many parts of the world, particularly in 
rural communities. While access to modern technology varies greatly within 
countries and according to certain demographics, the digital divide is particu-
larly stark between developed and developing countries. Another risk may be 
referred to as the “dark side of ICT”, when new technology and social media 
platforms are harnessed to advance global threats, such as terrorism, human 
trafficking and cybercrime. In recent years we have sadly witnessed that ICT 
can just as easily be used to reverse social and economic progress as it can be 
to accelerate it.  
What role for the UN? 
The changed development landscape has already begun to put pressure on the 
UN development system. With a multitude of new actors involved, a shift in 
the nature of poverty, and a reduced portion of ODA being channelled through 
the UN (a mere 16 per cent of ODA to least developed countries came from 
the UN in 2012, down from 25 per cent in 1990), the UN needs to consider 
what its role in development will be moving forward. Overall, its development 
function appears to be losing relative importance when compared to other UN 
functions such as peace and security, human rights, and humanitarian aid. With 
numerous previously low-income countries having graduated to middle-in-
come status, countries have greater capacity to solve their own challenges, and 
technical assistance is less needed outside least developed countries and fragile 
states. Yet a different type of support will be sought. 
The UN’s greatest strength lies in its ability to convene diverse stakeholders 
and set global standards and norms. It succeeded in consulting a broad range 
of actors to establish a post-2015 development agenda by and for ‘the people’. 
The challenge ahead will be implementation. Given the centrality of multi-
stakeholder partnerships to the UN’s plan for implementing the SDGs, the UN 
will need to ensure that efforts of diverse development actors are aligned with 
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the objectives of the international development agenda. As the primary body 
for coordinating sustainable development, ECOSOC should play a leadership 
role in setting global norms. It could start by establishing the principles and 
guidelines that govern the partnerships. To ensure a convergence between UN 
and business interests, it could also ask companies engaged in partnerships 
with the UN to commit to the UN Global Compact Principles.  
Actions need to be based on the right intentions, but they also need to be 
coordinated. To enhance coordination, UN agencies and programmes could be 
assigned as Task Managers for each SDG. A meta-partnership could then be 
created for each target which would oversee the contributions of various parties 
towards the targets and report back to the appropriate Task Managers (Dodds 
2015: 13). The UN will also be looked upon for leadership in overseeing SDG 
monitoring and review, which will take place at the national, regional, and 
global levels.  
Is the UN prepared?  
There is little question that the task at hand is a mighty one. In a post-2015 era, 
the UN is expected to lead in implementing the sweeping and ambitious new 
development agenda, manage multi-stakeholder partnerships, adapt to a rap-
idly evolving development landscape, embrace technology and innovation, and 
measure and evaluate progress.  
Yet the UN development system (which refers to the 30+ organizations in 
the UN system mandated to work in areas related to social-economic develop-
ment) struggles to remain relevant. The system is fragmented and exists in si-
los, there is significant overlap in the work of organizations with similar man-
dates, software and business practices used are as numerous as organizations, 
and competition for limited resources is rife. Moreover, ECOSOC, the coordi-
nating body, is known for being ineffective and cumbersome.  
Meanwhile, the World Bank, which is a specialized agency of the UN, and 
regional development banks (e.g., the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank), which are not part of the UN system but coordinate 
closely with it, are seen by many experts as the true leaders in development, 
producing superior research and policy, and operating more efficiently. The 
UN development system risks being marginalized by other actors if it contin-
ues to put off much-needed reform.  
Ban Ki-Moon made reference to the shortcomings of the UN development 
system on multiple occasions, and called for swift action. He reinforced that 
sentiment in a 2015 statement to the Security Council, stating that “the 2030 
Agenda calls on us to move from silos to synergy, to move from fragmentation 
to partnership.” This recognition that the UN development system requires re-
form to operate more efficiently and effectively is not new. Numerous attempts 
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at reform have been made, including efforts to streamline the entire system, 
coordinate the work of multiple UN programs in a given country, and improve 
how ECOSOC operates. The three key reform initiatives have been the 1969 
capacity study which sought to address fragmentation of the development sys-
tem, Kofi Annan’s resident coordinator initiative in 1997, and the 2006 High-
Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence. Yet results have been limited and 
observers continue to stress the urgent need for more ambitious reforms such 
as the creation of UN Women (see Box 10).  
Streamlining the UN development system and ‘Delivering as One’  
In the UN’s early days, its development work was carried out by a few special-
ized agencies. During the 1960s and 1970s there was a proliferation of organ-
izations in the UN development system, which today boasts 30 organizations 
plus research and training institutions. These organizations are headquartered 
in 16 countries, with over 1000 field offices dotted around the globe. The sys-
tem has become extremely complex and inefficiencies abound. Some of the 
challenges associated with having so many players in the system include du-
plication in policy advice and on-the-ground service delivery, lack of coher-
ence and consistency across the UN system, and competition for funds among 
UN agencies. For instance, the Future UN Development System, or ‘FUNDS’ 
Project, an NGO devoted to accelerating change in the UN development sys-
tem, points out that there are 16 UN organizations carrying out water and en-
vironmental projects.  
Box 10: UN Women 
In July 2010, the General Assembly decided to establish UN Women, a 
UN entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women by merg-
ing four existing entities dedicated to women: the Office of the Special 
Adviser on Gender issues and Advancement of Women, the Division for 
the Advancement of Women of the Secretariat, the UN Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the International Research and Training 
Institute for the Advancement of Women.  
In this rare move of merging entities with overlapping mandates, the 
UN demonstrated that solutions to an increasingly fragmented and unco-
ordinated system are possible.  
The need for a more robust overall approach has been understood for years. In 
2006, Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the ambitious Delivering as 
One initiative, following recommendations by the UN Secretary-General’s 
High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence, a group that had been 
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exploring options for strengthening and modernizing the UN system. The ob-
jective was for the UN system to “deliver as one” at the country level. Most 
developing countries have numerous UN development organizations present 
(e.g., UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WFP), each with their own office, budget, pro-
gramme and so on. Through the “Delivering as One” approach, each country 
sought to improve service delivery and collaborate as one UN team based on 
One Programme, One Leader, One Budget and One Office (the four overarch-
ing principles set out by the High-Level Panel). It was believed that such a 
unified approach to delivery would reduce duplication, fragmentation and 
competition for funds, while enhancing capacity for strategic approaches 
(United Nations 2012: 8).  
When it was launched, the governments of eight countries jumped on board, 
volunteering to become pilots: Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Vietnam. These pilot countries were encour-
aged to innovate and experiment with new approaches to collaboration based 
on the four ‘Ones’. During implementation two additional concepts—One 
Voice and One Fund—were added. The pilot phase concluded with an inde-
pendent evaluation conducted in 2012 of achievements across the six Ones. 
Conclusions were mixed. The most positive finding was a strong increase in 
national ownership and leadership, whereby UN programming in pilot coun-
tries was being driven by their own needs and priorities. The greatest challenge 
proved to be achieving efficiency gains and reduced transaction costs, mainly 
due to the persistence of overlapping or incompatible reporting requirements 
and regulations of organizations. This failure revealed the barriers to experi-
mentation that pilot countries face, pointing to the need for more systemic 
changes at headquarters level.  
As of 2016, 52 countries have formally adopted the Delivering as One ap-
proach. Most are low and middle income countries, with a handful of upper 
middle and high income countries as well. To date, progress has remained slow 
and the UN has not demonstrated leadership in accelerating the process of 
achieving a unified approach at the country level. This view was reflected in 
the results of a 2014 survey conducted by FUNDS that asked over 3,200 people 
from across sectors who interact regularly with the UN which changes in the 
UN Development System should be implemented by 2025. Many respondents 
wanted to see changes that are consistent with the Delivering as One” agenda, 
with the top suggestions including fewer organizations, a single country pro-
gramme, a single head of the UN Development System and single country rep-
resentatives for the system.  
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Improving business practices 
The UN system is large and unwieldy, not to mention notoriously inefficient. 
The top ideas for reform identified by experts in the above-mentioned 2014 
FUNDS survey were in fact related to technology, administration and infor-
mation management. Over 90 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly 
agreed with suggestions to cut costs and improve efficiency through greater 
use of technology; develop a single UN gateway to all UN research and publi-
cations; and use a common, system-wide technology platform for administra-
tion. 
Currently, virtually every UN organization and agency uses its own enter-
prise resource planning software to manage its business activities, service de-
livery, technology and human resources. Harmonizing business practices 
across the system and adopting a single platform for all administration would 
significantly reduce costs and increase the likelihood of delivering through a 
single office at the country level (which continues to be improbable with the 
multitude of platforms).  
Focusing on strengths and priorities 
There is little doubt that some organizations and agencies within the UN de-
velopment system are far more successful at achieving their stated objective 
than others. Thus any claims about the effectiveness of the UN development 
system as a whole fail to account for variation by organization and by sector. 
For example, the fields where the UN development system is seen to excel are 
health, education and gender. Similarly, the organizations that are viewed as 
most effective are WHO, UNICEF, UNAIDS, WFP and UNDP. It is worth 
noting though that while the UN is generally seen to be a leader in health, its 
reputation is stronger for achieving long-term impacts than for dealing with 
pandemics (see Box 11). The areas in which the UN is perceived to be least 
relevant are crime prevention, drug control, and financial stability (FUNDS 
2014). In assessing where to allocate energy and resources, the UN should fo-
cus on areas where it has a comparative advantage. 
In addition to assigning resources based on relative strengths, the UN should 
also critically assess how its current programmes and funds fit with the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, and make adjustments as necessary. 
There are a number of priorities on the agenda where the UN currently lacks 
expertise and has not allocated sufficient resources, such as urban design and 
sustainable cities, ocean health, and clean energy. New UN programs may need 
to be established, while others should be combined or done away with alto-
gether. 
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Box 11: Global health crises—Ebola response 
The Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 and 2015 was among the 
largest health emergencies the world has faced in recent years. During 
the two years, the uncontrollable spread of the deadly virus caused more 
than 11,300 deaths, most of which were in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Gui-
nea. The World Health Organization was widely criticized for its delayed 
and inadequate response. An independent panel selected to assess the 
WHO response to the epidemic charged the agency’s culture and politics 
with its poor response, calling for a transformation of WHO’s organiza-
tional culture and delivery approach, as well as changes on the part of 
member states. 
A key finding of the Panel report was that WHO has a “technical, nor-
mative culture, not one that is accustomed to dealing with such large-
scale, long-term and multi-country emergency responses occurring at the 
same time”. Lacking a culture of rapid decision-making, WHO “tends to 
adopt a reactive, rather than proactive approach to emergencies”. This 
contributed to WHO’s unnecessary deferral in declaring a public health 
emergency. Another factor behind the delay was that it did not wish to 
challenge national governments of affected countries who initially de-
nied the extent of the outbreak due to fears of economic and trade impli-
cations. Even when it did recognize the extent of the crisis, a lack of fun-
ding for emergency response posed real challenges. At present, assessed 
contributions account for less than 25 per cent of WHO’s biennial pro-
gram budget; the remainder comes from voluntary funds from donors. 
While donors do provide a considerable amount of money for emergen-
cies, WHO has no core funds for emergency response (the outbreak and 
crisis response budget line).  
If WHO is to increase its effectiveness in dealing with future pandem-
ics and improve its governance of the entire global health system, it needs 
to learn from past mistakes and make the reforms necessary for it to be a 
true leader. 
Source: World Health Organization 2015  
ECOSOC reform 
As we saw in the first chapter, ECOSOC is the principal body for coordination, 
policy review, dialogue and recommendations on economic, social and envi-
ronmental issues. Established by the UN Charter in 1946, ECOSOC coordi-
nates the work of many UN agencies and bodies, and acts as a forum to discuss 
the issues falling within its broad mandate. The Council’s membership has 
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expanded over the years, from 18 in 1946 to the current 54 states, elected by 
the General Assembly for overlapping three-year terms.  
ECOSOC has received more than its fair share of criticism. Prominent dip-
lomats, politicians, policymakers and researchers alike have called it a weak 
and irrelevant institution. Various reasons for this have been put forth, includ-
ing: an overly expansive agenda that overlaps with that of the General Assem-
bly; a lack of authority or “teeth”; a disregard for results and outcomes; and an 
unrealistic workload with too many bodies reporting to it. Critics point to a 
need for ECOSOC to be less bureaucratic, more action oriented and policy 
relevant.  
While many complain about its ineffectiveness and limited ability to exer-
cise authority, there is little consensus around what to do about it. Indeed, some 
experts have argued that membership is too large and should be reduced, while 
others have called for a slightly expanded membership. Some feel that certain 
minor tweaks would do the trick, yet others make a compelling case for a com-
plete overhaul of the institution. Ambitious proposals envision ECOSOC as a 
more powerful body, capable of making binding decisions rather than merely 
recommendations. Many observers support the idea of elevating ECOSOC’s 
status to that of the Security Council, which, despite its challenges with repre-
sentation and fairness, is highlighted as a model in terms of its decision-making 
authority. Global economic policy coordination features in many reform pro-
posals as well. In the socio-economic development space, the “institutional di-
vision of labour” is such that the UN leads on peace and social concerns; the 
IMF on finance and macroeconomic management; the World Bank on devel-
opment lending; and the WTO on trade. Certain proponents of a strengthened 
ECOSOC have argued that the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO be 
made more democratic, reintegrated into the United Nations system and sub-
jected to ECOSOC’s overall policy coordination.  
Under pressure, ECOSOC has attempted to revive itself through several re-
forms over the years. The early 1990s saw several tweaks, including replacing 
biannual sessions with one more substantive annual session that had three seg-
ments: a high-level segment, a coordination segment, and an operational seg-
ment. Member states began sending higher level officials to attend, reflecting 
renewed interest in ECOSOC’s work. In 2006, the General Assembly adopted 
another resolution (61/16) on strengthening ECOSOC. It mandated ECOSOC 
to review progress made in implementing the outcomes of UN conferences and 
summits, including the MDGs. It also gave the Council a greater role in mon-
itoring trends and progress in international development cooperation and of-
fering policy guidance and options to improve effectiveness. 
In 2013, ECOSOC again underwent reforms, this time with the aim of mak-
ing it a more issues-oriented body capable of overseeing implementation of the 
2030 development agenda. Among other changes, the Council was mandated 
to provide greater leadership and guidance on substantive priorities by 
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convening a separate segment on integrating the economic, social and environ-
mental dimensions of sustainable development. In the same vein, ECOSOC 
began hosting an annual partnership forum in 2008 to explore how multi-sector 
partnerships can advance global development, as well as an annual youth fo-
rum in 2012 to promote youth engagement and the inclusion of key priorities 
for youth in drafting and implementing the development agenda. 
Relative to most reform proposals put forth by experts, these adjustments 
are fairly minor, and will lead to incremental rather than transformative 
change. Still, efforts to reform show a willingness on the part of the UN to 
respond to criticism. However, the absence of a broad consensus around fun-
damental change demonstrates how complex the issues are.  
Is reform possible? 
There is a general sense of optimism around the UN’s standing, with 86 per 
cent of programme country governments considering it to be a more relevant 
partner than two years ago (United Nations Secretariat 2015). And no matter 
how difficult reform may be, many also believe that it is possible. In the 2014 
FUNDS survey of individuals from private sector, UN organizations or agen-
cies, national governments/public sector, academia or NGOs who are familiar 
with the UN’s work, over three quarters said they felt that the UN development 
system was capable or strongly capable of significant reform. This is encour-
aging, given the pressure on the UN to deliver on the ambitious 2030 develop-
ment agenda. ECOSOC and all UN entities active in the development space 
still have much work to do to prove they are up for the task. 
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Chapter 4 – Promoting and Protecting Human Rights  
Human rights: one of the UN’s great ideas  
that too many countries fail to respect 
The fundamental paradox 
The protection and promotion of human rights is among the most controversial 
issues at the United Nations. In a world where states (as opposed to other levels 
of government or non-state actors) are the central unit, it is they that must pro-
tect the rights of their citizens. Yet it is states that are the primary violators. 
Attempts by the international community to intervene in a given country in 
order to protect the rights of individuals or groups are often met with accusa-
tions of interference with the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention. In-
deed, the prevalence of state sovereignty as the guiding norm in international 
relations remains the greatest obstacle to realizing universal human rights.  
Human rights are intended to be universal legal guarantees protecting indi-
viduals and groups against actions which interfere with fundamental freedoms 
and human dignity. They are considered to be inherent to all human beings, 
whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, col-
our, religion, language, or any other status. The defining characteristics of hu-
man rights are that they are: universal, internationally recognized, legally pro-
tected, equal and non-discriminatory, inalienable, interdependent and indivisi-
ble (see Box 12). 
Human rights featured prominently in the UN Charter. The Charter begins 
with a series of pledges: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, to maintain compliance with international law, to promote social progress 
and to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in equal rights of men and women and of nations large and 
small”. This strong commitment to human rights and the dignity of each indi-
vidual came after the devastating loss of tens of millions of lives and human 
abuses during the Second World War.  
But the notion that individuals have basic rights precedes the UN Charter, 
and even early international cooperation efforts. The UK Bill of Rights was 
adopted in 1689, the US Bill of Rights which came into effect in 1791, and 
France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizen, adopted just after 
the revolution and establishment of the first French Republic in 1789, are early 
examples of human rights protection. Historians will trace the origins of human 
rights ever further back, beginning with the Cyrus Cylinder, an ancient record 
dating back to 539 B.C. The rights set out in national bills and declarations 
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pertained to civil and political rights and freedoms, and not to what we refer to 
today as economic, social and cultural rights.  
Box 12: Key characteristics of human rights 
Universal – The principle of universality has become the cornerstone of 
international human rights law. It has been emphasized in numerous hu-
man rights conventions, declarations, and resolutions, beginning with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. All states have ratified 
at least one of the core human rights treaties and 80 per cent of states 
have ratified four or more.  
Interdependent and indivisible – Human rights can be grouped into 
civil and political rights, economic social and cultural rights, and collec-
tive rights. Certain rights cannot be sacrificed in favour of other rights as 
all of these rights are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated. 
Inalienable – Rights should not be taken away, except in specific situa-
tions determined by law and solely for the purpose of securing recogni-
tion and respect for the rights of others and of meeting the just require-
ments of the general welfare, morality and public order in a democratic 
society.  
Equal and non-discriminatory – Present in all the major human rights 
treaties, this principle prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, race, 
nationality, place of residence, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
language or any other status.  
International human rights law 
A series of human rights treaties, conventions and declarations adopted since 
1945 have given legal form to inherent human rights. Together, these contrib-
ute to a strong body of international human rights law. The most significant 
thus far has been the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the 
General Assembly on December 10th 1948 (which has since been designated 
Human Rights Day). It was the first international attempt to explicitly spell out 
basic human rights for all individuals, as the UN Charter did not in fact define 
human rights. The rights covered can be categorized into various categories: 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights (see Box 13). The Declara-
tion is regarded today as having established the fundamental norms of human 
rights that we, individually and collectively, should respect and protect.  
In 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (along with 
its two Optional Protocols) and the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights were adopted by the General Assembly, though they 
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only came into force ten years later, in 1976. The two Covenants were in fact 
completed in 1956 but due to disagreements over definitions, extent and mean-
ing as well as concerns over potential limitations on state sovereignty, it took 
ten years before they were formally adopted. Even today, not all states have 
ratified these treaties, including great powers—China is not party to the former, 
while the US still refuses to become party to the latter. The two Covenants 
along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights together form the In-
ternational Bill of Human Rights. By becoming parties to these and other in-
ternational treaties, states are, in principle, legally obligated to respect, protect 
and promote human rights. This means that states cannot interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights, they must protect individuals and groups against 
abuses, and they must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic 
rights.  
Box 13: Categories of human rights 
Civil rights – Both civil and political rights protect individuals’ freedom 
from infringement by governments, social organizations, and private in-
dividuals. Civil rights include life, liberty and security; privacy; protec-
tion from discrimination; and freedoms of thought, speech, religion, 
press, assembly and movement.  
Political rights – Rights of individuals to participate in politics and civil 
society such as freedom of association, the right to assemble and the right 
to vote. Political rights also include procedural fairness in law, including 
right to a fair trial, due process and legal remedy.  
Social, economic and cultural rights – Rights to adequate food, ade-
quate housing, education, health, social security, water and sanitation, 
work, enjoy one’s culture, practice of religion and use of one’s language.  
There are a total of nine core international human rights instruments. These 
include the two Covenants discussed above, and an additional seven conven-
tions regarding racial discrimination, discrimination against women, the rights 
of the child, the rights of persons with disabilities, the rights of migrant work-
ers, enforced disappearance and torture. Beyond the International Bill of 
Rights and the core human rights treaties, the General Assembly has adopted 
over 100 other international treaties and declarations addressing a host of is-
sues such as indigenous peoples, marriage, slavery and war crimes. A number 
of other human rights instruments exist at the regional and national level, 
which serve to compliment international norms. At the regional level, treaties 
and other instruments are adopted to reflect human rights concerns specific to 
a particular region and provide special protection. For instance, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights was strongly inspired by the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights and international treaties, but also demonstrates 
the African conception of “rights” and the emphasis on individuals’ responsi-
bilities. At the national level, when a government ratifies international human 
rights treaties, it commits to develop national legislation compatible with its 
treaty obligations and duties. Typically states will do so through adopting con-
stitutions and other laws that formally protect human rights.  
Contradictory interpretations 
Despite universal human rights norms elaborated in key treaties as well as in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a single and consistent interpreta-
tion of these rights remains a distant aspiration. 
There has traditionally been a North-South divide over the prominence 
given to various groups of human rights. Western, democratic countries have 
long stressed the importance of civil and political rights, which deal with lib-
erty and participation in civil and political life. These are sometimes referred 
to as “negative” rights as the state must refrain from any action that would 
interfere with individuals’ rights and freedoms. Conversely, many countries in 
the global South have pushed more for social, economic and cultural rights, 
which are considered “positive” rights as they require the state or other public 
authority to take positive steps to ensure access to basics such as food, shelter 
and education. Since negative rights came first, they are called “first-genera-
tion”, while positive rights which followed afterward are called “second-gen-
eration”. A third generation later emerged, which focuses on collective or 
group rights rather than individual ones. The right to self-determination and 
the protection of groups of persons, such as indigenous peoples, are examples 
of these “solidarity” rights. In many countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, 
the emphasis of collective rights over individual rights is reflective of ideolo-
gies and values that historically do not regard the individual as the central unit.  
States often perceive a trade-off between these different human rights, ar-
guing that certain rights need to be pursued immediately while others can re-
main on the back burner until the timing is right. Developing countries have 
argued that the right to development should take priority over other human 
rights, and that they should be able to neglect certain human rights, namely 
political rights, as they catch up to the West. Yet this, of course, runs counter 
to the core human rights principle of interdependence. Stressing the indivisi-
bility of all human rights, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights re-
cently stated “If States pick and choose which rights they will uphold, the en-
tire structure is undermined.” (UN OHCHR 2016). 
Cultural relativists have long challenged the notion of universality, asserting 
that it is a means for the West to impose its values and norms on other coun-
tries. While there is a strong case for cultural relativism and the usefulness of 
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considering contextual factors, relativists have seen their cause seized upon by 
those seeking to justify violations. The latest variant of this has been the em-
phasis by many countries on the importance of “traditional values”. In 2012, 
the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on “promoting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional 
values of humankind”. While it sounds benign, or perhaps even productive, 
customs and traditions are often cited as justifications by human rights abusers. 
Consider the practices of child and forced marriages, female genital mutilation, 
so-called “honour killings”, and marital rape that persist in many countries to-
day. Or the countless lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people 
globally who are denied the same rights that others in society enjoy. Traditions 
have not always been kind to everyone, and in many cases they have indeed 
impeded people’s rights. 
The 2012 resolution, which was preceded by two others in 2009 and 2011 
requesting further study of traditional values, set a dangerous precedent by cre-
ating a potential means through which countries can justify discrimination, 
harmful practices and other rights violations. Spearheaded by Russia, it had the 
support of a number of known human rights violators, such as China, Libya 
and Uganda. Meanwhile those that voted against were mostly Western coun-
tries with relatively good human rights records. Former Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon expressed disapproval with this trend on several occasions. At the 
2013 International Conference on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gen-
der Identity he stated “I respect culture, tradition and religion—but they can 
never justify the denial of basic rights.” (United Nations 2013). 
These varying perspectives reveal that despite a supposedly universal un-
derstanding of human rights, what we witness in practice is continuous debate 
and negotiation around how basic rights are defended.  
The tremendous cost of violations 
Despite a robust legal and normative framework surrounding human rights, 
there are numerous cases of human rights violations around the world each and 
every day. Individuals and groups are denied basic rights to which they are 
entitled, often by states that have signed and/or ratified human rights treaties. 
The current situation in Syria is a particularly appalling. The government 
has carried out indiscriminate airstrikes in which it has bombed markets, 
schools, hospitals and clinics, killing thousands of civilians (UNHRC 2017). It 
has detained people arbitrarily, including many activists, human rights defend-
ers, journalists and humanitarian workers. In early 2017, Amnesty Interna-
tional exposed the Syrian government’s secret campaign of mass hangings and 
extermination, in which as many as 13,000 people, most of whom were civil-
ians believed to be opposed to the government, were hanged at Saydnaya 
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Prison between 2011 and 2015 (Amnesty International 2017). The Syrian gov-
ernment is believed to be responsible for killing scores of civilians in numerous 
chemical attacks against its own people, including those in August 2013 and 
April 2017 which attracted international attention and condemnation. Not sur-
prisingly, Syria continues to refuse to grant the UN access.  
This case is far from isolated. When the UN tries to investigate alleged 
abuses, states are often uncooperative and claim interference with sovereignty. 
In his opening remarks at the Human Rights Council session in September 
2016, the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ah Al Hussein, 
expressed grave concern over attempts by countries to block human rights 
scrutiny. He stated that “monitoring activities, and advocacy intended to help 
better protect the people of your countries, are refuted as somehow violating 
the principle of state sovereignty—or even the UN Charter”, adding that cred-
ible statements by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights are 
often dismissed as ‘biased’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘misleading’ or based on ‘false’ 
premises by countries. A number of countries were singled out for preventing 
the UN from conducting independent and impartial investigations into alleged 
abuses, including Syria, Venezuela, Turkey, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Gambia, 
India, China, Nepal, Iran and the United States.  
Unfortunately, this lack of willingness by many states to cooperate with UN 
human rights observers is correlated with a large number of violations globally. 
Some examples of human rights issues in the world today are outlined in Box 
14. 
It would be wrong to assume that human rights violations only occur in non-
Western countries, particularly undemocratic regimes. The example of the 
United States’ use of torture on prisoners illustrates that abuses can certainly 
occur in Western, liberal democracies. Following the 9/11 attacks and in-
creased concern with the threat of terrorism, the United States used “stress and 
duress” interrogation techniques on prisoners in Afghanistan and in Guantá-
namo Bay, Cuba, and subjected detainees in Iraq to torture and cruel treatment. 
The United States Senate report on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Pro-
gram released in 2014 concluded that “the program caused immeasurable dam-
age to the United States’ public standing, as well as to the United States’ 
longstanding global leadership on human rights in general and the prevention 
of torture in particular.” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16). The 
2015 Universal Periodic Review of the US’ human rights record similarly sug-
gested tremendous room for improvement. 
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Box 14: Select examples of current human rights issues  
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights – There are 
76 countries around the world (mostly in Africa and Asia) that have anti-
gay laws, a clear violation of basic human rights. A number of these are 
passing or attempting to pass even more draconian bills. In 2013, an Anti-
Homosexuality Act was passed in Uganda that broadened the criminali-
zation of same-sex relations including life imprisonment (the original bill 
proposed the death penalty). Meanwhile Indonesia, where homosexuality 
is not illegal, made international headlines in early 2016 after a series of 
attacks against members of the LGBT community, including by promi-
nent public figures.  
Freedom of religion – Sadly, religious minorities are often the victims 
of violent attacks. The Muslim minority in the majority Buddhist Burma 
and Hindu and Christian minorities in the predominantly Muslim Pakis-
tan are but a couple of examples from a long list of cases where indivi-
duals and groups have come under attack based on their religion. In Saudi 
Arabia, conversion from Islam to another religion is punishable by death 
and the government provides no legal recognition or protection for free-
dom of religion. 
Freedom of speech and press – Too many countries today are guilty of 
denying people basic freedoms of expression. Security and intelligence 
forces in Iran have arrested journalists, bloggers and social media acti-
vists, who were given heavy sentences. The Chinese government notori-
ously censors all forms of media, communication and education, inclu-
ding the internet, television, film, literature and video games. Russia has 
also suffered a worsened reputation recently for intensifying its harass-
ment and persecution of critics and activists.  
Use of torture, ill-treatment of detainees and enforced disappear-
ances – The United States’ detention facilities at Guantánamo Bay in 
Cuba came under intense fire for human rights abuses including the use 
of torture. In its effort to combat organized crime, Mexican security 
forces have been involved in countless violations including extrajudicial 
killings, enforced disappearances and torture. Among numerous other a-
buses, Egyptian officials have in recent years committed torture and en-
forced disappearances, and mistreatment of detainees have led to many 
deaths.   
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The United Nations’ Record in Upholding Human Rights  
The organizational structure of UN organs, offices, agencies, treaty bodies and 
committees charged with ensuring that states apply human rights norms is 
complex and dizzying. Though not an exhaustive list, some of the main ones 
are: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the International 
Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, International Criminal Tri-
bunals, treaty bodies and various committees on specific areas of concern such 
as the rights of the child, torture and discrimination against women. 
An assessment of the overall impact of the UN’s human rights work reveals 
that it is particularly effective at promoting and developing human rights, but 
is failing to adequately protect those rights when countries opt not to respect 
their obligations. This stems from a reliance on political and diplomatic pro-
cesses as the means to achieving its objectives. Such an approach works for 
offering resources and technical assistance to countries, which in its very na-
ture is non-confrontational, but has posed significant challenges when inter-
vention is required to protect individuals from abuses (Freedman 2015: 54). 
Politicization is a defining feature across the human rights machinery; one that 
has hindered its success for decades. Selectivity and bias are widespread, and 
national interests consistently triumph over principled action. Diplomacy fa-
vours dialogue and cooperation, which rarely produces results where grave vi-
olations have occurred. An utter lack of enforcement mechanisms across UN 
human rights bodies has worsened the problem. Unlike domestic laws, inter-
national laws are often not enforceable. The international community can apply 
pressure to uncooperative states through tools such as sanctions or military in-
vasions, but aside from these extreme measures and simple diplomatic pres-
sure, sovereign states cannot be obliged to do anything.  
The following section examines the complex system of human rights bodies 
at the UN, including their strengths and weaknesses and proposals for reform. 
It focuses on the bodies exclusively concerned with human rights and human-
itarian affairs, though it is worth noting that much of the work of the General 
Assembly and Security Council centres on human rights issues. Through set-
ting standards and passing resolutions to condemn or draw attention to human 
rights violations, the General Assembly’s role in advancing human rights is 
mostly an indirect one. The Security Council plays a more central role, holding 
the authority to reach a binding “decision” that a situation is a threat to or 
breach of international peace and security. It has occasionally done so during 
particularly serious human rights abuses. We do not provide a detailed account 
of how these two UN organs have defended or failed to defend human rights. 
Suffice it to say, they have been plagued by some of the same challenges as 
the UN’s principal human rights bodies explored below, namely the primacy 
of power and politics. Meanwhile, innovations in the human rights field such 
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as the Responsibility to Protect norm and the International Criminal Court have 
emerged largely to provide limits to sovereignty, which continues to dominate 
both the General Assembly and the Security Council. 
From the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council 
When the Human Rights Council replaced the Commission on Human Rights 
in 2006, observers hoped that it would not suffer from the same defects as did 
its futile predecessor. Established in 1946 as the UN’s principal mechanism 
and forum for the promotion and protection of human rights, the Commission 
had a 70-year run marked by a few early successes followed by countless chal-
lenges. During its first 20 years it successfully established the international le-
gal framework outlined earlier in this chapter. It was also responsible for the 
many conventions adopted over the years.  
Having succeeded in setting norms and standards for states to follow, it 
shifted its attention in the late 1960s to monitoring and implementing human 
rights. This meant going beyond simply elaborating treaties to investigating, 
reporting on, and condemning violators. This new focus quickly turned politi-
cal and states viewed it as infringing on the principle of sovereignty. It soon 
exposed the inherent contradiction between the political nature of the Commis-
sion (it was, after all, a body made up of member states that represented their 
own national interests) and its mandate to act for the principled protection of 
human rights.  
A main criticism of the Commission was that its membership included 
known human rights abusers. The complete absence of membership criteria 
beyond geographic composition meant that not only did the body not select 
members based on an exemplary human rights record, but nor did it exclude 
states with appalling records. At the time of the Commission’s collapse, Sudan 
enjoyed membership despite the genocide taking place in Darfur, as did Zim-
babwe while the Mugabe government pursued forced evictions and demoli-
tions that left 700,000 people homeless and created a “humanitarian crisis of 
immense proportions” (Hoge 2005). This had been an issue for years but wors-
ened in the early 2000s. The straw that broke the camel’s back and ultimately 
led to the demise of the vexed human rights body was the election of Muammar 
Gaddafi, the Libyan leader whom many labelled as a dictator and tyrant, as 
chair of the Commission in 2003. Over time it became clear that human rights 
abusers were actually seeking membership on the Commission as a means of 
protecting themselves from closer examination. And since violators were less 
likely to condemn other violators, their presence further threatened the body’s 
credibility.  
The political nature of the Commission led to marked regionalism and 
group-blocking action. Regional alliances that were particularly visible were 
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the G77, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of the Islamic Co-
operation. Members were frequently encouraged by regional allies to vote 
against resolutions about grave violations in order to protect group members. 
In a flagrant show of contempt for the Bush administration, the Muslim-Afri-
can bloc voted the United States off the Commission in 2001, while countries 
like Sudan and Pakistan were elected as members (Freedman 2011: 35). In 
many instances, regional alliances and friendships overrode misconduct be-
cause membership is decided by votes from the world’s regions. 
Country-specific resolutions were the primary mechanism for addressing 
human rights abuses in countries. They became highly political weapons used 
by states to shield allies from scrutiny as well as to disproportionately lambast 
opponents. The United States would frequently focus on human rights viola-
tions in Cuba but stay silent on more serious abuses in allied states like Guate-
mala and El Salvador. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union similarly used 
human rights as a political tool when it criticized rights violations in Chile un-
der Pinochet (an ally of the US), while ignoring the grave human rights situa-
tion in communist states (Weiss et al. 2014: 211). Too often, states’ actions 
revealed political motivations and obvious double standards.  
The Commission was ultimately scrapped and replaced with the Human 
Rights Council following former Secretary General Kofi Annan’s recommen-
dation in a 2005 report. It was believed that the challenges with politicization 
and selectivity were so great that a complete overhaul was the only option for 
reform. But the ensuing discussions around what a more effective human rights 
body would look like proved more difficult and divisive than expected. First, 
there was no consensus on the optimal size of the Council. Annan suggested 
limiting membership to 15, while others wanted it to be universal. Nor was 
there agreement over what, if any, membership criteria should be established. 
Many developing and non-democratic nations already saw human rights as a 
Western tool being used against them, so the idea of excluding violators and 
undemocratic states would have only acted to reinforce this belief. And creat-
ing an exclusive club of likeminded, Western countries would have likely led 
to further polarization between the two groups. As well, given the variation in 
states’ understanding of human rights that was explored earlier in this chapter, 
it would have been near impossible to settle on any common definition of a 
‘tolerable’ human rights record to begin with. As a way to promote the primacy 
of human rights over politics, the notion of having human rights experts rather 
than government representatives on the Council was discussed. However, 
many states were not willing to concede power and see the new body become 
an expert rather than political one.  
In the end, after a great deal of deliberation, the newly established Human 
Rights Council did not differ greatly in architecture, function or composition 
from the ineffective Commission: it has 47 rather than 53 members, no mem-
bership criteria is used, and representatives are government officials concerned 
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with national interests. It was not identical to the Commission and introduced 
some new features explored below, but it was unable to tackle the heart of the 
issue. It is therefore little surprise that the Council has fallen short of expecta-
tions.  
The Council did not get off to a good start. During its first year in 2006, 
China, Russia, Egypt, Cuba and others were elected as “champions”. The US 
decided not to even run, but rather to be an observer, as a means of protesting 
the UN’s inability to address the flaws of the Commission, especially the mem-
bership of human rights violators. After two years it withdrew altogether 
(though under Obama the US reversed this decision of the Bush administration, 
running and getting a seat in 2009). Politics were omnipresent. The first session 
saw Israel condemned nine times, yet no other country. Over the Council’s first 
four years, six of the 12 special sessions that members held were focused on 
Israel. During the same period, the human rights situations in Myanmar, Dar-
fur, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sri Lanka were the subject of a 
single session each. There is little doubt that the Council has maintained the 
Commission’s strong bias against Israel. And while later sessions centred on 
Syria and other countries, it is still too early to proclaim a permanent shift. 
The 2016 Human Rights Council election saw several countries with less 
than stellar human rights records elected or re-elected as members, including 
China, Egypt, Cuba and Saudi Arabia. This points to the continued need for 
some minimal criteria for membership beyond the current voluntary pledge 
stating that the country will uphold international standards of human rights and 
listing their actions in advancing and protecting human rights. In the absence 
of strict guidelines, the international community may in some cases decide it-
self that a country is not worthy of a seat on the council. We witnessed this in 
October 2016 when Russia was defeated in its bid for re-election. But this is 
only possible when a regional group puts forward more candidates than the 
number of seats available, as was the case in Eastern Europe where Russia, 
Croatia and Hungary competed for two seats. There was no such competition 
for Saudi Arabia, a country that had been indiscriminately bombing civilians 
in Yemen during the 18 months prior to the vote. Given that the Asia group 
had put forward just four candidates—Saudi Arabia, China, Iraq, and Japan—
for four seats, it came as little surprise when they all won. Despite the prede-
termined results, Abdullah bin Yahya Al-Moallami, the Saudi Ambassador to 
the UN, still claimed that “the re-election of Saudi Arabia reflects the interna-
tional community’s trust in the pioneering and leading role of the Kingdom in 
the Human Rights Council.” (Saudi Press Agency 2016). This potential to by-
pass a competitive process needs to be addressed for the Council to maintain 
its credibility.  
The Council has enjoyed some achievements, alongside criticisms. Not un-
like the Commission, its greatest strengths lie in setting international standards 
and norms, raising awareness on human rights issues, and convening actors at 
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global forums. It has fared even better than its predecessor when it comes to 
considering the human rights situations in specific countries, particularly 
through the Universal Periodic Review mechanism that emerged from the re-
form process. Each year the human rights situation in 42 countries is reviewed, 
meaning every country gets its turn every four and a half years. The process 
requires countries to submit a 20-page report on their efforts to improve human 
rights and overcome any challenges to the enjoyment of these rights. To reduce 
bias, two supplementary reports are submitted alongside the “national report”. 
The first contains the views of Special Procedures (i.e., independent human 
rights experts), human rights treaty bodies, and other UN entities, while the 
second includes information provided by NGOs and national human rights in-
stitutions. Discussions are held and an outcome document is drafted with rec-
ommendations for states. Once adopted, states are expected to confirm which 
recommendations they accept. It is fairly rare that states reject recommenda-
tions, with the acceptance rate at 70-90 per cent (Ramcharan 2011). Whether 
countries implement the recommendations remains to be seen, but it is encour-
aging that the Universal Periodic Review has been fairly well received by 
states. Its universal nature has meant that all countries are treated equally, while 
the emphasis on dialogue over the naming and shaming has reduced impres-
sions of being targeted or singled out.  
Diagnosing a problem can be infinitely easier than developing a good solu-
tion. Despite this, there is no shortage of proposals for improving the flawed 
human rights body. A number of workable ideas are outlined in the final chap-
ter. But reforming the Human Rights Council will certainly not be straightfor-
ward, especially if the reform process of the Human Rights Commission is any 
indication.  
The Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Not all parts of the UN human rights apparatus are as political as the Security 
Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Council. At the opposite ex-
treme are the UN treaty-based bodies, which are the least politicized, biased 
and selective. These bodies are comprised of experts rather than government 
officials and do not have jurisdiction over states that are not party to the rele-
vant treaties. They serve to monitor the implementation of key conventions and 
protocols. There are 10 such bodies, including the Human Rights Committee 
(monitoring civil and political rights), Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women and the Committee against Torture. Somewhere in the middle are the 
secretary-general and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Both roles 
require a careful balance of impartial human rights advocacy and political sen-
sitivity. Failure to advocate for principled human rights protection would result 
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in criticism from human rights NGOs and commentators, while neglecting pol-
itics would lead to a loss of support of member states.  
There has been tremendous variation in the degree of outspokenness of past 
secretaries-general. Typically the world’s top diplomats have prioritized pro-
gress on peace and security over human rights, presumably to reduce the risk 
of offending states by singling them out as violators. Kofi Annan, a vocal hu-
man rights defender, was a notable exception. He used his position as a means 
to push states to behave better, albeit he did so cautiously. His successor Ban 
Ki-moon spoke out about some grave violations, but was fairly non-confron-
tational and would usually defer public statements until major powers had 
taken stances (Weiss et al. 2014: 204). 
The job of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is particularly de-
manding. The General Assembly created the post in 1993 following a success-
ful lobbying campaign by several actors including many NGOs, the Carter 
Presidential Centre and the US government (ibid: 207). Earlier that year, the 
UN Vienna conference on human rights had also recommended it be created. 
Unlike with the secretary general who juggles multiple priorities and can 
choose not to make human rights a prime concern, the high commissioner en-
joys no such luxury. Ruffling some feathers is effectively in the job description 
for this key human rights post. This sheds light on why so many who have 
assumed the position have been harshly criticized, even to the point of having 
to step down. This was the fate of the former president of Ireland Mary Rob-
inson who was nominated as high commissioner for human rights by Secre-
tary-General Annan. After Robinson drew much public attention to human 
rights violations in China and Israel, the US, which had close relations to these 
states and preferred quiet diplomacy to public condemnation, grew disillu-
sioned with her and pressured her to resign in 2002. Louise Arbour, who as-
sumed the post in 2004, also became disliked by Washington over time, while 
her successor Navanethem (Navi) Pillay upset many governments by high-
lighting violations against LGBT people and by focusing on specific abuses in 
Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Syria (ibid: 208-9). Since accepting the role in 2014, 
Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein of Jordan denounced violations in many states. 
Prior to Donald Trump’s election in the US, Zeid called him “dangerous”—a 
rare move for his office and one that suggests further clashes with Washington 
are to come (Cumming-Bruce 2016).  
Dealing with the worst violations: the International Criminal Court 
and ad hoc tribunals 
Crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide represent the most heinous 
human rights abuses. What distinguishes these ‘international crimes’ from 
other violations of human rights is that they are widespread or systematic 
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attacks knowingly committed against a civilian population. Crimes against hu-
manity can include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, 
apartheid, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, and other offences if they 
are committed on a large scale against a population that is predominantly ci-
vilian. Unlike war crimes, they can take place either during a time of peace or 
of war. As their name would suggest, war crimes can only occur during con-
flict, and are violations of international humanitarian law or the law of armed 
conflict. Many of the offences are similar to those categorized as crimes against 
humanity, though it also covers areas like hostages and prisoners of war. Gen-
ocide occurs when an intentional attack is carried out to destroy a national, 
ethnic, racial or religious group (United States Institute of Peace). 
International criminal courts and tribunals have been established to prose-
cute individuals who, in committing these grave crimes, violate international 
criminal law. The Tokyo and Nuremberg trials were the first tribunals created 
to prosecute and punish those guilty of international crimes. After the Second 
World War the world was appalled by the atrocities that had taken place. Mil-
itary commanders and political leaders in Nazi Germany were guilty of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide. Since there was no body of inter-
national criminal law at the time, it was effectively ‘invented’ and ‘applied 
retroactively’ to ensure the crimes committed did not go unpunished (Freed-
man 2015: 29). International criminal law later became codified and incorpo-
rated in international, regional and national law. A number of international 
criminal tribunals and special courts have since been set up after wars and mass 
killings to bring justice to victims and deter others from committing such 
crimes. Criminals were prosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity 
through tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, while special courts 
in Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia and East Timor dealt with serious viola-
tions in those countries.  
The ad hoc nature of these tribunals and courts was the impetus for the even-
tual creation of a permanent court, the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Based in the Hague, the Netherlands, the ICC is the first-ever permanent, 
treaty-based court of its kind that hears cases against individuals (the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is also a permanent, treaty-based international court, but 
only deals with disputes between states). It cooperates with the United Nations 
while remaining formally independent from it. The ICC was born through the 
Rome Statute adopted in 1998, but only began work formally after the Statute 
had entered into force in 2002. It has 18 judges elected by states parties for a 
term limited to nine years, no two from the same country. 
The ICC does not have universal jurisdiction to investigate any situation it 
pleases; rather, states decide to be bound by the Court’s rules by signing and 
ratifying the Rome Statute. For countries that are party to the Rome Statute, 
situations may only be brought to its attention when national courts are unwill-
ing or unable to prosecute individuals. As such, the Court was designed to 
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complement existing national judicial systems. Crimes in non-party states that 
remain outside of the Court’s jurisdiction can still be investigated if they are 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council. Similar to the courts and tribunals 
that came before it, a main objective of the ICC is deterrence—stopping leaders 
from believing they can get away with heinous crimes.  
Since its inaugural session in 2003, the ICC has opened ten investigations 
and publicly indicted 39 individuals, including Ugandan rebel leader Joseph 
Kony, Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir and Libyan leader Muammar Gad-
dafi. Its first judgement was issued in 2012 when it found Thomas Lubanga, 
Congolese rebel leader, guilty of war crimes related to child soldiers. Several 
others have been found guilty since. Aside from the most recently opened in-
vestigation in Georgia, every case investigated has been in Africa, and all 39 
people indicted have been Africans. This prompted a perception among Afri-
can countries in particular that the court is biased against them. In October 
2016, three African countries—Burundi, Gambia, and South Africa—an-
nounced that they would withdraw from the ICC, becoming the first countries 
to do so. In explaining his country’s decision to leave the Court, Gambia’s 
Information Minister Sheriff Bojang described the global judicial body as “an 
International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of people of 
color, especially Africans” (Sieff 2016). Many observers fear the decisions to 
leave will spark a mass exodus of African countries. Already Kenya and Na-
mibia’s parliaments have voted to withdraw, while Uganda’s president has 
harshly criticized the Court, even calling it “useless” (Gaffey 2016).  
Whether the ICC is biased against Africa has been the focus of much debate. 
The challenge with such a claim is that many of the cases that have been in-
vestigated were referred by African governments themselves—34 of which are 
members of the ICC. The situations in Sudan and Libya, countries that are not 
party to the ICC, were referred by the Security Council. So when the Court is 
accused of discriminating against Africa for not investigating situations in 
other countries, it is a criticism that should in fact be directed toward the Se-
curity Council. The ICC Prosecutor did cause an upset when on his own au-
thority he decided to investigate post-election violence in Kenya, effectively 
challenging the Kenyan government which objected to the decision. However, 
this case was the exception rather than the rule. Electing an African Prosecutor, 
Fatou Bensouda of Gambia, in 2011 to replace the Luis Moreno Ocampo of 
Argentina helped combat anti-Africa perceptions to some degree. And looking 
at the preliminary examinations currently underway (in the pre-investigation 
phase), many are in countries outside Africa, including in Afghanistan, Colom-
bia, Iraq/UK, Palestine and Ukraine.  
Since its inception, the much-needed human rights institution has struggled 
with the consequences of states being allowed to choose whether to opt into 
the ICC or not, as many have chosen not to. Before any country had announced 
it would withdraw, 124 states were parties to the ICC. If a state decides not to 
113 
be bound by the Court’s rules, its citizens can avoid arrest and prosecution 
simply by remaining in their country or not stepping into a country that is party 
to it. The US, which has been accused of committing war crimes at an Iraqi 
prison in 2003, has not sought membership in the Court (and with the US hold-
ing veto power, the Security Council will not refer this case to the ICC). Nei-
ther has Sudan, where the ICC has issued arrest warrants for those allegedly 
responsible for the genocide in Darfur, including the Sudanese president Omar 
al-Bashir. Since the country is not party to the ICC, the individuals can only 
be arrested if they enter a country that is. Even then, the ICC must rely on that 
country to make arrests as it cannot arrest individuals itself. However when 
Bashir flew to South Africa in 2015 for a summit, the South African govern-
ment declined to arrest him. The dispute escalated politically, ultimately lead-
ing to South Africa’s decision to leave the ICC, a surprise move given it had 
been a vocal supporter of the Court in its early days. This series of events 
served as a reminder that even if states join an international organization and 
agree to be bound by its rules, they can only be encouraged, not forced, to fulfil 
their commitments. 
In addition to the US, several other influential countries have decided not to 
join including great powers Russia and China. Russia had signed but not rati-
fied the ICC’s statute, but in November 2016, a day after the Court classified 
the Russian annexation of Crimea as an occupation, it formally withdrew its 
signature. Though significant, the move was purely symbolic, given Russia 
was not subject to the Court’s jurisdiction to begin with. The combination of 
powerful countries deciding not to join and perhaps more importantly the series 
of recent departures from the Court have caused real harm to the institution as 
a body that derives its legitimacy from members’ willingness to be bound by 
its jurisdiction. 
When the ICC was established, there was a strong sense of hope among 
NGOs and UN officials that it would effectively challenge state sovereignty 
and international politics and put human rights first. Human Rights Watch ex-
claimed at the time, "The International Criminal Court is potentially the most 
important human rights institution created in 50 years. It will be the court 
where the Saddams, Pol Pots and Pinochets of the future are held to account.” 
(Human Rights Watch 2002). Sadly, what we have witnessed instead is that 
state power and politics have prevailed over attempts to prosecute the worst 
human rights violators, even where mechanisms to seek justice exist under in-
ternational law. Until this is addressed, the ICC will remain a flawed institu-
tion. 
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Responsibility to Protect and human security 
The Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, norm was a similarly promising inno-
vation in human rights protection. As with the ICC, it was developed in the 
early 2000s to overcome the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty in 
the face of mass atrocities. The idea behind R2P was simple. Sovereignty is 
not a one-way street that leaders can use with impunity. Alongside a state’s 
right to sovereign independence comes the duty and responsibility to protect 
its citizens from gross violations. If a state proves unable or unwilling to do so, 
or if the state itself is the perpetrator, the principle of non-intervention yields 
to the international responsibility to protect. It came about as an alternative to 
the hotly-debated “humanitarian intervention”. In the 1990s, two devastating 
events—the genocide in Rwanda and war crimes committed during the Kosovo 
War—had demonstrated the deadly consequences of the UN Security Coun-
cil’s failure to authorize interventions in order to protect civilians. States rec-
ognized that the controversial “right to intervene” centred on coercive military 
intervention needed to be replaced by a more nuanced “responsibility to pro-
tect” that framed military action as a last-resort measure and favoured preven-
tion over intervention.  
The R2P norm was first articulated in the 2001 report of the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibil-
ity to Protect, financed by Canada for the UN. The report outlined three spe-
cific responsibilities of the international community: to prevent, to react and to 
rebuild. State sovereignty was framed as contingent on meeting certain obliga-
tions rather than an absolute right, and the notion of ‘human security’ was pri-
oritized over state security. Fortunately the report’s fate differed from that of 
many other international committee reports that largely go unread. Instead, the 
norm was widely acknowledged and quickly gained traction. It was endorsed 
by the 2005 UN World Summit and included in Kofi Annan’s report In Larger 
Freedom.  
The issue of ensuring ‘right intention’ was recognized from the outset. The 
ICISS report noted it as a precautionary principle, stating, “The primary pur-
pose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, 
must be to halt or avert human suffering.” The report went on to propose spe-
cific criteria which must be met to justify intervention but these have never 
been adopted by the Security Council. Thus R2P critics often note the uneven 
application of the principle, pointing to cases where great powers have used 
R2P as an excuse to intervene when it has been in their interest to do so, while 
ignoring grave situations where they stood to gain little or nothing. Commonly 
cited examples of abuses of the norm include: the US and UK in Iraq in 2003 
where R2P was a post-hoc justification for the war after original claims of Al-
Qaeda links and weapons of mass destruction fizzled out; Russia in Georgia in 
2008 which was inspired by imperial aims more than protecting human rights; 
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and France’s intervention in Burma in 2008 after a hurricane hit and the local 
government was slow to react (Weiss et al. 2014: 29). 
Recent events in the Middle East have reaffirmed that the decision to protect 
and assist vulnerable individuals ultimately rests on political will and military 
capacity. In 2011, the Security Council was swift to authorize military inter-
vention in Libya to protect the population from the ongoing atrocities. Mean-
while it has utterly failed to do the same in Syria, where the moral justification 
for intervention has been at least as strong as it was in Libya at the time (many 
would argue it has in fact been stronger). A host of factors explain the paralysis 
over action in Syria: the military challenge was tougher, potential costs of co-
ercion were believed to exceed the benefits, and the geopolitics differed greatly 
with both Russia and China exercising veto power to prevent action and ex-
press their general opposition to foreign intervention (Weiss 2014b). 
The intervention in Libya was initially lauded as a successful instance of 
R2P application. As explained in Chapter 1, a problem arose when the US, UK 
and France went beyond the Security Council’s agreed-upon mandate of lim-
ited civilian protection to helping usher in a regime change. This move upset 
the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in particular 
and contributed to states’ unwillingness to respond to the Syrian crisis soon 
after. It also prompted Brazil to table the “Responsibility while Protecting” 
(RwP) proposal, which stresses that military action must be pursued as an ab-
solute last resort, and that implementation should be subject to close monitor-
ing and regular review (Evans 2015). 
Edward Luck, the UN’s first-ever Special Advisor on the Responsibility to 
Protect (2008-12), reiterated these concerns while reflecting on R2P’s first ten 
years. Despite the wide acceptance of the prevention and protection principles, 
he stated that questions remain for states on implementation. He noted unfin-
ished business with regard to operational practice, accepting individual respon-
sibility, and developing a more nuanced understanding of sovereignty. Echo-
ing Brazil’s RwP proposal, he stressed the need for exercising greater respon-
sibility before and after protecting. According to Luck, a key challenge stems 
from the 2005 Summit’s failure to specify who is responsible for protecting, 
as individual responsibility can get lost in collective responsibility. “The chal-
lenge now is highly political and highly practical. We need to convince na-
tional policymakers: (1) that curbing atrocities serves their broader foreign pol-
icy and security objectives; and (2) that we know how to do prevention and 
protection in a cost-effective and sustainable manner.” (2015: 503). He makes 
a useful distinction between territorial sovereignty and “decision-making sov-
ereignty”. Few countries have used territorial sovereignty claims to protest 
against actions under the R2P principle, yet many insist on retaining the right 
to decide whether and how to act—something he sees as a real stumbling block 
for the implementation of R2P. 
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More than a decade after the 2005 World Summit, R2P undoubtedly re-
mains a crucial norm. Evidence of its growing normative traction lies in the 
general acceptance and support for R2P in both the General Assembly and the 
Security Council. Between 2005 and early 2011 the Security Council had only 
endorsed four resolutions mentioning R2P, but between March 2011 and Oc-
tober 2015 it had adopted 31 resolutions that referenced this principle—figures 
that may surprise some given the strong disagreements over the Libyan inter-
vention in March 2011 and ensuing claims of R2P’s demise (ibid). Still, the 
pillars related to preventing and rebuilding have proven less controversial than 
that which calls on states to react, thus going against the core norm of non-
intervention. And as we have seen, R2P is by no means a guarantee that those 
in danger will receive assistance; geopolitics continues to dictate who is helped 
and who is left behind.  
Migration, refugees and the humanitarian response 
In 2016, the UN reported that the number of forcibly displaced people world-
wide—a staggering 65.3 million—was the highest in human history. The pre-
vious record had been set in the aftermath of the Second World War. While 
displaced people refers to refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
migrants, only those in the first two categories are considered to be ‘forcibly 
displaced’ (see Box 15). 
The conflict in Syria undoubtedly accounts for a large portion of those dis-
placed. Since the civil war began in March 2011, over 11 million Syrians have 
fled their homes—more than half the population of Syria. Despite a focus on 
the refugees pouring into Europe, most of those displaced remain in the region. 
In early 2017, the UN estimated that over 5 million were refugees in neigh-
bouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq) and 6.3 million 
were internally displaced within Syria (UNHCR 2017). While the world spot-
light has been on Syrian refugees, conflict and unrest in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Yemen and elsewhere have equally led to an exodus of people 
from these countries.  
Under international law, refugees have the right to safe asylum. This in-
cludes physical safety but also freedom of thought, speech, religion and move-
ment, freedom from discrimination and torture, and economic and social rights 
such as access to health care, education and work. The key legal document 
pertaining to refugee protection is the 1951 Refugee Convention, which has 
been signed by 144 states. It defines ‘refugee’ and spells out their rights, as 
well as the legal obligations of states to protect them. 
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Box 15: Key terms related to the movement of people 
Refugees – People fleeing armed conflict or persecution by crossing their 
national border to seek safety in nearby countries. Refugees are defined 
and protected in international law and the status guarantees access to as-
sistance from states, UNHCR and other organizations. Governments 
have specific responsibilities towards anyone seeking asylum on their 
territories, as defined in national legislation and international law.  
Internally Displaced Persons – Those who are forced to flee their 
homes, often for the very same reasons as refugees—war, civil conflict, 
political strife, and gross human rights abuse—but who remain within 
their own country and do not cross an international border.  
Migrants – Unlike refugees, migrants do not relocate due to a direct 
threat of persecution or death but rather to improve their lives. Typically 
they are searching for better job opportunities, but they may also relocate 
for education, reuniting with family or other reasons. Countries accept or 
reject migrants based on their own immigration laws and processes. 
Stateless Persons – Those who are not recognized as citizens by any 
state.  
The conflict in Syria undoubtedly accounts for a large portion of those dis-
placed. Since the civil war began in March 2011, over 11 million Syrians have 
fled their homes—more than half the population of Syria. Despite a focus on 
the refugees pouring into Europe, most of those displaced remain in the region. 
In early 2017, the UN estimated that over 5 million were refugees in neigh-
bouring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq) and 6.3 million 
were internally displaced within Syria (UNHCR 2017). While the world spot-
light has been on Syrian refugees, conflict and unrest in Iraq, Libya, Somalia, 
Afghanistan, Yemen and elsewhere have equally led to an exodus of people 
from these countries.  
Under international law, refugees have the right to safe asylum. This in-
cludes physical safety but also freedom of thought, speech, religion and move-
ment, freedom from discrimination and torture, and economic and social rights 
such as access to health care, education and work. The key legal document 
pertaining to refugee protection is the 1951 Refugee Convention, which has 
been signed by 144 states. It defines ‘refugee’ and spells out their rights, as 
well as the legal obligations of states to protect them.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the 
UN’s refugee agency and the guardian of the Refugee Convention. It was es-
tablished in 1950 to help the millions of Europeans displaced after the Second 
World War. UNHCR was only meant to exist for three years, and was to con-
clude its work once it had successfully dealt with the refugee problem in Eu-
rope. No one could have predicted that this would not be the last refugee crisis 
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to face the international community. Not only has it been dealt new challenges 
every few years, but the number of people that fall under its mandate has risen 
steadily each decade (see Figure 7). Since 2012, the increase has been drastic. 
The scenes of mass population movements have shifted over time—from Eu-
rope to Asia (and to a lesser extent Africa and Latin America) beginning in the 
1960s, and then to the Middle East at the turn of the century. 
Figure 7: Populations of concern (refugees, asylum-seekers,  IDPs, return-
ees, stateless persons), 1951-2015 
Source: UNHCR data. Available at: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview  
The UN is generally well regarded for its humanitarian work and support for 
refugees. UNHCR has helped more than 50 million refugees since inception 
and received two Nobel Peace Prizes for its worldwide assistance to refugees. 
Yet the magnitude of the current emergency has left it overwhelmed and under-
resourced. In 2014 the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP), which relies en-
tirely on voluntary contributions, ran out of money and food supplies and was 
forced to suspend food assistance to 1.7 million Syrian refugees. Without a 
reliable source of funding, it had to resort to online crowdfunding to raise the 
$64 million needed to reinstate the food vouchers program. The 72-hour social 
media campaign with the hashtag #AdollarAlifeline was a desperate plea, ask-
ing members of the public to donate $1 to the cause (WFP 2014). 
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It is little surprise that the escalation of the current crisis has led to a renewed 
discussion around addressing the root causes of refugee movements and mass 
migration. In his former role as head of UNHCR, UN Secretary General Anto-
nio Guterres was forthright about the need to address this, stating “To those 
who trigger and prolong conflicts, leaving humanitarians to clean up the mess, 
it is time to say that this must stop. We as humanitarians can no longer pick up 
the pieces.” (UNHCR 2014). Unfortunately, the UN has had far less success in 
ending conflict than it has in providing humanitarian assistance and aiding ref-
ugees.  
The UN has also struggled to get states to do their part in accepting refugees 
and respecting their obligations outlined in the Refugee Convention. Fears of 
Islamic radicalization and terrorism have driven nationalism and anti-immi-
grant public narratives in many Western countries. Some states were reluctant 
to welcome refugees from Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East, whom they 
perceived as a greater threat than refugees of past eras.  
While the UNHCR has been praised for its work with refugees, the General 
Assembly has been criticized for failing to get states to make the commitments 
needed to end the suffering of millions worldwide. The first-ever Summit for 
Refugees and Migrants was held at the opening of the 71st UN General As-
sembly in September 2016. Member states adopted an agreement aimed at im-
proving educational opportunities for refugee children and working conditions 
for displaced adults, while fighting to counter xenophobia and fear. Meanwhile 
the US convened a Leaders’ Summit on Refugees the following day to get in-
dividual states to agree to accept more refugees and to encourage states and 
companies to contribute material support (both funding and in-kind contribu-
tions) for refugee assistance programs. NGOs were largely disappointed by the 
outcome of the summits and human rights critics held that the international 
community has not done enough. Salil Shetty, the Secretary-General of Am-
nesty International, stated that, “Faced with the worst refugee crisis in 70 years, 
world leaders have shown a shocking disregard for the human rights of people 
who have been forced to leave their homes due to conflict or persecution.” 
(Amnesty International 2016).  
In March 2017, Secretary-General António Guterres appointed Louise Ar-
bour of Canada as his Special Representative for International Migration. Hav-
ing served as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, Arbour is well placed to lead the follow-up to the migration-related 
aspects of the 2016 Summit, and to work with member states and other stake-
holders to develop a global compact on safe, orderly and regular migration. 
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What next? 
Reforms: big and small 
This chapter examined the major failings of the United Nations in protecting 
human rights globally. Despite having a solid reputation for promoting human 
rights, specifically in the areas of education, capacity building and technical 
assistance, the global body has struggled to reconcile its political nature with 
the principled protection of human rights. A lack of judicial authority and en-
forcement mechanisms have limited its success. Scholars and experts have put 
forth many reform proposals—both big and small—to improve the UN’s role 
in advancing human rights worldwide. 
A particularly ambitious idea is to establish a World Court of Human Rights 
that would address the lack of judicial and enforcement mechanisms at the in-
ternational level to protect individuals from abuses and punish violators. 
The scholars behind the proposal, Nowak and Scheinin, argue that there is 
a gap in the judicial system and many violations of international human rights 
law raised by individuals (rather than by states) are outside the jurisdiction of 
existing forums. Indeed, the ICC was created to deal with breaches of interna-
tional criminal and humanitarian law, but not cases that fall exclusively under 
human rights law, while the International Court of Justice only hears cases be-
tween states. Meanwhile decisions made by UN committees monitoring core 
international human rights treaties do not carry enough weight to fill the re-
maining void. 
An early vision for a World Court of Human Rights was developed in the 
1970s but it took years for the idea to be fully fleshed out. In 2014 a Statute for 
the World Court of Human Rights (the Treaty of Lucknow) was drafted 
through an international collaboration of judges, lawyers and scholars. Propo-
nents are currently raising awareness of the project and encouraging states to 
adopt the Treaty of Lucknow to actualize the Court. They hope to see India 
and the US agree to champion the new institution (World Court of Human 
Rights website). Not all human rights commentators are as enthusiastic though. 
Many express concern that the Statute in its current form does not adequately 
address the problems that other international legal bodies suffer from, namely 
whether countries could be convinced to accept the Court’s jurisdiction as 
binding and how it would enforce its judgements. 
A range of less radical reform proposals have been put forward over the 
years. Freedman has suggested that a more practical solution than a World 
Court would be to strengthen and utilize regional human rights courts. Three 
of the world’s regions have human rights mechanisms: Europe, the Americas 
and Africa. Each of these mechanisms relies on a regional rather than universal 
understanding of human rights, which helps explain why compliance has been 
strong. A similarity in norms, culture, practices and governance has made 
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countries more willing to engage with regional mechanisms than those at the 
international level. Equally crucial has been the geographic, political and eco-
nomic linkages that connect countries within a region. These ties often lead to 
tacit pressure on states to cooperate on human rights, which in turn understand 
the potential ramifications of noncompliance. To start, Freedman proposes that 
human rights mechanisms be created in Asia and Eastern Europe, and that pres-
sure be exerted on all countries to join a regional system. Financial aid and 
technical assistance would then need to be provided to ensure that regional 
courts could afford acceptable human rights procedures. The pitfall of this ap-
proach is that it appears to abandon the aim of truly universal human rights 
protection. 
In an effort not to forgo the notion of universality, observers have offered 
diverse options for improving the UN human rights machinery. The Human 
Rights Council, not surprisingly, has been the primary target. The concluding 
chapter outlines reforms suggested by Bertrand Ramcharan, former acting 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, which are particularly sensitive to real-
world constraints. Schwartzberg (2013) also provides useful ideas for strength-
ening the essential human rights body. Weiss (2009) blames bureaucracy and 
lack of leadership for the UN’s inaction in situations like the Rwandan geno-
cide, while Hanhimäki (2008) maintains that there are simply too many human 
rights bodies and that reform efforts should emphasize consolidation. This pri-
mer does not intend to explore proposals in detail, but rather to inspire further 
reading on the topic. 
There is clearly no shortage of good ideas, but how likely are we to see 
reform of the UN human rights machinery in the near future? If the process of 
replacing the flawed Commission on Human Rights with the Human Rights 
Council taught us anything, it is that achieving substantial change is no easy 
task. That colossal effort wrapped up just over a decade ago. Despite under-
whelming results, it is doubtful that another ambitious reform will be on the 
table any time soon. For one thing, doing so would be to admit defeat. As well, 
overhauling institutions or entire systems is costly in terms of time and re-
sources which could otherwise be allocated elsewhere.  
More plausible would be a series of smaller reforms or tweaks that would 
lead to incremental change in the right direction. Human Rights Up Front, a 
Secretary-General initiative launched in 2013, is an example of how the UN 
has sought to improve how it delivers on its human rights mandate through 
means within its control—in other words, non-Charter, internal reforms. The 
initiative strives to realize a culture change within the UN system, by increas-
ing awareness among UN staff of human rights and their responsibilities, while 
encouraging them to take action to prevent violations.  
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Can change happen?  
That the United Nations is merely an organization of sovereign states acting 
on their own cannot be overstated. As is the case with maintaining peace and 
security and achieving sustainable development, progress on human rights de-
pends entirely on member states. It would be as unrealistic to expect states to 
concede power to the UN (or any other global institution) to protect and pro-
mote human rights as it would be to hope for a radical shift in attitudes with 
regards to state sovereignty. Still, states that do not currently prioritize human 
rights can be swayed over time. A crucial factor in getting states to act is pres-
sure from domestic private groups, foreign NGOs, and international organiza-
tions. Whether it is in a liberal democracy or in a repressive government, non-
state actors often succeed over time in exerting influence on states to respect 
human rights.  
International human rights NGOs like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch have been particularly instrumental in supporting the UN over 
the past decades to protect and promote human rights. Through their work doc-
umenting violations, engaging in fact finding and advocating for action, they 
play a crucial role in exposing abuses and pressuring states to address them. 
Without their tireless efforts, it is unlikely that the ICC would have been cre-
ated, or that states would have adopted the International Ban on Landmines 
when they did. Sadly, many countries—Russia, Turkey and China are particu-
larly prominent examples, but there are countless others—have been increas-
ingly cracking down on NGOs, journalists and the media. When an authoritar-
ian regime suppresses freedom of speech, limits the activity of NGOs and har-
asses human rights defenders, it makes it more difficult to identify what Freed-
man refers to as ‘hidden abuses’. These unreported or under-reported abuses 
are taking place around the world, in countries like North Korea, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gambia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan. 
Yet even authoritarian regimes are finding that technology and social media 
are disrupting their ability to exert absolute control within their borders and 
dominate the public discourse. In an already complex world of human rights 
protection, ‘citizen journalism’ has emerged as a promising mechanism to ex-
pose human rights violations, particularly in countries where freedom of press, 
speech or expression is not guaranteed. During the Arab Spring when foreign 
reporters were frequently denied access and state-run media served only to 
spread government propaganda, individual citizens captured abuses with cell 
phone cameras and shared them on social media websites and blogs such as 
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and WordPress. 
Some observers believe that human rights protection is shifting outside the 
realm of the state, as governments find it harder to hold onto their accustomed 
control. There may be an element of truth to this, but it would be premature to 
predict the demise of the state.  
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The subjective nature of human rights complicates matters further. States 
adopt their own understandings of human rights and choose to prioritize certain 
rights over others, as this chapter has explored. That they are party to the same 
treaties and declarations gives a false sense of consensus. Even among other-
wise similar states (not to mention within states), disagreements often occur. 
We have witnessed this in Western states over issues like abortion, banning 
religious clothing or symbols, and whether health care should be considered a 
public good. Human rights are matters of moral judgement after all.  
Norms do change and adapt in the long run. But until there is actual consen-
sus among states, the UN will find it difficult to provide systematic and author-
itative protection. Progress on some fronts suggests there is reason to be hope-
ful, yet backtracking on others justifiably raises concern. Whereas the overall 
trend is positive in the areas of peace and security and development, it is diffi-
cult to discern with human rights. Although the UN has succeeded in placing 
the concept of ‘universal’ human rights on the international agenda, actually 
protecting human rights still remains as much of a challenge for the UN today 
as it was in 1945. 
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Chapter 5 – Workable Global Institutions:  
How to Get from Here to There? 
“The Charter of the United Nations frequently maps out a chasm between its aspi-
rations and the means to achieve them. War is to be renounced, human rights are to 
be advanced, and development to be a priority. Yet peace is beholden to the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, human rights obligations remain lim-
ited to voluntary commitments taken on by states, and development is the paradigm 
example of an unfunded mandate.” Simon Chesterman (2015: 505) 
This book has attempted to show, first, what the United Nations is and does 
and the astounding contributions it makes to the world. Second, we have tried 
to explain why the UN is so forcefully criticized for being unable to deal with 
urgent world problems. Third, we have wanted to indicate the sort of analysis 
that is required to understand this world institution.  
In this concluding chapter we consider possible reforms to the United Na-
tions, building on the analytical foundations that have been laid throughout the 
book. We begin by looking at what others have been saying about how to ap-
proach global reform. Then we list some of the types of reforms that are ur-
gently required. Finally, we analyze how we can bring about global reform. 
Specifically, how do we get citizens to want to transfer authority to world in-
stitutions so that institutional transformation is on the political agenda? 
What we have learnt about understanding world institutions 
Our goal is to find a possible path toward more workable 21st century global 
institutions—that is to say, authoritative institutions that the world will obey. 
What did the history of international organizations and the analysis of their 
present operations tell us about transforming the UN into an effective global 
institution? The complex picture is not always clear. Nevertheless, let us draw 
the best conclusions we can.  
If the founding of the League and the UN taught us one thing it is that it 
took great leadership, diplomacy, and public communication. It took a Wood-
row Wilson or a Franklin Roosevelt. They contributed ideas and deep thought, 
but they were also skilled at selling the concept to the public. Roosevelt dreamt 
of an organization that could overcome unilateralism, alliances, spheres of in-
fluence, and balance of power politics. This did not materialize but the ideals 
led the way to what was possible. The leaders were backed by solid secretari-
ats, and the impetus and ideas of private individuals and civil society also 
played a role. So, can we conclude that it takes a great power to lead the way? 
Perhaps. Certainly, the major powers cannot be opposed. Does it take a specific 
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personality? This is not certain either. Wilson failed to implement the League 
in the US and Roosevelt passed the baton to his successor Harry Truman, a 
sound but not a notable leader. There was a definite need for diplomacy and 
persistence to deal with contradictory goals. Member states wanted both coop-
eration and independence; internationalism compatible with their national in-
terests; and hierarchy alongside equality and participation. This is exactly the 
United Nations we got.  
Aside from the actors of the moment, the international organizations were 
also the result of their historical context. The League and the UN would not 
have come about without the devastation of war. Nor would they have come 
about without the cumulative historical precedents and models. They were, in 
part, the result of years of international thinkers, ideas, and conferencing—
given birth to by cumulative ‘internationalism’. So, we may say that new in-
ternational organizations resulted from what we have called the ‘big bang the-
ory’ as well as ‘evolutionary historicism’. They were also children of their 
epoch. They were spawned by the post-war economic, social and technological 
conditions. Now the question is: are we finding ourselves in a ‘global era’ cor-
responding to new ‘global’ challenges and requiring ‘global’ institutions?  
Our analysis of the United Nations—including its significance, the need for 
its transformation, proposals for reform, and barriers to achieving them—also 
provides useful insights when considering a path forward. To begin with, the 
importance of the UN is enormous. This book has discussed many of its nu-
merous achievements at length. As coordination managers, conveners, and the 
setter of standards, the UN’s contributions to peace are staggering. In 2016 
there were 16 ongoing multidimensional UN peace operations with 120,000 
military, police and civilian personnel trying to limit conflict in the world. At 
the same time, the UN is the world’s largest coordinator and supplier of hu-
manitarian aid and is responsible for managing the gigantic 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (the SDGs). The organization has also been respon-
sible for introducing and mainstreaming new concepts such as human rights, 
R2P, and gender equality, as explored in The Power of UN Ideas. Under Ban 
Ki-moon’s leadership, the UN made great strides in ensuring that climate 
change would be on the world’s agenda, including through convening the suc-
cessful 2015 Climate Change Conference in Paris.  
Just as the need for the UN is evident, so is need for its transformation into 
an effective global institution. Critics point to the UN’s lack of legitimacy as a 
decision-making body, and the absence of democratic participation and fair 
representation. The Security Council’s two-tier system that accords a veto to 
the powerful is seen as unequal treatment. Many do not consider its decisions 
to be moral or justified, not to mention the issue of impasses, when vetoes are 
used. Meanwhile, the General Assembly that relies on ‘one member, one vote’ 
rather than a form of weighted voting is also charged with being unrepresenta-
tive. The Human Rights Council struggles to protect human rights globally as 
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it struggles with a fundamental contradiction: it is a political body expected to 
take principled action. The Economic and Social Council deals with its own 
challenges, namely being a slow and bureaucratic organization that cannot 
make binding decisions and whose mandate greatly overlaps with that of the 
General Assembly. The result has been countless calls for reform of the UN 
system and the need for a global movement to bring them about.  
Beyond simply exposing the weaknesses of our present institutions, our 
analysis also revealed that there is no shortage of proposed improvements. 
Many aim to improve representation, fairness and effectiveness of the major 
organs, particularly the General Assembly, Security Council, ECOSOC and 
the Human Rights Council. Others focus on issues such as securing adequate 
financing, autonomous emergency peace services and increased engagement 
and consultation with stakeholders. Later in this chapter we will go into nine 
key reform ideas in greater detail. 
Despite all the good ideas that have surfaced over the years, we have also 
seen why the UN’s hands are tied and why we are not moving ahead. There is 
indeed a considerable gap between the ideas for reform and the political will 
to implement them. Most states do not want a more powerful and effective UN. 
And although the significant steps taken toward the international responsibility 
to protect have limited sovereign impunity, we are still living in an era of na-
tion-state predominance. The primacy of national power and politics is hardly 
disputable. Meanwhile, there has been no sustained campaign to communicate 
the UN’s achievements or to speak of its need for additional authority to deal 
with global challenges. These are a couple of reasons we have yet to see gen-
uine change. 
Reviewing the literature on revamping the UN 
“To respond to today’s and tomorrow's threats to peace and security, the United 
Nations must become more relevant, more credible, more legitimate and more capa-
ble.” Mogens Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly (UN 2016) 
Before outlining reform proposals and discussing how to get citizens to want 
to transfer authority to global institutions, we should take a peek at what vari-
ous experts have been saying on the topic. In this section we examine three 
major, recent examples of thinking about revamping the UN. 
In UN 2030: Rebuilding Order in a Fragmenting World, a 2016 report by 
Kevin Rudd, former Australian Prime Minister and Chair of the Independent 
Commission on Multilateralism, 10 principles are put forth for reforming the 
United Nations in response to the “globalization of everything”. To ensure a 
more relevant and responsive UN, Rudd highlights the need for agenda setting 
that is future-oriented (dealing with, for example, cybersecurity and lethal au-
tonomous weapons systems) and proposes strengthening policy-planning 
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capability. He argues for breaking institutional silos through a ‘Team UN’ ap-
proach of multi-disciplinary teams dealing with specific challenges on the 
ground, as well through the structural integration of the UN’s peace and secu-
rity, sustainable development, humanitarian and human rights agendas. To im-
prove member state participation and cooperation, he calls for a formal com-
mitment to multilateralism by member states and for the UN to build bridges 
between the great powers to reduce tensions. Rudd also suggests a greater fo-
cus on prevention, better results management, and enhanced efficiency to deal 
with the reality of budgetary constraints. Finally, he makes the case that 
women should be at the centre of the UN agenda and that youth need to have 
their voices heard in UN councils. 
While all this looks like a reasonable agenda for change it should be noted 
that it is very light on structural modifications. In fact, it looks more like ad-
ministrative adaptation to the new demands of globalization, most of which is 
going on to some degree within the UN as it is. Although good principles are 
announced, there are no institutional changes for bringing them about.  
The 2016 report Reinventing Development: Reforming the UN for People 
and Planet by Barbara Adams and Karen Judd specifically warns that institu-
tional transformations that would demand shifts in power structures within the 
United Nations may take a long, long time. Thus, they claim, efforts aimed at 
major structural changes may stand in the way of the kind of urgent reforms 
that can make the UN a more capable force for people and the planet. There 
are deeply entrenched interests that support the status quo, so it may be more 
effective to ignore difficult institutional reforms and instead concentrate on the 
critical issue of development. 
According to Adams and Judd, there is already a framework in place for 
member states to transform the UN. It is composed of the three new global 
‘agendas’ hammered out in 2015 by states and civil society: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development (SDGs); the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on fi-
nancing for development; and the Paris Agreement on climate change. The 
agendas reflect a political effort to come to terms with new global realities. 
They can potentially forge international cooperation under the auspices of the 
UN. Unlike past development agreements, the 2030 Agenda is universal, thus 
requiring all countries to measure and report on progress.  
The authors point to rising corporate influence and the emerging gap in ac-
countable governance as obstacles to realizing development goals and serving 
public interests. They explain that universal norms and standards are not ap-
plied consistently across the UN nor are they necessarily accepted by other 
institutions such as the WTO or IMF. Since trade and investment largely by-
pass the UN, public interest is not always guaranteed. Another challenge they 
outline is that the UN’s assessed contributions have become increasingly inad-
equate for covering the organization’s increased responsibilities.  
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In order to overcome these obstacles, Adams and Judd list four priorities for 
member states, which are necessary for achieving the three new development 
agendas: greater integration of the three pillars of the United Nations (peace 
and security, human rights and sustainable development); implementing a new 
funding formula to finance goals and commitments; adopting a values-based 
framework for intergovernmental processes; and creating a culture of account-
ability. Taken together, these imperatives constitute an agenda for reform. 
All this seems very plausible and reasonable. The question is, of course, will 
the three agendas be respected without any authority to ensure compliance? Is 
a bunch of NGOs snapping at the heels of recalcitrant states enough to make 
them keep their promises? It never has been in the past. Do the three agendas 
have enough clout to ensure change at the UN? The authors offer good sugges-
tions for achieving these, and the three agendas include timelines and measur-
able goals. And experts and civil society are working hard to try to ensure states 
fulfil their obligations. But will ‘should’ and ‘must’ become ‘shall’ and ‘will’? 
Is it just another case of planned reforms without teeth? Will improvements in 
development spill over into power politics? The fundamental question we have 
to ask ourselves is whether ‘process agendas’ can transform international pol-
itics without any substantive change to institutional structures and their under-
lying power imbalance and entrenched interests. 
In June 2015, the Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & 
Governance was published. It is one of the most significant, recent studies pro-
posing the renaissance of the UN. In presenting their report, Ibrahim Gambari, 
co-chair of the Commission and former Nigerian Foreign Minister and UN 
Under-Secretary-General of Political Affairs, noted that “the UN and global 
governance institutions are ill-suited to address many modern evolving threats 
and must reform or risk prolonging and deepening global crises.” According 
to the other co-chair, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the 
world requires “more capable tools of global governance, with different kinds 
of public, private, and mixed institutions designed for twenty-first-century 
challenges.”  
The report, which is over 100 pages in length, presents a comprehensive 
agenda for reform. It focuses on the priority objectives of security (specifically 
state fragility and violent conflict), climate governance, governing the global 
economy, reforming global institutions, and engaging partners. Some of its key 
recommendations are summarized below: 
 Security: The Commission advocates focusing on conflict prevention, 
strengthening the role of women in peace and security, and building 
consensus on criteria for determining when to apply R2P. To deal with 
conflict situations, it calls for enhanced UN capacity in military, police 
and civilian response, through rapid deployment and military planning, 
designated military units, state-formed police units, and a standing and 
reserve capacity of civilian specialists.  
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 Climate change: The creation of a number of new climate change en-
tities is suggested to support the implementation of the COP21 climate 
commitments. These include: an International Carbon Monitoring 
branch, a Climate Research Registry, a Climate Action Clearinghouse, 
and a Climate Engineering Advisory Board. It is also proposes that ad-
ditional investments be made in climate adaptation and that private en-
terprise be engaged on market-based incentives to reducing emissions. 
 Governing the global economy: To foster a renewed framework for 
global economic cooperation and crisis response, the Commission turns 
to what it calls the G20+, where the plus signifies enhanced coordina-
tion with the UN and Bretton Woods institutions. Interestingly, this pro-
posal comes despite acknowledging a lack of evidence that G20 agree-
ments led countries to reshape national actions in a significant way. 
Other priorities outlined include: combating illicit financial flows and 
extremist financing, instituting effective governance of natural re-
sources, and securing the digital economy while promoting internet ac-
cess in the Global South.  
 Reforming global institutions: For the General Assembly, its recom-
mendations include streamlining its agenda, leading the post-2015 de-
velopment agenda and developing a consultative UN Parliamentary 
Network that would have a formal relationship to the UN as an advisor 
to the GA. The purpose of the network would be to bring together 
elected parliamentarians from their national legislatures to discuss and 
advise on issues of UN governance. It would also function as an addi-
tional channel to civil society, and to expand public knowledge and par-
ticipation in UN work. Regarding the Security Council, the Commis-
sion proposes that membership be expanded and immediate re-election 
of non-permanent members be allowed. It adds that the SC should con-
sult more with civil society and business. On modernizing the Secretar-
iat, it is recommended that the secretary-general selection procedure be 
improved and that the SG be given more discretion to manage the Sec-
retariat. Other ideas are put forth related to the Peacebuilding Commis-
sion, international courts and human rights bodies.  
 Engagement: The Commission stresses the importance of the UN en-
gaging with critical regional, local, civil society and business actors in 
global governance.  
To realize these changes, the Commission recommends a transitional strategy 
for reform—a longer-term approach to modernizing global governance struc-
tures. Specifically, it calls for the building of ‘smart coalitions’ to mobilize 
support to sustain reforms, the convening of a Conference on Global Institu-
tions in 2020, and establishing a mechanism to monitor and coordinate reform. 
We can see that there is certainly no lack of proposals for reform in this 
report. In fact, the Commission’s work is an excellent example of combining 
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high-minded analysis of the need for better global governance with its mem-
bers’ judgement of what is actually possible. It is pragmatic, but not at the 
expense of good ideas and necessary changes. The only caveat is that it could 
go further in terms of offering ideas for institutional transformation. For in-
stance, it stops short of suggesting an autonomous, emergency peacekeeping 
force or independent funding sources for the UN. Finally, in devoting the last 
chapter to “Getting from Here to There”, the report goes further than most in 
setting us on the path to thinking about how we can achieve reform.  
Nine popular proposals to transform the UN  
To conclude this book, we present in greater detail a list of widely-known pro-
posals for strengthening the United Nations before terminating with a set of 
ideas about how the renaissance of the UN can be brought about. To guide the 
process of understanding and contextualizing these proposals, we begin by of-
fering some reflections on the various types of change (with their correspond-
ing level of ambition) along with contrasting approaches to achieving change. 
It is helpful to think about change in terms of different gradations. It has 
been said that reform falls into two categories: a more up-to-date alignment of 
status and authority and better management of the system (Fasulo 2015: 237). 
But, in fact, it is a little more complicated. First, there are simple adjustments 
to administrative, financial, personnel and budget considerations—often called 
‘reform’. These may be purposeful, managed improvements to administration. 
The UN has been quite effective at this sort of continuing reform. The terms 
‘reform’ and ‘change’ can cause confusion as they are often used as catchall 
terms to include the whole spectrum of change at the UN. Second, we have 
‘adaptation’. This refers to modifications made on an ad hoc basis to deal with 
short-term problems, without any overall plan or purpose. Third, a more fun-
damental form of change is what is called ‘transformation’. Transformation 
entails structural modifications to the composition, organization, norms and 
rules of an institution to allow it to better cope with the effects of socio-eco-
nomic, technical and political change. It may question the goals, purposes, val-
ues and functions of organizations. This is sometimes referred to as changing 
the ‘architecture’ of the international system. Far more than a merely academic 
question of definitions, the terms ‘reform’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘transformation’ 
are critical to our understanding of what we are trying to achieve (for an elab-
oration, see Trent 2007: 24-30).  
Once the desired change is determined, there are multiple strategies that can 
then be considered for how to achieve such change. Reformers (and we hope 
this will include you) struggle over whether to aim for radical and immediate 
change, or for incremental steps that may amount to a transformation over time. 
In historical terms the debate has been over revolution or evolution—what is 
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theoretically necessary or what is politically attainable. In the first chapter we 
introduced this debate, concluding that the founding of the League and the UN 
were the result of both ‘big bangs’ (the world wars) and ‘historical evolution’ 
(a cumulation of progressive steps). 
On the one hand, a gradual approach to change that considers political con-
straints can be seen as practical and realistic. The hope is that smaller, achiev-
able changes will eventually lead to a larger shift. We recall this recommenda-
tion from leading scholars when it comes to improving the Human Rights 
Council.  
The challenge is that these minimalist arguments may focus on what is prob-
able at the expense of what is desirable and what may, at a future time, be 
possible. Ambitious dreams for an alternative world order are often driven 
down to the lowest common denominator by those counselling practicality and 
prudence. Reformers must be inspired by the vision of a cooperative world, as 
were the founders of the League and the UN. This means being challenged by 
the end target of workable institutions that can respond to the challenges of 
tomorrow. It means being animated by the goals at the tip of our grasp while 
accepting all practical steps to move ahead. 
So perhaps the two are not irreconcilable after all. As Ban Ki-moon wisely 
put it: “Keep your head above the clouds, and your feet firmly on the ground. 
And move up, step by step. That means: Dream big—but be practical.” (UNSG 
2016). 
Finally, a brief note on how we selected these nine ideas. We must stress 
that all the following proposals have their critics. They are also not intended as 
an exclusive plan for revamping the United Nations, but rather examples of 
reforms that could allow the United Nations to gain legitimacy and develop the 
institutional capacity to make respected, authoritative decisions. Each of the 
proposals is what we call “workable”, meaning it is practical, necessary and 
can be implemented. However, unlike the lists prepared by various interna-
tional commissions and high level panels, our choices are not the proposals 
that might be considered the most politically acceptable. They are instead 
based on what is necessary to make the UN a credible global institution that 
can give leadership to the world. They range from grandiose to minute. 
1. A more legitimate Security Council 
One fairly radical but ‘workable’ proposal for restructuring the Security Coun-
cil is made by Joseph Schwartzberg in his powerful book, Transforming the 
United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World. He recommends a 
three-pronged approach. First, to surmount national interests and help smaller 
countries to work through larger groupings, he suggests a system of represen-
tation in the Council by 12 world regions rather than individual nation-states. 
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Each multinational region would nominate slates of candidates from which one 
would be elected to the Security Council by the General Assembly. Second, he 
proposes a mathematically determined weighted vote for each region. Third, 
in exchange for phasing out the veto, the P5 would be rewarded with a larger 
weighted vote in a more empowered General Assembly. 
Additional new proposals for reforming the Security Council have been 
made in the 2015 Report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice and 
Governance. To achieve the twin goals of effectiveness and acceptability, it is 
suggested that the Council’s membership be expanded to reflect the tremen-
dous increase in UN membership (as was done in 1965) and that immediate re-
election of non-permanent members be allowed. The Commission then pro-
poses ideas for resolving the question of the veto and improving peace opera-
tions through improved worked methods (see Box 16). 
Box 16: Improving the working methods of the Security Council 
 Where there are reasonable grounds to justify it, members should be 
requested to defend their ‘no’ votes publicly in the Security Council. 
 Permanent members should be given the option of casting a ‘dissen-
ting vote’ that does not rise to the level of a veto and therefore does 
not block passage of a resolution.  
 The Council should ensure sufficient resources and political support 
to new peace operations where there are potential risks of war cri-
mes. 
 For each peace operation a ‘Group of Friends’ should be constituted, 
States that can help bring political and diplomatic pressure to bear 
on the situation. 
 The Council must consult troop and police contributing countries 
whenever there are problems and address their concerns. 
 It should undertake a rolling analysis of those terrorist, criminal and 
extremist elements that are capable of influencing the context of 
peace operations.  
Finally, in assessing the current requirements for social, economic and legal 
supports for peace and security, the Commission favours instituting a formal 
mechanism of consultation for regular, structured discussions between the Se-
curity Council and representatives of civil society, business and municipalities. 
After all, these stakeholders have a demonstrated interest in and make specific 
contributions to the new dimensions of security (health, protection of civilians, 
women and children, climate change, natural disasters).  
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2. A more balanced and focused General Assembly  
Joseph Schwartzberg (2013) tells us that the General Assembly owes its legit-
imacy to being an almost universal body with 99.6 per cent of the world’s peo-
ple. This population has tripled since 1945, but for all this time the voting 
power in the GA has steadily been skewed to favour relatively minor states 
including a proliferation of microstates. No fewer than 39 current members 
have less than a million inhabitants each, and 13 have fewer than 100,000 in-
habitants each. In financial terms, 128 members collectively pay less than 1.3 
per cent of the total UN budget. If one can be opposed to an ‘undemocratic’ 
veto then one should be equally opposed to GA coalitions of the very weak. It 
has been called the ‘immoral egalitarianism’ of the ‘one-member, one-vote’ 
rule. At present, the three most populous countries (China, India and the United 
States) have 42 per cent of the world’s population but only 1.6 per cent of votes 
in the General Assembly. The major powers resort to bribery or threats to bend 
the weak to their demands. Because of these faults, the biggest states have 
opted to create the G20 where they can discuss economic matters without being 
hobbled by what they consider to be the noisy, ‘marginal’ states. A well-de-
signed system of weighted voting would mitigate these defects. The aim, as at 
the beginning of the UN, should be to combine power with principle. 
The three basic principles for the weighted vote of each member would be: 
1) the democratic principle in which population is the determining factor; 2) 
economic capacity represented by contributions to the UN budget; and 3) the 
sovereign equality principle whereby each state is treated equally. The three 
components of the vote would be combined in a simple formula as if they were 
of equal relevance (Schwartzberg 2013: 21-26). Over time, say, every ten 
years, a neutral agency would adjust these weights according to changed con-
ditions. The aim is that states might start listening to each other. Rather than 
having weak and poor states pass a plethora of meaningless resolutions that 
destroy the reputation of the GA and are largely ignored by the rich and pow-
erful, debates could become more consequential. 
Once the voting power within the General Assembly is more balanced, one 
could proceed to making its operations more focused. Because global problems 
require global solutions, Schwartzberg argues that the time has come to give 
the GA limited capacity to pass legally binding resolutions (in areas not being 
considered by the Security Council). In matters of a worldwide nature that can-
not be addressed at the regional or national levels, the GA should be authorized 
to legislate binding international law when there is a two-thirds majority that 
includes 50 per cent of the total world population. Some issues might require 
a supermajority of 75 per cent of the weighted votes. 
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3. An Economic, Social and Environmental Council  
This book has discussed some of the reasons why analysts have been decrying 
ECOSOC as the weak sister among the UN’s principal organs since at least the 
1980s. The UN’s founders intended for it to coordinate the economic and social 
work of the UN system with its specialized agencies and other bodies. Yet they 
gave the agencies their own governing arrangements; set the Bretton Woods 
financial institutions on an autonomous path; provided ECOSOC and the Gen-
eral Assembly with overlapping mandates; and failed to give ECOSOC a dis-
tinctive profile. From there, everything went downhill. Critics say it is too large 
for high-level consultations and flexible decision-making, but not large enough 
to perform credibly as a plenary body. Heads of state, foreign secretaries and 
finance and trade ministers prefer the smaller, shorter and more focused meet-
ings of the World Bank and IMF. They find ECOSOC to be incapable of deal-
ing with crises, unable to exercise any significant influence over the special-
ized agencies, and thus only attracting low level delegates to endless debates 
and little apparent action. 
Over the years, there have been a plethora of proposed reforms from differ-
ent groups. Fearing hang-ups with structural reforms, some observers have 
limited themselves to suggesting short-term process changes. However, show-
ing the weight of discontent with ECOSOC, structural transformations have 
been proposed by many groups such as: UBUNTU (World Forum of Civil So-
ciety Networks), the Commission on Global Governance, Reimagining the Fu-
ture, the United Nations Association of the USA, the South Commission and 
the World Commission on Environment and Development.  
The major suggestion coming from these groups is that ECOSOC be trans-
formed to a Social and Economic Security Council or an Economic, Social and 
Environmental Council (ESEC), with powers and methods parallel to those of 
the Security Council (without P5 vetoes). Its policy proposals would be trans-
ferred back to the GA for debate and majority approval. As with the original 
intentions of the Charter, the new ESEC would have effective control and co-
ordination over all agencies, financial institutions and multilateral groups in 
the UN system in the spheres of economics, social development and the envi-
ronment. The Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly (dealing 
with economic and financial issues; and social, humanitarian and cultural is-
sues, respectively) would be wound up and their activities transferred to the 
new ESEC. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) would be closed down. 
The votes in the World Bank and the IMF would be more equitably distributed. 
To govern the new council, a ministerial board of some 25 governments could 
be created along with an advisory commission. Alternatively, the General 
Committee of the General Assembly could be the leader of ECOSOC. The 
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governing bodies of the major development agencies would be combined into 
one executive committee. 
The Commission on Peace, Justice and Governance outlined an alternative 
idea to strengthen the United Nation’s role in the field of economics without 
completely redesigning ECOSOC. It proposed transforming the G20 into the 
G20+. The term ‘co-optation’ is not used, but this is the essence of the proposal 
to institutionalize the G20 and strengthen its coordination with the UN, the 
World Bank, IMF, WTO, ILO and regional organizations. The proposed G20+ 
would meet every two years at the UN. The UN would furnish a secretariat, a 
liaison mechanism, a UN deputy secretary-general, and a technical body of 
experts to frame its activities. The details are shrewd and complex, but this 
appears to be a subtle manner to bring the G20 within the UN—which is indeed 
a necessity.  
4. A reconfigured Human Rights Council  
In Chapter 4 we discussed how the UN has achieved far greater success in 
developing and promoting human rights than it has in protecting them, and 
how the politicization of UN human rights bodies, particularly the Human 
Rights Council, is to blame for this. We also looked at why it may be unlikely 
that we will see a complete overhaul of the flawed Human Rights Council any 
time soon, for a host of reasons including the time and resources involved and 
the optics of another major reform so soon after the 2006 effort. 
Box 17: Ideas for reforming the Human Rights Council 
 Representation: Governments could remain members but the repre-
sentatives they select should be judges or academics with human 
rights expertise. Membership could also be expanded to include in-
dependent experts in addition to government representatives.  
 Status within UN: The Council could eventually be made a principal 
UN organ, rather than a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, 
though doing so at this time may only elevate its politicization. 
 Prevention: Strategies that emphasize preventing conflict and vio-
lence that lead to human rights abuses should be pursued. 
 Protection: A provision on implementing the Responsibility to Pro-
tect could be added to the Council’s mandate.  
 Universal Periodic Review: The UPR process could integrate a pro-
cedure for dealing with violators, to ensure that dialogue and coop-
eration leads to action. 
 NGOs: A more formal institutional framework around the relation-
ship of NGOs to the Council would be beneficial. The consultative 
status that NGOs enjoy with ECOSOC would be a model to follow. 
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But that does not mean we cannot make certain changes that would have a 
measurable impact on the Human Rights Council’s work. In doing so, we 
should focus on what is realistic and achievable. Ramcharan (2011) outlines a 
number of actionable ideas that could help make the body more fair, impartial 
and effective (see Box 17). These vary in level of ambition.  
Reforming the Human Rights Council will not be straightforward—espe-
cially if the reform process of the Commission on Human Rights is any indi-
cation—but in the long run, failing to even try will have devastating conse-
quences.  
5. Improved staffing and management practices 
There is a general consensus among experts that the UN’s approach to hiring 
and managing the international civil service needs fixing.  
One of the chief criticisms of the Secretariat relates to the politicized ap-
proach to hiring, particularly when it comes to top appointments. Since it was 
launched in 2014, the 1 for 7 Billion campaign has made appeals for greater 
transparency regarding top UN appointments, and an end to the current mo-
nopoly over the decisions. It explains how permanent Security Council mem-
bers have dominated the selection process for secretaries-general, often sup-
porting candidates in exchange for promises to reserve senior posts for their 
own nationals. Multiple examples are provided, for instance how since 1997 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been led by four successive 
nationals of France, and how five successive US nationals headed the Depart-
ment of Management from 1992-2007 (since 2007, Americans have led the 
Department of Political Affairs). There are similar cases of posts held by UK, 
Russian and Chinese nationals for multiple terms. This practice thus prevents 
nationals from other countries from holding these positions. 1 for 7 Billion 
argues that the selection process should be based exclusively on merit, as stip-
ulated in the UN Charter, so that the secretary-general can recruit a strong lead-
ership team from all the world’s regions (1 for 7 Billion 2016).  
The Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance made related 
calls, stating that, through the General Assembly, member states politicize hir-
ing at all levels by micromanaging the budget. As well, despite having some 
influence on the selection process, the Secretary-General can neither appoint 
nor let go the heads of UN agencies, programs, and funds. The Commission 
highlighted a need for the Secretary-General to have greater discretion to man-
age the Secretariat. For the appointment of under-secretaries-general and as-
sistant secretaries-general, it proposes that member states continue to approve 
the selections, but that the Secretary-General be presented with an array of 
candidates from which to choose (2015: 93).  
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A second issue increasingly in the spotlight relates to management prac-
tices. In former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s recent report, he calls 
for “deep reforms of the UN management system”, arguing that the organiza-
tion relies on “rigid staffing” and that its “excessively hierarchical structure is 
a legacy from an earlier age” (2016: 21,35). He draws attention to some of the 
main challenges, from the inability of managers to move employees either 
within or between agencies, to the length of time involved in hiring people (up 
to 12 months) and the difficulty of firing people. He also disapproves of what 
he refers to as the “demise of a permanent, professional, international public 
service”, whereby the ability of long-standing and highly-experienced UN staff 
to rise to senior management positions is being weakened by an increase in 
external, political appointments. He makes a strong case for a flatter, flexible, 
effective, and cross-disciplinary structure that can better respond to complex 
challenges.  
Finally, Rudd claims that more of the Secretariat’s staff should be in the 
field, rather than at headquarters (at present they are roughly equally divided). 
This would help shift the UN’s work from report writing to executing its man-
date on the ground. At the same time he states that the opportunities for ad-
vancement are disproportionately at headquarters, and that deserving field staff 
should be encouraged, rewarded and promoted (ibid: 33). Weiss (2009) has 
echoed these sentiments, calling for an end to the tendency for promotions to 
result from work and contacts in pleasant headquarter settings.   
6. Autonomous emergency services for the UN 
It is unlikely that reformed structures alone will be enough to help the United 
Nations to fulfil its mandate for global protection and development. The or-
ganization will also require additional resources to give it the autonomy to 
carry out its work. This proposal will look at a suggestion that has come from 
multiple experts for giving the UN its own emergency, rapid reaction peace 
force, while the next will cover ideas for independent sources of income. 
One of the leading proponents of a United Nations Emergency Peace Ser-
vice (UNEPS), Peter Langille (2015), has pointed out that UN peacekeepers, 
over the years, have helped improve conditions in 69 armed conflicts world-
wide. The chief problem is that it currently takes 6-12 months for the UN to 
mount a peace operation—as opposed to the seven days it took to deploy forces 
to the first UN peacekeeping in the Suez in 1956. In addition, Western coun-
tries with their advanced militaries are now only contributing a minimal num-
ber of the 120,000 troops the UN has in the field. In part because of this slow 
reaction, the UN is now spending $8.2 billion annually on peacekeeping, but 
only after conflicts have spread, thousands have died and countries have been 
destroyed. 
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Creating a UNEPS would help prevent the spread of conflict along with the 
ensuing mass atrocities and huge costs. Its principal characteristics would be: 
 a permanent standing, integrated UN formation; 
 highly trained and well-equipped; 
 ready for immediate deployment by the Security Council; 
 composed of soldiers, police and civilian experts (‘multidimensional’); 
 capable of diverse assignments (e.g., security, environmental and 
health crises); 
 13,000 to 15,000 professional volunteers; 
 equitable regional and gender representation; and 
 a first responder to cover the initial six months until member states can 
deploy. 
The central aim of UNEPS would be to deter aggression and its spread. There 
would be sufficient military forces and police to restore and maintain order and 
civilian teams to provide essential services. Its approximate start-up costs of 
$3 billion and recurring costs of $1.5 billion annually, while significant, are 
trifling in comparison to the $13.6 trillion in annual military expenditures glob-
ally (Global Peace Index). A very similar proposal has been presented in great 
detail by Robert Johansen in “A United Nations Emergency Peace Service: To 
Prevent Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity”. 
7. Financing the UN 
Over the years, UN proponents have put forth a whole series of ideas for find-
ing innovative, alternative sources of funding for the organization. The basic 
problem is that the regular assessments of member states (even when they are 
paid) have never provided a sufficient budget to finance the UN’s multitude of 
operations. When these are supplemented by voluntary contributions from 
states, they are still insufficient and tend to reflect the priorities of the particular 
donor. They have been called the ‘UN à la carte’. So, there has been an ongoing 
search for additional and independent financial resources for the UN. There is 
no lack of ingenuity in proposals, which have included imposing levies (a sort 
of international tax) on air and sea travel, arms sales, transnational movements 
of currencies, international trade, the production of polluting materials, and 
production from the global commons such as mining of sea nodules—even an 
annual UN lottery has been suggested. The trick is to keep it international, find 
huge areas of untaxed transactions, and place the levy low so that it will not 
cause a backlash. A good example is the air travel tax that France introduced 
in 2005 to finance Unitaid, which was implemented by nine countries.  
Yet none of these relatively simple and ingenious ideas has ever been im-
plemented on a global scale. Many critics believe that member states have not 
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given the UN permission to impose such levies because they do not want the 
organization to have its own independent sources of revenue. Rather, they wish 
to retain full control. It is this attitude on the part of governments that must be 
one of the major targets of a reform movement. 
This latter consideration caused Joseph Schwartzberg to propose that the 
easiest path would simply be for the UN to return to its original financial well 
in a more astute manner. He proposes scrapping the present complicated and 
contentious system used to calculate member state assessments, and replacing 
it by one wherein all states are assessed at a “very small, affordable and equal 
percentage” (say 0.1 per cent initially) of their respective gross national in-
comes (GNI). He calculates that if such a GNI assessment had been in place in 
2010, it would have generated $58.65 billion—more than twice the total cur-
rent spending for the entire UN system (2013: 201-24). 
Tax evasion is another issue that harms national budgets, and thus the UN’s 
budget. In his book Options for Strengthening Global Tax Governance, Wolf-
gang Obenland calls on the UN to create new institutions for a platform for tax 
collaboration. He claims the world is losing hundreds of billions in tax reve-
nues annually because of a lack of international cooperation on tax issues 
which permits rich individuals and corporations to evade or avoid taxes in off-
shore tax havens or to demand preferential treatment in their host countries.  
8. Principles and criteria for the Responsibility to Protect  
It is time to complete what the United Nations neglected when it adopted the 
resolution on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN Summit in 2005. 
In itself, it was one of the most significant steps to place some limits on the 
abuse of national sovereignty. But the resolution omitted two of the most im-
portant elements of the report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, which had formulated the concept of R2P. These were 
the ‘Principles for Military Intervention’ that formed the criteria for when the 
Security Council needed to act, and, even more alarmingly, the whole chapter 
on ‘the Responsibility to Prevent’ which dealt with early warning, analysis of 
root causes, and the techniques of prevention.  
Without clear principles for intervention, the UN lacked the key instruments 
for deciding when to put R2P into action. Some wicked tongues claimed this 
was exactly the intention of some of the P5. If this was the case, it backfired. 
When the Security Council authorized the NATO intervention in Libya, the 
principles of ‘right intention’ and ‘proportional means’ and the operational 
‘principle of limitations’ were not on hand to guide the resolution. So, NATO 
went on to overthrow the government of Libya rather than just halting or avert-
ing human suffering. As we have discussed, this has been the basis of Russia 
and China vetoing UN intervention in Syria with the results we know.  
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The Commission put forth six principles that should be respected before the 
UN would decide on military intervention in the name of protecting civilian 
populations: 
 The ‘just cause threshold’ stated that there had to be actual or appre-
hended large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing. Human rights viola-
tions, the overthrow of democracy, or the desire to rescue one’s nation-
als were not sufficient cause. 
 The ‘right intention’ principle said the intervention must be to avert 
human suffering which could best be assured by ‘multilateral opera-
tions’ supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.  
 The ‘last resort’ principle stipulated that every form of negotiation and 
non-military forms of arm-twisting had to have been exhausted. 
 The principle of ‘proportional means’ asserted that the scale, duration 
and intensity of the intervention has to be the minimum necessary to 
achieve the human rights objectives. 
 The principle of ‘reasonable prospects’ insisted there has to be reason-
able chances of success and that action will not be worse than inaction. 
 The principle of ‘right authority’ stipulates that the Security Council is 
the appropriate body for authorizing interventions, but it should act 
promptly. In addition, the Permanent Five should not apply their veto 
power except when their vital state interests are involved. If the Secu-
rity Council fails to act in a reasonable time, an alternative option would 
be for the General Assembly to consider the matter in an Emergency 
Special Session under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure, or a regional 
organization might take action. 
In addition to these R2P principles for military intervention, the Commission 
also proposed ‘operational principles’ including clear objectives, unity of com-
mand, limitations in the application of force (“for the protection of the popula-
tion, not for defeat of the state”), adherence to international law, and coordina-
tion with humanitarian organizations. 
It is high time the UN gave due consideration to these criteria and principles 
for the use of R2P.  
9. The dispersion and control of global power 
Most experts agree that providing the United Nations with greater authority is 
a necessity. Thomas Weiss has courageously taken the bull by the horns in his 
recent publications. In his 2009 book, What’s Wrong with the United Nations 
and How to Fix It, he closes with the statement, “global government rather than 
global governance is a necessary part of future analytical perspectives.” (232). 
Latterly, in Governing the World, Weiss concludes, “We cannot continue to 
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ignore and rationalize the absence of overarching authority… Humanity col-
lectively is capable of better and more fairly governing the world.” (2014a: 
101). 
Similarly, French thinker Jacques Attali summed this view up well, stating 
“Neither an empire nor the marketplace will be able to master the immense 
problems which await the world. For that it will require a world government. 
This government will take a form fairly close to today’s federal regimes. ... 
Leaving to the national governments the responsibility for assuring the specific 
rights of each people and the protection of each culture, the global government 
will be in charge of the general interest of the planet and verifying that each 
nation respects the rights of each citizen of humanity.” (2011: 10). 
However, there is a widespread fear of a more authoritative global institu-
tion. Since the time of Immanuel Kant, the fear of a global leviathan has been 
one of the main arguments against giving enhanced authority to the United 
Nations or any other international institution. Unfortunately, even cosmopoli-
tans share this fear of big government—even if, aside from this, they are some 
of the strongest proponents of a reformed international system. It is reflected 
too in science fiction where we have the forces of the ‘Federation’ confronting 
those who want to install an evil and all-powerful oppressor. 
One of the most serious warnings came from Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore in their book Rules for the World. Their research focused on inter-
national organizations as bureaucracies. They point out that we have known 
ever since the work of the German sociologist, Max Weber, that bureaucracy 
is a distinctive social form with its own internal logic that generates specific 
behavioural tendencies which might be good or bad.  
According to the authors, bureaucracies can govern complex situations be-
cause of their rules-based, hierarchical, continuous, impersonal, and expert na-
ture. They control access to knowledge and their rational process makes them 
both proficient and efficient. Moreover, rules shape their activities, under-
standings, identity, and practices, along with how bureaucrats see the world 
and perceive social problems. Bureaucrats often make rules that prescribe the 
behaviour of others. When we think about the activities of the UN and the 
European Commission in this light, we can see why there has been growing 
reaction against often inappropriate rules applied by distant, impersonal, so-
called experts who are unaware of local conditions. This is, in large part, driv-
ing the rise of populism.  
The analysis by Barnett and Finnemore shows that there is a danger lurking 
in the nearly 300 international organizations that manage much of the world’s 
relationships. These organizations are lauded for advancing liberal goals such 
as human rights and economic growth, but behind this liberal façade is the 
reality that they do so using undemocratic procedures. They note how Weber 
recognized that “a bureaucratic world had its own perils, producing increas-
ingly powerful and autonomous bureaucrats who could be ‘spiritless’ and 
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driven by rules, who could apply those rules in ways that harmed the people 
whom they were expected to serve.” (2004: 172-73). 
We must take these warnings to heart as we contemplate ever-more power-
ful international organizations. There will be bureaucracies. Yet the well-
founded concerns some have of a ‘world government’ can be addressed by 
designing transformed global institutions based on the diffusion and control of 
power. As Trent began to elaborate in his Modernizing the United Nations Sys-
tem (2007: 237-40, 256-8), the best way to do this is by applying what democ-
racies have learnt about diffusing and controlling power during the past two 
hundred years. The techniques of federalism, subsidiarity, checks and bal-
ances, the division of powers, constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, rights and 
equality, liberalism, the rule of law, transparency and participation all help to 
decentralize power. To these can be added the more specific freedoms of 
speech, thought, association and the freedom of the press. While at first glance 
it may not appear so, the rising inequality between and within countries also 
has a tendency to reinforce established power. The wealthy often use their 
money to influence the political elite to develop policies that reinforce their 
wealth—creating a vicious circle. The control and dispersion of power must 
include the struggle against inequality.  
Democracy itself is at the core of the dispersal of power. Many associate 
democracy with electoral techniques, but it is far more complex than that. 
There is a long list of attributes often considered as the defining properties of 
democracy: free, fair and frequent elections, competition, participation, con-
testation, civil liberties, rights, freedom of expression, information and associ-
ation, rule of law, an effective state, accountability, equality, inclusive citizen-
ship, individual and minority rights, checks and balances, constitutional pro-
tection, and an active civil society (Geissel et al, 2016). Taken together, these 
properties ensure the circulation, distribution, division and control of power, a 
key objective of democracy. Two centuries ago, few gave the nascent democ-
racies much chance of persisting but because of the control of power we have 
come a long way. These techniques must be replicated in any proposals for the 
reform of global institutions. 
Another concept we may briefly expand upon is world federalism. Federal-
ism is a mechanism for creating rules and norms for the distribution of juris-
dictions and for a continuing, principled struggle for power. Under federalism, 
each political unit maintains its own ‘sovereign’ responsibilities and authori-
ties. In functioning federations with a constitutional enforcement and multiple 
political parties, there is no concentration of power. It is a fundamental tech-
nique for ensuring that the ‘centre’ does not accumulate too much ‘authority’. 
It is also what has allowed vast territories such as Canada and the United States 
to have one central government along with a great dispersal of power in the 
provinces/territories or states. Thus, world federalism would promote a contin-
uing balancing of power between states and a UN with more authority. So, we 
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can assume that if the UN had small but autonomous emergency peace forces 
and sources of funding, the member states would still have their national mili-
tary and police forces along with their own legislatures, judiciaries, public ser-
vices and everything else that goes to make sovereign nation-states. 
It should be added that so-called federalism is also the governing authority 
in countries such as Russia which are not exactly shining models of democracy 
and freedom. So, we must understand that federalism is a necessary technique 
for the dispersion of power but by no means a sufficient one for ensuring the 
decentralization and control of authority. 
Worrying about the techniques of global democracy and world federalism 
may not appear to be of immediate concern, but considering the multiple tech-
niques for the control and distribution of power in international organizations 
with more decision-making authority needs to be a priority. 
Sequencing reform proposals: where to start 
This list of possible transformations of the UN leads immediately to the ques-
tion: where to start? The next section, which will conclude this book, explores 
a possible path to mobilizing public and political support for reform so it is 
placed on the international agenda. Before getting to this, it is necessary to 
consider how to begin to sequence reform proposals.  
As we have said, it is not our intention to present a comprehensive program 
or step-by-step plan for reform. Rather, we wanted to demonstrate to the reader 
the extent of thinking that has already gone into UN reform and offer a panoply 
of proposals to work from. There are many more that have come from scholars, 
civil society and other UN experts. To sort or rank these issues is no small task. 
Developing a methodological approach is helpful. Some of the questions we 
need to ask when considering how to prioritize are: How urgently is the reform 
needed? How large is it in scale and scope? How easily could it be achieved? 
What would the cost be? How much time might it take? Is there/would there 
be political will? Is there/would there be public support? How developed are 
the proposals? Is there consensus among experts on what needs to be done? Is 
there a strong champion behind it?  
Joseph Schwartzberg (2013) gives considerable thought to the sequencing 
of UN reforms. He suggests that some changes are easier to get accepted, and 
that starting with these may open the door to further reforms. His preference 
would be to begin with: improving UN funding via a new assessment system; 
regaining legitimacy through weighted voting in all the UN organs (i.e., in-
cluding population and the economic contributions of states in their voting 
power rather than just one-state-one-vote); creating a Security Council that is 
universally representative with weighted regional voting and no veto; and es-
tablishing a standing, all volunteer UN peace force.  
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Few disagree that the UN must have its own sources of revenue, although 
many would prefer this to come from some form of taxation. Many also accept 
the need for some form of emergency peace force. Still, to get these two re-
sources, the organization must have legitimacy. This is why weighted voting 
is such an important concept. The European Union has used weighted voting 
and it appears to work quite well. In the context of global institutions, it could 
help address the issue of large countries fleeing the cacophony of the UN to-
wards the G7 and G20, in part to have their voices heard for their just value.  
Four steps toward the renaissance of the United Nations 
We have come to the conclusion that significant groundwork needs to be done 
before reforms will get under way. The whole issue of renewing the UN must 
be placed on the international agenda. This will take considerable leadership, 
education and communication. At the same time, overcoming established in-
terests and natural tendencies for maintaining the status quo will require im-
mense mobilization of popular support to create political will. In all likelihood, 
neither of these will be achieved without the efforts of a committed and sus-
tained movement pushing for change in this direction. This final section ex-
plores how we can bring about a civil society-led UN renaissance movement, 
and how strategic campaigning and advocacy can garner the public support 
and political will required for transformative change.  
1. Mapping actors and interests  
A useful first step in building a successful movement for reform, one that gar-
ners enough popular support to lead to political action, is having a deep under-
standing of the players involved. This is as true for allies as it is for opponents.  
Let’s begin by identifying potential allies to help spot opportunities for co-
alition building. A first step is seeking out civil society organizations that ad-
vocate for more effective global governance and share a common vision for a 
fairer and more legitimate UN. There are also a number of groupings of states 
that have voiced their concerns about the status quo and have called for reforms 
at the UN. Some of these governments may be willing to join efforts to collec-
tively push for action. There are also allies within the UN and other interna-
tional organizations who would like to see a more effective global institution. 
The core of change will come from a partnership of NGOs and like-minded 
states plus reformers in the UN. 
Not all those identified as allies will be focused on the same issue areas, nor 
will they necessarily agree on how to fix some of the problems. Issue-specific 
groups or committees can be formed to deal with this, as was done with the 
NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, discussed in Box 18.  
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Of course, not everyone favours a rational and progressive path to more 
workable global institutions. The most obvious opposition has come from 
member states themselves, particularly the most powerful ones. The recent 
wave of right-wing populist nationalism spreading across the West poses an 
additional threat to attempts at reform, as anti-globalism sentiment is paired 
with isolationist policies, trade barriers, and restrictions on the movement of 
people. Such politicians are responding to the understandable frustration that 
many have felt as a result of the gains from globalization not being equitably 
shared, and from the challenges that have come with greater regional and 
global integration. Yet rather than working to improve global institutions to 
better manage the harmful consequences of living in a globalized world, they 
are proposing to reverse the positive achievements of the past decades, includ-
ing gains made on climate change policies, trade, regionalism and multilater-
alism, diplomacy, efforts to improve taxation and environmental regulation, 
humanitarianism, multiculturalism, arms reductions and peace and security.  
Potential opposition could also come from all those who benefit from inter-
national conflict, inequality and general disarray. Among them are the wealth-
iest one per cent (who collectively control over fifty per cent of the world’s 
capital), who may not support a more regulated international regime that might, 
for example, combat offshore tax havens. There are also those who benefit 
economically from war and world military spending, which in 2016 was esti-
mated at $1.7 trillion. And of course there are the many perpetrators of conflict 
and war. 
Not all sets of actors will have clearly identifiable interests or roles. The 
media (which admittedly is a broad term that reflects a wide diversity of or-
ganizations, from CNN to DemocracyNow! to Breitbart News) has played dif-
ferent roles at different times. On the one hand, there was a great deal of bal-
anced, high quality reporting in the mainstream media around the time of the 
UN’s 70th anniversary that recognized the organization’s many achievements 
while also pointing to a need for change. At the same time, the media has often 
painted the UN in a negative light, as was the case in late 2016 when it failed 
to report on a successful example of countries uniting against Security Council 
inaction in Syria, opting instead to lambaste it over appointing Wonder Woman 
as honorary ambassador. Given the fairly direct link between media coverage 
and public opinion, this example may help explain why we have a relatively 
ill-informed and ambivalent public.  
There are additional actors and interests that should be mapped out too, 
many of which may not be clear allies or opponents. These include various 
parts of the UN system itself, regional groupings, faith-based organizations, 
multinational corporations and others that have been explored throughout this 
book.  
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2. Form smart coalitions of allies 
For many of the more substantial reforms ideas to materialize, a coalition, or 
perhaps multiple coalitions, will likely need to be formed to drive a wider 
movement. Among the attributes of these ‘smart coalitions’ comprising NGOs 
and some governments are: ideas, leadership, expertise, skilful negotiations, 
mobilization of networks and resources, concrete agendas, targets and indica-
tors, and tools to measure progress and respond to setbacks.  
In terms of personnel, they will require NGO experts, international practi-
tioners, communicators, academics, retired politicians and ideally some repre-
sentatives of willing governments. Often, complex reforms must be organized 
into manageable, issue-specific areas that can be overseen by actors with spe-
cific expertise.  
It is useful to learn from past examples of successful coalitions, such as the 
Coalition for an International Criminal Court, the International Coalition for 
R2P, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, and 1 for 7 Billion, all of 
which were mobilized by the World Federalist Movement. These campaigns 
came along when conditions in the General Assembly opened the door to cre-
ating momentum for the specific reform. NGOs and governments made use of 
each other’s relative advantages. NGOs applied their expertise, their ability to 
inform the media and frame the discourse, and their means for embarrassing 
dissenting governments through naming-and-shaming campaigns. Friendly 
governments used their money and resources to manage negotiations and de-
cision-making. Campaigns were based on a strong and simple normative mes-
sage. Instead of meeting opposition governments head-on (even the P5), the 
coalitions moved around them through the support of a strong majority of 
states. The Coalition for an International Criminal Court is explored in greater 
detail in Box 18.  
This idea is not new. The report by the Commission on Security, Justice and 
Governance (which we have analyzed at length in this chapter) called for a 
World Conference on Global Institutions that could “serve as a rallying point 
for smart coalitions and simultaneously generate political momentum for mul-
tiple, urgent global reforms” (109-110). The Commission proposes that the 
Conference take place in 2020 to mark the UN’s 75th anniversary, and that it 
be the culmination of a three-year multilateral negotiation process on global 
institutional reform. It highlighted the need to include diverse voices, including 
those at the most local level and those of under-represented groups. A number 
of scholars have also called for the creation of NGO coalitions for UN reform, 
including Trent in his 2007 book Modernizing the United Nations System. And 
indeed, a small number of NGOs are already working toward a 2020 UN re-
form congress. 
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Box 18: An NGO coalition that made history 
The Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) started in 
1995 when 25 civil society organizations joined together to advocate for 
a permanent international criminal court. By 1997, the Coalition had 
grown to 450 organizations. After three and a half years of intense advo-
cacy and deep collaboration among NGOs and between NGOs, govern-
ments and the UN Secretariat, governments held a diplomatic conference 
in Rome and 120 countries adopted the Rome Statute that established the 
ICC. The Coalition’s role was enormous. The information-sharing, legal 
analysis and advocacy that it undertook prior to and during the con-
ference is widely seen as having shaped the outcome. The Coalition is 
credited with a number of achievements, namely the independent nature 
of the Court and its prosecutor, strong victim and witness protection, and 
the inclusion of gender crimes.  
Coordinating the 200+ NGOs that attended the conference and 
achieving the results they did was a major feat. The Coalition included a 
steering committee of a dozen NGOs and regional caucuses that re-
presented all the world’s regions. Thematic caucuses were formed to 
delve into specific issues. These were: Women’s Initiative for Gender 
Justice, Victims’ Rights Working Group, Faith-Based Caucus, Universal 
Jurisdiction Caucus, Children’s Caucus, and Peace Caucus. The World 
Federalist Movement–Institute for Global Policy (WFM–IGP) and its 
Executive Director, William R. Pace, served as Secretariat for the entire 
network. 
Over 20 years later, the Coalition remains as active as ever. Its recent 
efforts in the fight for international justice have focused on encouraging 
African countries to stay with the ICC, restraining the Security Council 
veto (which prevented the investigation of crimes in Syria) and trying to 
halt government attempts to undermine the Court.  
Source: Coalition for the ICC website  
3. Marketing the UN and its achievements to build public support 
A main task of a smart coalition would be to generate public support for more 
authoritative global institutions through an effective marketing campaign. 
Those in other fields and industries seem to understand the importance of mar-
keting far better than those desiring UN reform. Consider the entrepreneurs 
who often spend more time on marketing than they do on inventing. Or the 
athletes who work as hard on their game plans as they do on muscle building. 
Or the movie moguls who put as much effort into attracting the public as they 
do in producing films. Those seeking reforms need to convey the UN’s im-
portance as well as its numerous achievements to an audience that remains 
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unconvinced that better global governance is even necessary. This will take 
considerable leadership, education and communication. It will also take out-
side specialists from diverse disciplines—like strategists, communicators, ed-
ucators, psychologists, behavioural economists, marketers, and mobilizers. 
Throughout this book we have observed our collective incapacity to develop 
policies and take actions to adequately deal with the challenges that go beyond 
the capacities of any single state. We explored how the UN needs new institu-
tional capacities to fill this void, and how a first step in this direction is to 
continue efforts to harness sovereignty. The question is, how precisely do we 
lead citizens to look favourably on more UN authority?  
Some useful insights were provided by Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt in his arti-
cle “Why do citizens want the UN to decide?”. He studied the fifth wave of the 
World Values Survey and drew several conclusions about public attitudes to-
ward giving more decisional authority to the UN. First, he found that, in gen-
eral, public support for UN authority is strongly linked to individuals believing 
that many problems we face are of a global scope and that nation-states are 
unable to handle them on their own. A second finding is that citizens of pow-
erful nations view UN authority more favourably because their power base al-
lows them to establish international institutional arrangements that preserve 
their interests. Finally, he found that the social legitimacy of world institutions 
is already in short supply. Global governance ‘architects’ or ‘entrepreneurs’—
those pushing for reform—should be aware that any attempt to simply ‘upload’ 
more authority to existing institutions is likely to lead to further backlash. 
Ecker-Ehrhardt concluded that institutional inequality and skewed distribution 
of power must be convincingly addressed before effective global institutions 
will be widely accepted.  
The takeaway from this research is that the more people think global chal-
lenges surpass the capacities of states, the more they will support global au-
thorities—except when they think present world institutions are skewed in the 
favour of major powers or special interests, in which case they will demand 
institutional reform that spreads power more equitably. Marketing and com-
munications efforts must address these lessons.  
Of course, engaging the public should not be the sole responsibility of a 
civil society-led coalition for reform. The UN itself needs to invest more time 
and energy in its public relations. This observation was made recently by Kevin 
Rudd, who recommended that the UN appoint a chief communications officer 
to “overhaul the UN’s communications structure and strategy in order to effec-
tively communicate its message to member states, the general public, the me-
dia, and the rest of the UN system” (2016: 62). His rationale is precisely what 
we have argued, “The UN has a good story to tell, but it is not telling it effec-
tively.” He proposed that the UN develop a new communications strategy that 
makes use of all media platforms in multiple languages, and uses plain lan-
guage rather than “UN dialect, which is incomprehensible to the rest of the 
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world.” While it is made clear that this would not be a substitute for the indi-
vidual communications efforts of UN agencies, Rudd stressed the need for a 
UN-wide approach to enhancing the integrity of its brand.  
4. Transforming public support into political action 
Can we assume that an effective social movement and a corresponding shift in 
public opinion will lead to political will for change? The short answer is yes. 
A wealth of research has been produced over the past decades on the impact of 
public opinion on public policy, and the evidence is compelling. In his book 
How Change Happens, Duncan Green, author and Head of Research at Oxfam, 
explores how activists have succeeded in achieving norm change (2016: 48-
56). While acknowledging that on rare occasions governments have been the 
source of new norms, he explains how many core features of the state, such as 
social protection, education and healthcare, were formulated by activists before 
being taken up by the state. This was similarly the case with securing various 
group rights, including women’s rights, children’s rights, disabled people’s 
rights and gay rights. The typical trajectory is that activists gain public support, 
and politicians respond to voters’ desires by implementing change.  
In their piece “When the pillars fall: how social movements can win more 
victories like same-sex marriage”, Mark and Paul Engler (2014) describe how 
the fight for marriage equality in the US was one where the consensus view 
held by the public changed, for a host of reasons, and politicians and legal 
rulings responded. “The change has come about through a mass withdrawal of 
cooperation from a past order based on prejudice. It could be felt well before 
it was written into law, and well before it was acknowledged by those leaders 
now struggling to show that they have ‘evolved’.” As recently as 1990, 75 per 
cent of Americans saw homosexuality as immoral. Politicians knew that ex-
pressing support for same-sex marriage could end their career. In 1996, the 
U.S. Senate passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which narrowly defined mar-
riage and denied federal benefits to same-sex couples, by an overwhelming 
majority. But the movement slowly chipped away at the “pillars of support”, 
the institutions of society that legitimized the status quo. In this case, denying 
equal rights to same-sex couples was a system propped up by the churches, the 
media, the business community, the military, the educational system, the 
courts, and so on.  
Gains were made on a range of fronts and public support for same-sex mar-
riage rose steadily until it reached a tipping point—in 2011, polls showed it to 
be more than 50 per cent for the first time in history. The tide of public opinion 
had turned, and legal and political victories came in rapid succession. In 2012, 
President Obama stated that he had changed his position on the issue, as did 
Bill Clinton who had led the Defense of Marriage Act just a decade and a half 
earlier. In a single week in April 2013 six U.S. Senators came out in support 
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for marriage equality. This example presents an important lesson for other so-
cial movements: “Rather than being based on calculating realism—a shrewd 
assessment of what was attainable in the current political climate—the drive 
for marriage equality drew on a transformational vision.” (Engler and Engler, 
2014).  
Of course, this case is from the US, which has strong democratic institu-
tions. To what extent does the assumption that public opinion leads to political 
change hold in places with undemocratic regimes? After all, demands are fil-
tered through domestic political institutions and the sensitivity of political 
elites to the demands of voters varies greatly. Yet the “pillars of support” no-
tion is every bit as applicable. If civil servants, the military, merchants and all 
others effectively propping up a regime were to suddenly refuse to cooperate, 
they could bring down even the most authoritarian dictatorship. By removing 
enough pillars, the temple will topple and the tyrant will tumble (ibid).  
It should be clear from this example and others explored in this book that 
social movements matter. In many cases, they are the single most important 
factor leading to change. Take for example the research conducted by Laurel 
Weldon and Mala Htun on what factors drive change in government policies 
on violence against women around the globe, which Green presents in his book 
(2016: 55-56). Gathering data from 70 countries over four decades on various 
forms of state action (legal and administrative reforms, prevention measures, 
training, etc.) and other factors such as women legislators, level of economic 
development, political regime. They concluded that, when all else is equal, it 
was the presence of strong feminist movements that made the single largest 
impact on whether a country had comprehensive policies addressing violence 
against women or not. Public opinion and political pressure can and do lead to 
political action.  
To summarize, we have now seen from domestic and international politics 
that creating significant political change has a number of components. In-
formed citizens need to recognize a massive public problem, in this case that 
existing international organizations do not have the capacity to surmount 
global problems. Activists need to rally around a transformational vision, 
likely in partnership with politicians and other allies. A movement for reform 
needs to be launched—ideally one that seeks to undermine the pillars of sup-
port for maintaining the status quo. Broad public support needs to be gained, 
in order to influence the decision-making of elites. 
Concluding remarks 
History suggests that a reform movement will most likely start when a small 
number of like-minded states and numerous civil society organizations with 
strong leadership and communications skills can mobilize widespread and sus-
tained support for a UN with adequate authority. This should be an immediate 
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focus of activists concerned with our current collective inability to govern the 
world.  
It is worth reminding ourselves that if nationalist and isolationist politics 
continue to gain traction, all these potential reforms may be cast aside—for the 
moment. If they are, they will come back into their own as ever more citizens 
recognize that the renaissance of world institutions is required to deal with 
global issues. It may also result in their return to the spotlight, with the reform 
agenda being seen as more urgent than ever. The UN and the League were 
founded both on cumulative historical developments and on the impetus com-
ing from the scourge of world wars. But with modern weapons, we likely could 
not survive another world clash. We must hope that the fear of global catastro-
phes will force world leaders to choose reform over conflict or chaos. The cri-
sis of multilateralism may just shed enough light on what we risk losing to 
bring the doubters and believers together to revitalize the UN. 
“You may never know what results come of your actions but if you do nothing there 
will be no results” Mahatma Gandhi  
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